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DEDICATION

To a friendship of goodwill between people, all the qualities…belong in virtue of the
nature of the friends themselves; for in the case of this kind of friendship the other
qualities also are alike in both friends[…] Love and friendship therefore are found most
and in their best form between such people.
But it is natural that such friendships should be infrequent; for such people are rare.
Further, such friendship requires time and familiarity; as the proverb says, people can’t
know each other until they have “eaten salt together;” nor can they admit each other to
friendship or be friends till each has been found lovable and been trusted by each. […]
And such a friendship is, as might be expected, permanent, since there meet in it all the
qualities that friends should have. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics VIII 4)

I dedicate this dissertation to my friend, Erik Kleiber (1985- 2017). I wish I could have
shared this with you. I miss you always.
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ABSTRACT

In this dissertation I set out to address the “scope problem” in Nietzsche scholarship. In
the secondary literature, the scope problem is characterized as a problem for Nietzsche, who
seems deeply skeptical about nearly every item of his inherited western metaphysical toolkit. If
his skepticism about western metaphysics penetrates all dimensions of his thought, how can he
motivate a reader to also reject western metaphysics without himself committing to some of it? I
stipulate that answering the scope problem means explicating what Nietzsche views as the
general source of normativity—it is there that we can understand the resources Nietzsche is
committing himself to, and the ones he rejects. I examine Leiter’s solution to this problem, which
assigns science as the general source of normativity. However, Leiter’s solution depends on
textual pedigree that I argue is inconsistent with the texts themselves. I argue that the normativity
of science, instead of being the source of general normativity, represents an order of normativity
for Nietzsche—but it is not ordered generally. I look to GS 341 to analyze “eternal recurrence,”
and argue that an expression of Nietzsche’s “higher morality” can be located in the passage.
Higher morality, I argue, places the general source of normativity in the value the reader places
on her life. This account of higher morality solves the scope problem by narrowing it to readers
who already accept or embrace the challenge of placing a level of value on their life
commensurate with eternal recurrence.

iii

INTRODUCTION

In some remote corner of the universe, poured out and glittering in innumerable solar systems,
there once was a star on which clever animals invented knowledge. That was the highest and
most mendacious minute of "world history"—yet only a minute. After nature had drawn a few
breaths the star grew cold, and the clever animals had to die. (TL 1)

In “Truth and Lies in the Extra Moral Sense,” Nietzsche characterizes humanity and
human knowledge in a story, I take to circumscribe the kinds of claims, and their attendant
problems, he tends to make throughout his active and productive intellectual life. On what I think
is an uncontroversial gloss of the passage quoted above, Nietzsche can be read as making at least
three claims. They are:
TLa. Earth occupies a “remote corner of the universe” amongst “innumerable solar
systems” rather than at its center;
TLb. Knowledge is a human invention, opposed to a discovery or a revelation
TLc. The significance of knowledge and its inventors has been falsely inflated in
discussions about the place of humanity in the context of history
TLd. Humans, despite claims to the contrary, are mortal.1

I will return to how these clams are vindicated in the orders of Nietzsche’s normativity in the
conclusion.

1

1

Interpreted as a set of claims that contradict central (or former) dogmas of
Christianity, there arises a problem. First, consider TLa. If our miniscule place in the
solar system is, on this reading, supposed to contradict the idea that it is our centrality in
the universe that makes humanity and human knowledge valuable, what value remains
for recommending to people that this is a story that is in their interest to read? In other
words, if what makes humanity and human knowledge important relies on the necessary
and false condition that humans live in a place intentionally designed to be the center of
the universe, how can a story like this have any value?
Consider TLb. If the value of knowledge relies on the necessary and false condition that
it is essentially a discovery or a revelation and not a creation, how can this passage be imbued
with value sufficient to motivate someone to read the passage and believe its claims to be true?
In other words, if knowledge derives its normative authority from the necessary condition that its
nature be one of discovery or revelation, and this condition turns out to be false, how can
knowledge bear sufficient normative authority for a reader to believe this claim to be true?
Last, consider TLc. If the significance of knowledge and its inventors have been falsely
inflated in discussions about the place of humanity in the context of history is necessary for
humanity and human knowledge to have value, how can there be any value important enough to
motivate someone to read this passage and believe that TLc is true? In other words, if it’s false
that human knowledge and its inventors have any significance in the context of the history of the
universe, why should Nietzsche believe anyone has any reason to pick up his books and read
them—to believe TLa—d are true?
These problems touch on what contemporary Nietzsche scholars call the “scope
problem.” The scope problem is the problem concerning Nietzsche’s ability to make any
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normative recommendations to any actual or potential readers, despite casting off much the
normative authority of traditional Western values and assumptions. This problem bears itself not
in the local area of the notebook fragment from 1878’s short and unpublished essay TL. The
scope problem is a more global problem, and its solution (or lack thereof) spans all of
Nietzsche’s published, and in many cases his unpublished, works. Because scholars are divided
about how to rank the importance of these texts in the pursuit of deciphering some semblance of
unity throughout them, there have emerged camps whose interpretation of the scope problem
depend in part on which groups of text they focus on.
There have been a number of ways commentators address the scope problem—Jessica
Berry, for instance, reads Nietzsche on the model of Pyrrhonian skepticism, and doesn’t see the
need for him to solve it at all. Nietzsche’s work, on her account, isn’t about making cases at all,
and so he doesn’t need a solution to the scope problem. There are other commentators, like
Nadeem Hussain (2013) and Bernard Reginster (2006), who do read Nietzsche as making a
positive case for something to solve the scope problem—they try to locate the metaethical
position of non-cognitivist view of moral discourse and that he subscribes to a version of
fictionalism; Clark & Dudrick (2016) angle for non-cognitivism too, but land on attributing to
Nietzsche a version of Gibbard’s norm expressivism.
I am relatively unmoved by the extant solutions (or the lack thereof) to the scope
problem. I am going to try to approach the scope problem from a slightly different position than
the framework shared among the aforementioned accounts—I start from the perspective of
normativity. Normativity, broadly speaking, concerns correct-making or legitimacy-conferring
properties on actions, persons and practices. Taking a big-picture view, as I do in this dissertation
and others who have written on Nietzsche with the phenomenon of normativity in view, can help
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put the most general emphases of Nietzsche’s thought into clear view without getting lost in the
woods of squaring some bit of exegesis with another.2
For the purposes of this work, let general normative authority be defined as follows:
Some entity e or process p has general normative authority iff e or p provides a good or adequate
or legitimate justification for some value or some belief.3 General normative authority shapes the
way commentators interpret possible answers to the scope problem, because a theory (or lack
thereof) of general normative authority can be a source for characterizing the reason-giving
activity Nietzsche appears to engage in in his published works.
Instead of taking various attempts at the scope problem and dealing with them in a
piecemeal fashion, I’m going to look at a more-or-less standard view that presupposes a general
normative authority in science. I focus primarily on Leiter’s influential work on Nietzsche—he
argues that Nietzsche has partial resources to make normative recommendations to some actual
and potential readers. I will show that his account hinges on attributing to Nietzsche the view
that science bears general normative authority. But in order to make this attribution, Leiter needs
to rely on Clark’s “developmental hypothesis,” which maintains that Nietzsche’s intellectual life
evolved from his early to late works; specifically, in his earlier works, Nietzsche accepts
metaphysical correspondence theory, which holds that in order for any statement to be true it
needs to correspond to the way things really are in themselves. As his work evolves, the story

2

I return to my reasoning in abandoning the framework of the discourse presupposed by mostly all these
accounts in the conclusion of this dissertation. Suffice it to say for now that they all tend to make the case
that Nietzsche is best read as an X, where “x” is some contemporary theory of meta or normative ethics in
the Anglo-American tradition, and “x” entails the falsity of at least one other account. For instance, if
Nietzsche refrains from advancing claims in the Pyrrhonian skeptical tradition, as Berry claims, then
Leiter’s claim that Nietzsche is anti-realist about moral claims is false. I am dubious about this kind of
discourse.
3
The objects over which general normative authority range expand beyond the cognitive and conative. I
address this in chapter 3.
4

goes, Nietzsche abandons cognitive commitments to the thing-in-itself and in so doing, his later
works show a wholesale acceptance of ordinary empirical truths.
The developmental hypothesis is no good—the textual pedigree just isn’t there. There is,
as Anderson (1997) notes, just too much of the “falsification thesis”—the thesis that human
minds falsify reality—in Nietzsche’s later works to affirm the developmental hypothesis. In
chapter two, I argue that the developmental hypothesis is a textually inadequate source for
attributing to Nietzsche the view that science bears normative authority. I defend Acompora’s
(2006) interpretation of TI III against objections from Leiter, and I draw attention to passages in
which Nietzsche makes reference to “Copernicus” in a unified and thematic way across his life
as a thinker which undermines the claim that Nietzsche imbues science with general normative
authority.
And yet, there is something unsettling about completely denying science any normative
authority. There has to be recognition in Nietzsche’s published works that the results of
empirical inquiry are cognitively superior to those of an arm-chair metaphysician like Kant.
Nietzsche constantly lauds the senses, complains about their mistreatment in the history of the
west, and uses metaphor to constantly underscore their importance by, instead of advancing a
belief as false, he talks about it being “seasoned with one too many grains of salt” (BGE 198).
I propose, therefore, that in re-thinking Nietzschean normativity that we posit orders of
normativity; instead of normativity being a singular term referring to entities or processes that get
justifying beliefs and values off the ground, there will be orders, or degrees, or normativity. In
this dissertation I want to parse out two orders on the scale of importance4 with one having an
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There are likely many more, given the number of contexts that emerge in which we find norms bearing
force on our motivations, evaluative perceptions, values, etc. The moral psychological inventory is broad,
for Nietzsche. Schacht refers instead to this broad context as one’s sensibility. I explore this in chapter 3.
5

ordering of generality, which I’ve already indicated is what we’re after here. But an order of
normativity with less importance but still imbued with some normative authority emerges. I
argue in introducing chapter three that science is afforded this latter degree of normative
authority. I do so on the grounds to explain why Nietzsche contradicts himself on the possibility
of causality in TI. This explanation makes my account cognitively superior than Acampora’s or
Leiter’s take on that textual context because it fully engages with the fact that Nietzsche tells you
one of the goals he has in teaching you anything in the section preceding TI VI is that
understanding him there will “provoke contradiction” (TI III). I claim that Nietzsche
intentionally undermines pieces of genuine theoretical knowledge by contradicting those pieces
of genuine knowledge with an aim of showing the normative limitations that that knowledge can
bring to agency. It must be the domain of the practical in which we find the source of general
normative authority.
In chapter three, then, I first look at recovering a workable framework into which
naturalism in normativity can fit, but figuring in the reductive way Leiter et. al would have it. I
look at Schacht’s (2013) naturalist conception of Nietzsche’s normativity, which emphasizes
forms of life and sensibilities (beliefs and values and perceptions and motivations and reasons
and desires…) as the framework that normativity occupies. Schacht stresses mechanisms for
internalizing norms we can regard as having authority over and within the context of our
sensibilities for understanding much of contingent and culturally scripted and structured content
our normative lives have built into them.
I argue that Schacht finally brings us on the right track, but he leaves discussions
unfinished in which he would account for the first personal relation to norms. GS 341 is a

Accordingly, general normative authority will evolve as a concept to answer to the scope of contents that
sensibility brings to agency.
6

passage I think is pivotal to understanding Nietzsche’s moral thinking, and so I turn to the
concept of eternal recurrence in Nietzsche’s published works as the starting ground for a
Nietzschean picture of general normative authority that can survive the moral reflection I think is
nascent in the passage. Here, properly construed, the reader’s life itself is the bearer of general
normativity. Since Nietzsche imbues the concept of the reader’s life itself as an entity and
process which counts as a justifier against deficient, or nihilistic, conceptions of life, I think
eternal recurrence is a natural starting place for thinking about this question on Nietzsche’s own
terms. I survey some of the more cited takes on the normative significance of eternal recurrence,
specifically, Soll and Clark. Soll’s take is important because his objections to the coherence of
eternal recurrence threaten to undermine any of the purported higher moral significance I want to
imbue it with.
Clark has a novel solution to Soll’s worries, but I still think that Soll has missed the point
of eternal recurrence in two ways. The first is that he treats the value of life from an inter-cycle
perspective, where the content of value in someone’s life exists specifically in the value it can
bring in aggregate over the course of infinite lives with identical content. Soll thinks the value of
an inter-cycle life hinges on the hedonic perspective I bring to evaluating it—a life that recurs
eternally should matter to me just in case I can regard the person re-living it as me, and that I can
bring that me as much pleasure and as little pain as possible. I think the inter-cycle hedonic
position of evaluation misses the first-personal intra-cycle position of evaluation—the fact that
this thought experiment is being brought to bear on the reader’s life in this moment. I argue that
an adequate account of 341 needs to make this first-personal encounter normatively salient for
the reader, such that she can consider the value of her own life as a general source of
normativity.

7

But our second problem looms large, and it is that seldom does any scholar take pains to
notice that in 341 Nietzsche is addressing “you”, not “your drive to life,” or “your affects.” He is
addressing a unified you reading the passage. I have found Anderson (2013) to be an important
and persuasive account of what this Nietzschean you could be. Anderson (2013) gives an account
of a Nietzschean minimal self that doesn’t amount to the metaphysical implausibility of a
transcendental ego, but nor does it concede to the Williams (1995) program of deflating every
item of moral psychology that we have inherited from the Kantian and post-Kantian tradition.
Anderson focuses on the capacity to “stand back” from one’s cross-hatch drive/affect network
and assess some given drive or affect’s content. These form two sides of a minimal self, which is
constituted by the cross-hatch drive/affect network and couldn’t be what it is without that
network, but which is also at the same time making itself positionally related to the contents of
that network such that evaluation of any given element of it, when the whole minimal self is in
an adequate mood to get a glimpse of the whole cross-hatch drive/affect network.
I then conclude chapter 3 with an articulation of what I think counts as a “higher’ non“Morality in the Pejorative Sense” (Leiter 2002) version of Nietzschean morality presented in the
eternal recurrence thought experiment. If you can endorse your life on reflection with the whole
self evoked by the mood of loneliest loneliness as well as a prompt to reflect on affect in that
intentional context, then you satisfy the demands of a higher morality. In so doing, your life is
revealed as the general source of naturalist normativity for Nietzsche.
I conclude the dissertation with some reflection on the state of argument in the secondary
literature. I think there are some rare cases in which scholars approach the text with an eye to
inhabiting the history out of which it was written, as well as the nuances and subtleties that
usually overflowing in richness in the textual context to which they answer. But too often is it the
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case, with Hussain (2013), that scholars adopt a hermeneutics of “hypercharity,” such that belief
that p entails that Nietzsche believes p. I give some examples of shortcoming that I find puzzling,
but emphasize that across the dissertation I have tried to stay anchored in the textual context in
which these rich and subtle cues lie in abundance as clues for understanding what’s going on.
Even though I disagree with Clark, both on the position she brings to “charity” in interpretation,
as well as some of the results of adopting that position throughout the dissertation, I think she
models the kind of engagement we Nietzsche scholars should aim at living up to. I finish by
solving the scope problem that I laid out in this introduction, and show that the resources that lie
nascent in TL itself are present and in full force by the end of Nietzsche’s active intellectual
life—the value of your life as the general source of normativity is imbued in the spirit of
Nietzsche’s published works from start to finish.

9

CHAPTER ONE:
LEITER, AGENCY AND THE GENERAL NORMATIVE AUTHORITY OF SCIENCE

1.1 Introduction
Leiter thinks he has an answer to the scope problem: Nietzsche himself has no resources,
conceptual or otherwise, at hand to persuade or convince the reader of anything, and so does
nothing other than present the reader with his idiosyncratic expressions of value. In other words,
if Nietzsche thought that there was something his reader ought to believe or value, then he would
have to account for the nature of this recommendation; but Nietzsche doesn’t think accounts for
this sort of recommendation ever succeed, because there are no objective facts about value. To
see why Leiter thinks the view that there are no objective facts about value is attributable to
Nietzsche, I will explicate Leiter’s account of Nietzsche’s critique of morality. In doing so, I will
focus on Leiter’s account of Nietzsche’s charge that in the tradition of the western metaphysical
interpretation of morality, morality carries with it false and in some cases harmful
presuppositions in its conception of moral agency.
I will then turn my focus to what Leiter must presuppose in his account of Nietzsche’s
assessment of morality’s false and sometimes harmful presuppositions. In other words: in virtue
of what being the case does it follow that morality carries with it false and sometimes harmful
presuppositions? According to Leiter,
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Nietzsche thinks the “truths” he is pursuing about morality are, in fact, advantageous for
life, since, of course, he equates “life” in this regard with the flourishing of the highest
human beings. (Leiter 2002 280)
It’s here that we can start to appreciate the role that scientific truth plays in Leiter’s account of
Nietzsche’s critique of the moral interpretation of agency. The truths Nietzsche is pursuing about
morality, on Leiter’s account of Nietzsche, are grounded in empirically discernable facts (actual
or speculative/possible) about agency and those facts are grounded in the presence or absence of
flourishing for some human person.
For Leiter’s Nietzsche, science is the bearer of general normative authority. Recall my
stipulated definition of general normative authority:
Some entity e or process p has general normative authority iff e or p provides a good or
adequate or legitimate justification for some value or some belief.
In the introduction, I claimed that e or p (usually both) provide a general theory of the
source of normative authority for the beliefs or values someone holds—they confer correctmaking properties over the domain of belief and value. General normative authority is a
legitimate justifier over the domain of belief or value, and this authority confers itself across all
contexts of belief and value. We can consider cases of e or p that confer normative authority but
lack generality. Take for example e “law enforcement,” and the p “arresting somebody for
breaking the law.” Someone may explicitly recognize that doing something might subject
themselves to being p, which they by and large recognize as having normative authority over
how they act in the context of public behavior. However, law enforcement isn’t usually an entity
that people regard as having general normative authority—we can see this in cases of
disobedience.

11

What would count as an entity for someone which has completely general normative
authority? Take Christianity. Some entity “God” has general normative authority because God
supplies a general justification for belief about worldly phenomena, which of it to avoid, etc.
This is why some have argued that human law reflect divine law, and when that divine law is
violated, we can conclude that the attendant human law is unjust. This explains why in Letter
from Birmingham Jail, Martin Luther King Jr. remarks on the distinction between just laws and
unjust laws, appealing to “God” as having more general normative authority than certain edicts
of law enforcement.
For Leiter however, and for his Nietzsche, the entity that has general normative authority
for belief is scientific truth, and the process for forming true beliefs that has general normative
authority are those that take place in natural science. Take the following as an example:
Scientists, atheists, and even Antichrists and immoralists like Nietzsche…are all able to
tear down God, religions, and morality, as well as plumb the depths of reality itself in
pursuit of scientific knowledge. (Leiter 2002 266 my emphasis)
It is scientific truth, on Leiter’s reading, that serves as the basis of justification for
Nietzsche’s claims about what errors morality makes in its assessment of human agency. If, on
Leiter’s account, Nietzsche can make any justified claims about the false and sometimes harmful
presuppositions morality commits in its interpretation of agency, it then follows that Leiter’s
reading of Nietzsche must be capable of supplying an account of what enables Nietzsche to say
anything true about what makes the western tradition’s interpretation of agency “errant,” or to
say anything true about what morality has falsely posited about motivation and other facets of
agency. And his Nietzsche is able to do exactly this—but only if Nietzsche affords scientific truth
general normative authority. Nietzsche does not. So, I will argue in chapter two that Leiter’s
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account of Nietzsche on scientific truth is textually inconsistent with a variety of passages that
express doubt about whether scientific truth can amount to what Leiter thinks it can for
Nietzsche. Therefore, it follows that there is reason to believe Leiter’s account of Nietzsche’s
critique of agency is either incomplete or unsound.
I will explicate in 1.2 what Leiter claims is Nietzsche’s critique of morality as it is
construed in the tradition of western metaphysics. I will explicate in part 1.3 what Leiter thinks
the role of science is in executing this critique. Finally, carving out the appropriate domain of
texts is a live controversy in Nietzsche scholarship. Leiter subscribes to Maudemarie Clark’s
“developmental hypothesis,” which holds that Nietzsche’s thinking about the concept of truth
evolves over his life as a thinker. Clark argues that in attributing predicates to “Nietzsche,” one
must restrict the domain of associated texts with his later, and therefore more mature, thinking
about truth.5

1.2 Leiter: Nietzsche Against Morality
Nietzsche frequently refers to himself as an immoralist in his published works, often
offering up a self-description in somewhat dramatic terms:
I am by far the most terrible human being that has existed so far; this does not preclude
the possibility that I shall be the most beneficial. I know the pleasure in destroying to a
degree that accords with my powers to destroy—in both respects I obey my Dionysian
nature which does not know how to separate doing No from saying Yes. I am the first
immoralist: that makes me the annihilator par excellence. (EH D II)

5

Specifically, the aim is to talk about what an evolved Nietzsche thinks about truth in the later works. She
replicates this desiderata in attempting to construct a developmental hypothesis about Nietzsche’s
development in thinking about metaethics. See Clark, Maudemarie & David Dudrick (2015).
13

With his “immoralism,” Nietzsche aims to “destroy,” or provide a critique of, in all essentials,
“modernity” (EH BGE II). If Nietzsche is going to succeed at critiquing at least the moral
component of modernity, one wonders with what resources Nietzsche could possibly appeal to or
make use of in order to ground his critique. In other words, to what extent, if any, does
Nietzsche’s immoralism make use of traditional modern cognitive resources, such as moral facts,
to make his critique successful in the mind of his imagined reader.
Leiter considers Nietzsche’s immoralism to be an outgrowth of his attack specifically on
morality. A natural question arises here—what does Nietzsche mean when he refers to morality?
Because Nietzsche never gives an exhaustive definition of it or the values it and only it contains,
instead choosing to attack various aspects or appearances of it, commentators are divided about
whether or not Nietzsche has an adequate target in view in his various attacks on morality.6
There is a further complication. Nietzsche appears to conceptualize a form of morality
that is distinct from the form of morality he has inherited—one that he appears to endorse!
Consider a passage from the preface of Daybreak:
[this book] does in fact exhibit a contradiction and is not afraid of it: in this book faith in
morality is withdrawn—but why? Out of morality! Or what else should we call that
which informs it and us? … there is no doubt that a 'thou shalt' still speaks to us too, that
we too still obey a stern law set over us, and this is the last moral law which can make
itself audible even to us…
Nietzsche here draws attention to the fact that it is with fundamentally moral resources that an
attack on morality can be sustained. These resources have the same kind of intellectual force that
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See for example Foot (1973).
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‘thou shalt’ plays in Christian and Kantian versions of moral theory. The “moral law” that
Nietzsche is referring to, however, remains cryptically unexplained in this textual context.
Adding a bit of clarity to his thinking on the differences between the morality he has in
mind and the morality he attacks arrives in a passage years later after the publication of D in
BGE. There, Nietzsche claims that “morality of today,” the character of morality as he
encounters it is a deficient mode of morality:
Morality is in Europe today herd-animal morality—that is to say, as we understand the
thing, only one kind of human morality beside which, before which, after which many
other, above all, higher moralities are possible, or ought to be possible. (BGE 125)
From this passage we can discern that the morality Nietzsche criticizes, apart from having the
property of being “herd animal,” is the morality of “today” “in Europe” “as we understand the
thing” (ibid). So it appears that what Nietzsche is attacking is the system of moral values
circumscribed by his encounter with them. That allows an interpretation of one set of values
Nietzsche problematizes. But we know that Nietzsche thinks that either higher moralities are
possible, or at any rate they should be. So we know Nietzsche believes at least one moral
statement is true—that a different7 set of moral values from the lower values of the herd-animal
morality should be possible.8
Nietzsche unsurprisingly never gives any systematic explication of what content those
values would have. Nietzsche’s published works often avoid, at least in presentation, systematic

“different” here is left intentionally vague, since it will turn out that some of the “lower” values will land
in the synthesis of some of Nietzsche’s own proposal for the creation of the highest values he thinks exist
for humans.
8
There are several other passages (especially from the so-called “mature” work of Nietzsche) in which he
emphasizes a distinction between properties deficient moralities contain, and properties the higher
morality should have. My purpose here is to introduce the textual basis for the distinction between
moralities, and since Leiter ultimately presents a deflationary account of what this higher morality
amounts to, further discussion of the substance of the distinction will come in chapter three.
7
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exhibition in the way other philosophers present their own views. This is by design—Nietzsche
tends to utilize esoteric presentation of his views over exoteric on the grounds that he wants the
meaning of his work to be intelligible to the few who work hard enough to find it.9 So, in what
follows, I’ll review Leiter’s account of what he takes Nietzsche to mean when he distinguishes
between the “lower” moral values and the “higher” moral values. I will focus on one case of
value that Leiter characterizes as a problem for Nietzsche, which he dubs “similarity.”
To start, Leiter—in agreement with my analysis thus far—calls for a distinction between
the moral values Nietzsche endorses and those which frequently function as objects of his
sustained attack on moral values. These latter values represent what Leiter calls morality in the
pejorative sense (MPS).10 So the goal is to characterize what counts as an MPS. Leiter sums up
the secondary literature as having had three plausible approaches to defining MPS: the
“Catalogue Approach” gives a laundry list of the normative demands of MPS; the “Universality
Approach” focuses on the relation between MPS and “the view that one moral code ought to
apply to all”; the “Presuppositions Approach” focuses on the relation between MPS and its
“distinctive empirical and metaphysical presuppositions” (Leiter 2002 74-5).11
Leiter’s own schematic for understanding MPS “combines insights” and “subsumes
pertinent parts” of these three approaches (Leiter 2002 77). For any system of values and beliefs
S1, on Leiter’s read, S1 is an MPS when S1

9

See Clark (1990).
Leiter agrees with my remarks about regarding the “morality of today,” claiming that Nietzsche neither
needs to construct an “essential” definition of morality in order to criticize it as such. Instead, MPS is
hence a “heuristic” category both for Nietzsche in the late 19th century, and for his reader.
11
I omit the “Origins Approach,” since Leiter presents reasons for rejecting this approach in a different
textual context in the book. His reasons for rejecting it, and omitting it from his own characterization of
MPS are therefore irrelevant to the context here, since his account of MPS is not informed by it.
10
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1 presupposes three particular descriptive claims about the nature of human agents
pertaining to free will, the transparency of the self, and the essential similarity of all
people (“the Descriptive component”); and/or
2 embraces norms that harm the “highest” men while benefitting the “lowest” (“the
Normative component”) (Leiter 2002 78)
The three theses that comprise the descriptive component—respectively, the theses of “Free
Will, “Transparency of the Self” and “Similarity” (Leiter 2002 80)—are theories that make MPS
intelligible. In other words, without them, the moral judgments that constitute the morally
normative component of MPS are unintelligible.
For the purposes of brevity, I’ll set aside the other two and focus more closely on
“similarity” so we can get to the heart of Leiter’s account. In BGE 198, Nietzsche claims that
all these moralities [of today]…[are] unreasonable in form—because they address
themselves to ‘all,’ because they generalize where generalization is impermissible. All of
them speak unconditionally, take themselves for unconditional, all of them flavored with
more than one grain of salt and tolerable only—at times even seductive—when they
begin to smell over-spiced and dangerous, especially of “the other world.” All of it is,
measured intellectually, worth very little and not by a long shot “science,” much less
“wisdom,” but rather, to say it once more, three times more, prudence, prudence,
prudence, mixed with stupidity, stupidity, stupidity. (BGE 198)
Leiter infers from this passage that, for Nietzsche,
the general applicability of MPS is predicated on an assumption about similarity among
persons and their interests: people are essentially similar, and so the MPS that is good for
one will be good for all. It is this assumption Nietzsche denies. (Leiter 2002 104)
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I think Leiter’s read here is fairly straightforward: because morality addresses itself indifferently
to each person and in the exact same way and because it does so “unconditionally,” and so forth,
we can bundle these together can say in general that Nietzsche objects to the assumption in MPS
that everyone is essentially similar.
There will be more here to talk about with respect to ironing out the argument for
Nietzschean normativity in chapter three, but BGE 198 warrants a closer look before pressing on.
There is, I think, some structure in the passage that Leiter’s account ignores. Let’s grant Leiter
that Nietzsche’s target in BGE 198 is MPS. I think it’s fair to say that MPS and “unreasonable
forms of morality” can be regarded as one and the same in this textual context. Since Nietzsche
likes to blend cognitive and non-cognitive forms of persuasion, we have a glimpse of some
straightforward argumentation, so it will be worthwhile to distill it. So let the following be our
conclusion:
C. MPS is unreasonable in form.
Nietzsche starts the passage off with cognitive-enough-sounding language to be
enumerating premises, but, in typical form, obfuscates by sliding into claiming that MPS is like
over-seasoned food, and concludes with an ad hominem attack. Nevertheless, I think the
properties of MPS in BGE 198 read like conjunctions which in turn look like reasons for
advancing the conclusion that MPS is unreasonable in form.
all these moralities [of today]…[are] unreasonable in form—because they address themselves to
‘all,’ because they generalize where generalization is impermissible—
The italicized portion of our passage are two reasons for the conclusion, so we have:
P1. MPS addresses itself to all
P2. MPS generalizes where generalization is impermissible.
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Now, add:
All of them speak unconditionally, take themselves for unconditional,
And we get
P3. MPS speaks unconditionally
P4. MPS takes itself as unconditional
We have left:
all of them flavored with more than one grain of salt and tolerable only—at times even
seductive—when they begin to smell over-spiced and dangerous, especially of “the other world.”
All of it is, measured intellectually, worth very little and not by a long shot “science,” much less
“wisdom,” but rather, to say it once more, three times more, prudence, prudence, prudence,
mixed with stupidity, stupidity, stupidity.
MPS here is “flavored” with “more than one grain of salt.” This smacks of a protoobservation consistent with Nietzsche’s so-called doctrine of perspectivism, published the
following year in GM III. To try to do much more with an interpretation of Nietzsche’s
perspectivism would take us too far off course, but we can say briefly that any account of
morality as fundamentally aperspectival—that there be, for instance, moral facts whose
grounding comes from “a view from nowhere”—can be a reason for thinking this version of
morality is “bad form.”
P5. MPS is aperspectival in nature.
I consider being flavored with more than one grain of salt, or especially over seasoned to
be a metaphor for a morality that accounts for the nature or content of too many perspectives.
Specifically, all perspectives. A morality that purports to casually accomplish this would be
Christianity—and unsurprisingly, in order that a morality account for the nature or content of all
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perspectives involves an appeal to the “other world.” If God created humanity, and in turn, each
individual person and each individual perspective of the individual person, then it follows that
God had a hand in it; therefore, it’s in the person’s interest to shift their perspective so that belief
in God, reverence for God, &c, are all components of that perspective. And Nietzsche never
backs down from rejecting this line of reasoning. So we can add to MPS:
P6. MPS appeals to the “other world.”
In natural deduction, the rule of conjunction allows that any line in a proof (in this case,
argument) may be conjoined with formulae on any other line, either a premise or a formula
derived by rules of replacement or inference. Applying this rule to the present set of premises,
we can then show a simplified P1, let’s call it here P1’:
P1’. MPS addresses itself to all and MPS generalizes where generalization is impermissible and
MPS speaks unconditionally and MPS takes itself as unconditional and MPS is aperspectival in
nature and MPS appeals to the “other world.”
Adding P2’ gives the argument validity, given C and P1’ above:
P2’ If MPS addresses itself to all and MPS generalizes where generalization is impermissible and
MPS speaks unconditionally and MPS takes itself as unconditional and MPS is aperspectival in
nature and MPS appeals to the “other world” then MPS is unreasonable in form.
Therefore,
C. MPS is unreasonable in form.
I think this is a reasonable interpretation of the argument at hand. It is clearer to see now that it is
for these specific reasons taken as conjunctions that leads Nietzsche to conclude MPS is
unreasonable in form. If it were to turn out, say, that an account of morality is both
fundamentally perspectival in character and derived from the world of lived human experience
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and not from a divine commander, say, then P1’ would not include that moral system inside its
scope. In other words, the reasons Nietzsche has here for concluding that MPS is unreasonable in
form would not be reasons for thinking some other form of morality is unreasonable in form if
one or more conjuncts fail to apply to the moral in question. I’ll return to this important point in
chapter three, but for now we can see that the reasons in the passage here hang together with
more logical nuance than Leiter gives credit to.
Returning to Leiter’s exegesis, we can see that MPS assumes that there is an “extra
worldly” basis for the manner in which people arrive at the conclusion that everyone is
essentially similar. For in fact they must be in order that the scope of MPS’s demands apply to
everyone, in the same way. Leiter notes that if agents were “different in some overlooked but
relevant respect,” then it isn’t clearly the case that we should intelligibly prescribe it to all agents
regardless of their individual differences (Leiter 2002 81).
The problem with applying this descriptive component of S1 to someone who is different
in some overlooked but relevant respect is that such an application harms the person, on Leiter’s
view, provided the person in question is a nascent but unactualized “higher” type of person.
Higher types of people, on Leiter’s reading, are usually creative people who command respect
through excellence in creative expression—sometimes, this is in the form of artistic works
(Goethe, Beethoven), sometimes in the form of singularly impressive political and military
authority (Caesear, Napoleon, Borgias).
Once again, as in the case of defining ‘morality,’ we lack a precise definition. But for
Leiter (and for my present purposes) giving a general framework for the properties of higher
types of people is sufficient. One such property in the framework of actualized higher types of
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people is that they are “solitary” and (perhaps) as a result deal with other people “only
instrumentally.” In BGE, Leiter points out, Nietzsche claims that
A human being who strives for something great considers everyone he meets on his way
either as a means or as a delay and obstacle—or as a temporary resting place. (BGE 273)
If a higher type is going to accomplish her goals and achieve “something great,” the manner of
treatment required by the essential similarity of all persons in MPS serves as an impediment to
realizing the higher type’s ends. Higher types disregard the requirement, for instance, to treat
others as an end-in-themselves because they regard themselves as exempt from that component
of MPS on the grounds that it would require self-denial. And higher types have a “distinctive
bearing towards others” and “especially towards” themselves—they are always self-revering
(Leiter 2002 120). Thus, a higher type rejects the judgment from MPS that requires them to
regard themselves as being universally bound to treat others equally on the grounds that they are
fundamentally the same. The flourishing of higher types, on Leiter’s account, is practically
incompatible with the normative component of MPS.
So the following question arises—why can’t higher types simply flourish, in this case, in
virtue of their disposition to instantiate a distinctive bearing towards themselves? And on the
other hand, why can’t those for whom a disposition not to instantiate the distinctive bearing
towards themselves found in higher types simply instantiate that disposition? The answer to both
questions, according to Leiter, is for Nietzsche found in the “causal mechanisms of harm.”
On Leiter’s reading, Nietzsche believes that in practice, MPS doesn’t function as a
doctrine or a theory that one gives cognitive consideration to before accepting or rejecting it;
rather, “when moral values come to predominate in a culture, their valuations will subtly affect
the attitudes of all members of that culture” (Leiter 2002 133). No one in fact tends to be
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immune from the effects MPS has on their self-interpretation of their agency—“MPS in practice
simply does not make such fine grain distinctions—and importantly because of MPS’s
commitment to the idea that one morality is appropriate for all—potentially higher [humans] will
come to adopt [the values of MPS] as applicable to themselves as well” (ibid). People are
subsumed into a genus of valuation that, in some cases, includes potentially higher types; and in
those cases, the values that potentially higher types end up with is much like the transmission of
a virus. The values that nascent higher types end up internalizing, preventing them from selfactualizing, amounts, on Leiter’s reading, to a decisive objection against MPS.

1.3 The Scientific Foundations of Nietzsche’s Opposition to Morality
At this point, I need to clarify the relation that Leiter’s account of Nietzsche’s critique of
MPS bears to science. The clue for ironing out this relation is that general normative authority
for Leiter’s Nietzsche is sourced in science. To appreciate this fact, start with the empirically
derived categories of agency that Leiter’s Nietzsche holds to be generally true of all agents: this
is another Leiter-specific heuristic for understanding Nietzsche’s thought about agency, and it is
found in the notion of “type facts.” Type-facts may be generalized into what Leiter calls the
“Doctrine of Types.” According to this doctrine, “Each person has a fixed psycho-physical
constitution, which defines [them] as a particular type of person” (Leiter 2002 8). The facts that
circumscribe your physical constitution explain and thereby define what type of person you are.
Take some person “S.” Let “P” be the set of general properties that constitute S. The
type-fact constitution of S determines not just apparently mundane properties about S, like S’s
eye and hair color, and so forth. We ordinarily think that in P, the properties most directly
relevant to determining who S is has the least to do with the properties which she has no
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cognitive or other control over. The fact that S’s eyes are green and her hair is brown would on
most obvious analyses bear very little relevance on who S is (or who she takes herself to be).
However, consider the following kind of remark that Nietzsche sometimes makes:
With the necessity with which a tree bears its fruit our thoughts grow out of us, our
values, our yes’s and no’s and if’s and whether’s—the whole lot related and connected
among themselves, witnesses to one will, one health, one earthly kingdom, one sun. (GM
Pref. 2)
On this model, S is the result of P, which includes not just the accidental properties in P afforded
by S’s type-fact constitution, but all of the essential properties of S as well. The set of beliefs S
regards as true are the result of S’s “innermost drives of [S’s] nature” (BGE 6) as well as the set
of values (moral or otherwise) that S has.
For Leiter’s Nietzsche, then, the reality of agency is populated in each case with entities
called “type-facts” which determine what the person values and believes. We can put into view
Leiter’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s gripe with morality in a slightly different way—moral
values address themselves indifferently to any particular type-fact constitution. For any person,
their type-fact constitution is supposed to be compatible with believing and valuing in some way
appropriate to morality; but as we saw in the problematic case of similarity above, applying the
same moral interpretation to all people has the potential to rob nascent higher types from selfactualizing as such.
At the heart of this account, then, is the general normative authority of science. Science
alone is capable of unearthing the facts that explain or reveal the course of a causally determined
path the kinds of people we are and will become. Leiter calls this “causal essentialism,” and
again, only science can reveal the structures that causally determine what people value, and
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therefore, believe. After all, it is through “scientific knowledge” that Nietzsche believes that we
may “plumb the depths of reality itself,” (Leiter 2002 266) where “the depths of reality itself”
necessarily includes not just truths about the external world discerned in empirical inquiry, but
about ourselves as physically, psychologically constituted causally determined parts of it.
It is worth mentioning that affording science this level of normative authority is
conjoined to what Leiter argues is Nietzsche’s naturalism. If there is a problem with interpreting
Nietzsche as committed to the general normative authority of science, then there will be a
problem with what Leiter is calling “Nietzsche’s naturalism.” Leiter’s Nietzsche is a methods
naturalist—what he calls “M-naturalism.”
M-naturalists construct philosophical theories that are continuous with the sciences either
in virtue of their dependence upon the actual results of scientific method in different
domains or in virtue of their employment and emulation of distinctively scientific ways
of looking at and explaining things (Leiter 2002 5).
M-naturalism has two strictures for philosophy: the first is that philosophical theories should not
contradict conclusions reached by our best empirical sciences—this is how philosophy remains
“continuous” with the sciences. The second is that philosophical theories should essentially be
constructed the way we construct hypotheses in the natural sciences. For Leiter, one of the
features of scientific inquiry that makes it distinctive is that it empirically seeks causal
determinants that explain various phenomena, which we have seen at work in the doctrine of
types.
We are now in a position to see how Leiter’s Nietzsche deals with the scope problem.
Take a case of S believing that P. According to the doctrine of types, S’s belief that P will
usually be causally antecedent to S’s valuing associated with P; and S’s valuing associated with
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P is causally antecedent to “psycho-physical facts” (Leiter 2002 9) about S. Therefore, S’s belief
that P is a result of psycho-physical facts about S.
From this analysis, it follows that Nietzsche is what we would call an anti-realist about
value: “Nietzsche must ultimately deny that there is any objective vindication for his evaluative
position” (Leiter 2002 146). In order to communicate to someone that their values should change
or be subject to revision, one could attempt to anchor this recommendation in a value whose
character and existence is independent from human minds—e.g., traditionally, the importance of
truth, selflessness, etc. But the value of truth will only show up as important to the degree that its
importance is a function of your psycho-physical constitution. I can’t recommend to you that you
revise the value you currently place on truth unless your psycho-physical constitution already
allows that realignment. The value you currently assign to truth will be a member of subset value
in your more general set of prudential values—the values you hold that are good for you, or the
ones you don’t hold that are bad for you. But if the importance of truth is already in the set of
values you hold prudentially, then it follows that revaluing your values might matter to you. This
is one reason why Leiter believes Nietzsche bothered to write to begin with: if you are made of
the “right stuff,” that is, if you have an adequately similar psycho-physical constitution, then
reading Nietzsche’s works shakes you free from the grip of the MPS you inherited.
So, why should anyone accept anything Nietzsche says? Since his evaluative position on
MPS is that it is harmful to higher types, is there any reason to accept that you should re-value
your values accordingly? If you are a higher type, then reading Nietzsche will feel like you are in
good company, because you share his “idiosyncratic value expressions” (Leiter 2002 150). But if
your thoughts are in the order of: 1. I don’t believe this, 2. This is immoral; then Nietzsche has
nothing else to say. There is no reason for you to identify with his idiosyncratic value expression.
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Our scope problem is solved. Since value is the outgrowth of belief, and belief is the
outgrowth of some aspect of your physiological constitution, this deflationary account of value
has nothing more to do. If you happen to share in common with Nietzsche the same values, then
you may believe MPS can be harmful to higher types. And if you believe this, then we explain
by talking about this belief corresponding to some aspect of your physiological functioning. You
are built of the “right stuff,” and there is no further analysis to do.

1.4 Leiter’s Reliance on Nietzsche’s “Development.”
I mentioned above that for Leiter, the mature Nietzsche—the real subject of any
authentic predication in secondary literature—is represented in Nietzsche’s later period of
publication. The textual context that constitutes the primary domain of the mature Nietzsche is
the final six published works, the first of which is Nietzsche’s ’87 Genealogy of Morality. Before
that, the claim is that Nietzsche was still in various discernible periods of intellectual
development. Leiter’s account hinges on the truth of the developmental hypothesis, which is
Clark’s (Clark 1990). I’ll briefly reconstruct her argument for the developmental hypothesis to
bring the stakes of this discussion into clearer view: if the developmental hypothesis fails, then
so does Leiter’s basis for attributing science as the source of general Nietzschean normative
authority. If Leiter’s basis for attributing science as the placeholder of general Nietzschean
normative authority fails, it follows that something is wrong about his assessment of Nietzsche’s
gripe with morality.
For Clark, Nietzsche’s intellectual development on truth spans various iterations of the
‘falsification thesis’—the notion that “human knowledge falsifies reality” (Clark 1990 95). In the
early works, BT and TL, Nietzsche denies “truths accessible through science and common
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sense” and is concerned with “establishing the cognitive superiority of art” (ibid). In order to
execute this denial of truth, Nietzsche accepts the concept of the thing in itself as the standard for
truth: “The thing in itself (for that is what pure truth, without consequences, would be) is quite
incomprehensible to the creators of language and not at all worth aiming for” (TL 1). The thing
in itself is incomprehensible and unworthy of pursuit because some aspect of the human
cognitive and sensory apparatus necessarily renders the data of observation to be intelligible to
itself, in terms it can render that data intelligible. For Nietzsche, this is a process that makes any
statement involving even the concept of a thing false due to the fact that the concept of the thing
does not correspond to the way that thing is in itself.
Language, inasmuch as it purports to represent content about the world veridically, is in
early Nietzsche therefore essentially metaphor. When I deploy a metaphor, I use one category of
entities applied to another category non-literally. “Juliette is the sun” applies one set of entities
[the properties of a person] to another [the properties of the sun]. When we speak about the
natural world with categories and concepts that are supposed to be about the things they are
applied to, the categories and concepts can nevertheless never be literally applied to objects in
experience.
we believe that we know something about the things themselves when we speak of trees,
colors, snow, and flowers; and yet we possess nothing but metaphors for things—
metaphors which correspond in no way to the original entities….the mysterious X of the
thing in itself first appears as a nerve stimulus, then as an image, and finally as a sound.
(TL 1)
Sensation and cognition fundamentally transform the data of observation from whatever
properties it has in itself to properties that make the information intelligible to itself. That
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transformation starts at the sensory level. As soon as the eye processes some data from the
external world, that data is transformed from whatever properties it has in itself to properties that
the “nerve stimulus” confers to it.
As the cognitive processes kick in and start “representing” the object as a mental image,
conferring representational properties to it, it is further rendered as an object according to the
properties that make representing it at all possible—situating the object in space and time, for
instance, or classifying it and naming it accordingly. All these cognitive operations further render
the set of properties attached to the object completely detached from whatever properties the
thing has as it is in itself.
This analysis of language—that it is fundamentally incapable of expressing anything true
about the world because it in principle can not refer to it without distorting it—is possible only
on the assumption that there is a thing in itself. There must be a way the world is in itself apart
from the way in which our cognitive abilities allow us to encounter it. Early Nietzsche, therefore,
“explicitly makes the thing in itself into an unknowable essence, forever concealed from view by
the thing’s appearances” (Clark 1990 100-101).
Around 1881-1882, as Nietzsche is writing GS, Clark surmises that he is beginning to
recognize what he gives clearer expression to in 1886 with BGE—that conceptualizing the thing
in itself involves a contradiction.
There are still harmless self-observers who believe that there are “immediate certainties;”
for example, “I think” or as the superstition of Schopenhauer put it, “I will;” as though
knowledge here got hold of its object purely and nakedly as “the thing in itself,” without
any falsification on the part of either the subject or the object. But that “immediate
certainty,” as “absolute knowledge” and the “thing in itself” involve a contradiction in
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adjecto, I shall repeat a hundred times; we really ought to free ourselves from the
seduction of words. (BGE 16)
Here is the beginning of a usual attack Nietzsche makes against mental causation—but in tandem
with the apparent-but-false plausibility of the immediate certainty of the cogito is also “absolute
knowledge” and “thing in itself.” In the textual context of this passage, however, Nietzsche
continues to elaborate on the implausibility of the immediate certainty of the cogito and by and
large leaves behind the contradiction introduced by attaching “absolute” to “knowledge,” or the
“in itself” to “things.”
Clark’s proposal is to mine a fragment of the reasoning to this nascent conclusion from
1882’s GS:
What is appearance for me now? Certainly not the opposite of some essence: what could
I say about any essence except to name the attributes of its appearance! Certainly not a
mask that one could place on an unknown X or remove from it! (GS 54)
In early Nietzsche, we saw commitment to the claim that an object’s essence is “independent
from all possible appearances” (Clark 190 101). But if this were the case, all we could know
about the essence of the thing is all the properties we attach to it via appearance. So to talk about
an “unknown X” whose properties in itself are intelligibly distinguishable from the properties of
its appearance involves a logical contradiction: I can only know a thing according to the
properties I afford it in appearance, but I also afford it the property of unintelligibility, which
isn’t a property I can afford it in appearance. Since the object is both intelligible and
unintelligible, we can see how thing in itself gains a contradiction with the addition of the
adjective.
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Although much of GS retains and deploys the falsification thesis, as do BGE and the
1887 addition to GS of book V, Clark claims that
In the six books that follow BGE, there is no evidence of Nietzsche’s earlier denial of
truth: no claim that the human world is a falsification, no claim that science, logic, or
mathematics falsify reality. (Clark 1990 103 my emphasis)
No longer committing himself to the idea that things in themselves are different from all of their
possible appearances, the argument goes, Nietzsche is no longer committed to denying truth. If
he is no longer committed to denying truth, then he can accept that some beliefs are true. This
explains why, having had this realization, Nietzsche’s later works are sprinkled with more
cognitive language when advancing or rejecting a claim. Take for instance the following passage
from one of the “late” works:
What is science to the priest? He is above that! And until now the priest has ruled! He
determined the concepts of “true” and “untrue!” (A 12)
It is in instances such as these that lend apparent support to Clark’s developmental hypothesis. It
explains why the radical denial of truth and its conjunction to maintaining the existence of an initself appears to fade away as Nietzsche develops an increasingly plausible body of critical
thought.

1.5 Conclusion
I am not convinced that the developmental hypothesis tracks an abandonment of the
falsification thesis in Nietzsche’s so-called “mature” thinking, and in the next chapter I’ll show
why. Contrary to Clark, there is evidence of Nietzsche’s earlier denial of truth in the mature
works. There are, in addition to passages noted by Anderson (1996) and Acampora (2006),
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passages that capture a recurring thought of Nietzsche’s that has received no scholarly attention
to date. These are passages in which Nietzsche expresses the significance of Copernicus’
development of heliocentrism. There are two passages in the published works and one
unpublished comment that I will argue, if read as anticipating a kind of Kuhnian
incommensurability about theory change in science, contain a version of falsification that
disrupts the normative authority afforded to science on Clark and Leiter’s reading of Nietzsche.
From this two claims follow. The first is that it is not the case that the developmental hypothesis
tracks a coherent position on the normative authority of scientific truth that is textually consistent
throughout the mature writings of Nietzsche. The second is that it is not the case that Nietzsche
never doubts science’s ability to provide mind-independent objective truth about the world.
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CHAPTER 2:
A DENIAL OF TRUTH IN NIETZSCHE’S LATE PUBLISHED WORKS: AGAINST
THE DEVELOPMENTAL HYPOTHESIS

2.1 Introduction: The Copernicus Passages12
In what follows I argue that the Copernicus passages are plausibly read as anticipating a
semantic view about the nature of theoretical terms.13 The view, a species of description theories
of reference, holds that theoretical terms are “defined by their place in a theoretical-practical
system or structure” (Rowlands 2003, 50), so that the terms get their meaning by standing in
various “internal relations” to other theoretical terms in use. This semantic view implies
incommensurability—a view made popular by Thomas Kuhn14 that holds successive scientific
theories are semantically incompatible with one another.
I should note up front that while BGE is not placed in the “mature” period by Clark and
others, I am only looking at a passage in which language Nietzsche uses to describe the
significance of Copernicus’ discovery is echoed, usually verbatim, in the mature works.

12

Much of the Copernicus content here is either from Callahan (2011) or adapted from it.
I do not claim that Nietzsche can subscribe to the description theory of reference as such; the semantic
view I am using to model these passages wasn’t fully articulated until the 1960’s (e.g., in Kuhn), about
eighty years after Nietzsche published the works I am investigating in this essay. However, because the
Copernicus passages gesture toward or anticipate the theory by stressing the active role of scientists in
shaping the meaning of theoretical terms, I claim that the Copernicus passages are best read on the model
of the semantic view. Reading the Copernicus passages on the model the description theory of reference
will enable us to gather together disparate elements of BGE 12 and GM III 25 and unify them, as I do
below.
13
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See: Kuhn (1970).
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Therefore, the following analysis does not fall outside the scope of development Clark claims is
at work in the published works.

2.1a The Copernicus Passages: BGE 12
The first mention of Copernicus in Nietzsche’s published works is in BGE, and so we
begin there:
As for materialistic atomism, it is one of the best refuted theories there are, and in Europe
perhaps no one in the learned world is now so unscholarly as to attach any serious
significance to it (as an abbreviation of the means of expression)—thanks chiefly to the
Dalmatian Boscovich, he and the Pole Copernicus have been the greatest and most
successful opponents of visual evidence so far. For while Copernicus has persuaded us to
believe, contrary to all the senses, that the earth does not stand fast, Boscovich has taught
us to abjure the belief in the last part of the earth that “stood fast”—the belief in
“substance,” in “matter,” in the earth-residuum and particle-atom: it is the greatest
triumph over the senses that has been gained on earth so far. (BGE 12)
First, I need to examine Copernicus’ work, with “defeating visual evidence” and “triumphing
over the senses”15 as the clues for interpreting it. Reading Copernicus’ work through these two
lenses is required because here Nietzsche introduces nascent ideas about their significance that
are made more explicit in GM III 25. Nietzsche claims Copernicus managed to convince us,
“contrary to all the senses, that the earth does not stand fast” (BGE 12). To understand what

I occasionally use the word “defeat” in place of “successfully oppose” or “triumph over.” Not only does
“defeat” mean the same thing, but Nietzsche also uses this word to refer to the same relation between
Copernicus’ work and the previous schema of visual evidence in GM III 25, which I address below.
15
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Nietzsche’s quick reconstruction of Copernicus’ discovery means, let’s look at an explication of
what took place in the discovery.
Copernicus is a fifteenth- to early sixteenth-century astronomer. In 1510, Copernicus
writes an essay called “Commentariolus,” in which he claims that the universe is helio- and not
geocentric, cutting against the grain of his contemporary astronomy. Before Copernicus,
astronomers had been making use of a theoretical framework for astronomy Kuhn calls an
“epicycle and deferent system” (Kuhn 1970 60). In the epicycle and deferent system astronomers
would use a basic homocentric circle, called a “deferent,” to describe the motion of the planets as
they orbited the earth (Kuhn1970 59); but describing the motion of the planets only using the
deferent had the strange consequence of seeing the planets move retrogressively and making
irregular pauses. Astronomers would then use the concept “epicycle,” then, which was a circle of
motion used to describe the movement a planet made with respect to the deferent as it traversed
around the deferent. That way, when a planet was seen to move retrogressively, that motion
could be explained as a period in which the planet was completing the second half of an
epicycle—the planet still continued its eastward orbit around the earth, but only appeared to
move backwards because the planet was completing the circular motion with respect to the
deferent.
According to Kuhn, the epicycle and deferent system are unable on their own to
completely describe the motions of the planets as they traversed the earth. In 150 A.C.E.,
Ptolemy improved this system by introducing the term “equant” into the practice of astronomy
(Weinert 7; Kuhn 70). The equant was “an imaginary point on the other side of the deferent as
seen by observers on the earth” (Weinert 20) that astronomers used to chart apparent irregular
motion of the planets in the epicycle and deferent system.
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The equant became a particular source of cognitive frustration for Copernicus because he
was expected to understand the motion of the planets at some times in terms of the center of a
planet’s epicycle (the motion around which was calculated using an equant) and, at other times,
in relation to the deferent. Copernicus saw this situation as unreasonable because it rendered
observation disjunctive: if one regarded motion relative to the center of a planet’s epicycle and
discovered inconsistencies with other calculations astronomers had completed, one would have
had to attempt to square the observation with extant calculations by regarding the motion relative
to the deferent instead. Of the additional calculative work required by the concept of the equant,
Copernicus remarks:
[…] The planetary theories of Ptolemaic theory and most other astronomers, although
consistent with the numerical data, seemed likewise to present no small difficulty. For
these theories were not adequate unless certain equants were conceived; it then appeared
that a planet moved with uniform velocity neither on its deferent nor about the center of
its epicycle. Hence a system of this sort seemed neither sufficiently absolute nor
sufficiently pleasing to the mind.
Having become aware of these defects, I often considered whether there could
perhaps be found a more reasonable arrangement of circles, from which every apparent
inequality would be derived and in which everything would move uniformly, as a system
of motion requires. (Copernicus 1543 125)
Copernicus thereby redefines theoretical terms in a way that makes charting the motion of the
planets more reasonable. The more reasonable definitions, for Copernicus, are definitions that
lead to simpler research procedures and a simpler, more aesthetically pleasing representation of
nature (Weinert, 49; Kuhn 1970, 76). Copernicus discovers these desiderata can be realized
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simply by placing the sun at the center of our solar system. That way, when astronomers draw
circles to describe the relative orbits and motions of the planets, they have to deal far less with
the cumbersome ad hoc procedures ubiquitous in pre-Copernican astronomy.
We can now begin to see how Nietzsche’s characterization of Copernicus as a
“successful opponent” of “visual evidence” can map on to this astronomer’s work. Copernicus
challenges the meaning of the theoretical terms “equant,” “epicycle” and “deferent,” which
amounts to challenging the entire structure of internally related theoretical terms that determine
what counts as “visual evidence” for the Ptolemaic system. Nietzsche offers no clarification,
however, on how Copernicus actually executed the defeat of visual evidence. The following
remark from D provides a clue as to how he might think such an execution took place:
[…] there is nothing good, nothing beautiful, nothing sublime, nothing evil in-itself, but
[there] are states of the mind in which we impose such words upon things external and
within us. We have again taken back the predicates of things, or at least remembered that
it was we who lent them to them […]. (D 210)
In this passage, Nietzsche claims that the mind “imposes” words on things external to us,
and that this imposition is presumably responsible for making the thing what it is. In other words,
it is not the case that a given thing external to us—or the collection of all external things, the
world—is filled up with objects that already have predicates; on the contrary, objects get their
predicates because, first, human beings assigned (or “loaned”) them to them. Therefore, what we
see in the world with our eyes is too a function of some antecedent defining activity; its
intelligibility depends on having been subjected to this activity.
Returning to BGE 12, to understand the defeat of visual evidence in the sense that the
defeat can be considered “one of the greatest victories over the senses the world has ever seen,”
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we should not understand Nietzsche as simply saying that Copernicus falsified geocentric
astronomy. On the contrary, Nietzsche’s remark in Daybreak invites a more radical conclusion:
Copernicus showed that for some observation to count as visual evidence for a theory, the
relevant objects in the observation have to have been made intelligible in observation through a
prior act of definition. This prior activity consists in the imposition of predicates onto objects.
Before the publication of “Commentariolus,” the Christian assumption about the objects
in empirical inquiry was that their interpretation, and therefore, their significance, was
established by the creative or defining work of God; what it meant to observe object “earth,” for
example, was to observe an object with the following predicate divinely attached: “a body placed
at the center of the universe.” Copernicus defeated visual evidence and gained a victory over the
senses by showing that observing the world with our sense organs presupposes prior human
cognitive activity. Attributing this view to Nietzsche helps explain the following remark from
GM:
There is, strictly speaking, absolutely no science “without presuppositions,” the thought
of such a science is unthinkable, paralogical: a philosophy, a “belief” must always be
there first so that science can derive a direction from it, a meaning, a boundary, a method,
a right to existence. (Whoever understands it the other way around—for example,
whoever sets out to place philosophy “on a strictly scientific foundation”—first needs to
turn not only philosophy but also truth itself on its head…). (GM III 24)
A world investigated through science “without presuppositions,” or without antecedent cognitive
activity of “predicate loaning” would be “impossible.” Allowing an interpretation of science as
proceeding “without presuppositions” as a structure for investigating truth itself turns truth “on
its head,” which I take Nietzsche to at least be signaling to his reader that this is the wrong idea.
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Nietzsche is thereby best read here on the model of the semantic view outlined in the
introduction: Copernicus defeats visual evidence by imposing new definitions of internally
related theoretical terms onto the objects contemporaneous astronomers were concerned with.
With the significance of Copernicus’ discovery for Nietzsche with respect to the defeat of
visual evidence in view, I turn now to the next Copernicus passage. There, the active relation
between scientific practitioners and the world is expanded—a central feature of the semantic
view of the meaning of theoretical terms under discussion.

2.1b The Copernicus Passages: GM III 25
Since Copernicus, [humanity] seems to have stumbled onto an inclined plane—he is now
rolling faster and faster away from the center—whither? Into nothingness? Into the
“penetrating feeling of his nothingness?” (GM III 25)
In this passage, Nietzsche has us imagine humanity, likened to a round object, rolling out of
control into an indeterminate location. This is a strange image because the metaphor of humanity
rolling down a plane does not strike any familiar chords. But Nietzsche is in fact referring to a
discussion in the preface to the second edition of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. According to
Kant, when Galileo “experimented with balls of a definite weight on the inclined plane,”
determining in advance by calculation what the physical behavior of the ball would be, we
learned that:
[…] reason has insight into what it itself produces according to its own design; that it
must take the lead with principles for its judgments according to constant laws and
compel nature to answer its questions, rather than letting nature guide its movements by
keeping reason, as it were, in its leading strings. (CPR B/xiv)
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Kant thinks it is not the case that there is a world intelligible independent of the theories we
create to describe it. “Reason” is described here as a faculty that provides the blueprint into
which nature must be made to fit, and Kant’s radical claim is that reason familiarizes itself with
reality by imposing16 a rational structure onto it.
The figure of Copernicus, for Kant, is an exemplar of this new way of thinking because
Copernicus stands in a proper metaphysical relation to nature. Kant claims that the major
discoveries in natural philosophy, such as the “invisible force of Newtonian attraction” (CPR
B/xxii), would “have remained forever undiscovered if Copernicus had not ventured, in a manner
contradictory to the senses, yet true, to seek for the observed movements not in the objects in the
heavens but in their observer” (CPR B/xxii, emphases mine). Put another way, Copernicus,
according to Kant, did not just have to neglect the extant astronomical accounts of planetary
orbit; rather, he had to abandon a system of theories altogether—along with what was literally
seen supporting the theories, its “visual evidence”—to prevent himself from “keeping reason in
[nature’s] leading strings” (CPR B/xxii). The Copernican revolution, for Kant, was the
announcement of reason’s primacy in bringing objects into conformity with itself, and it does
this by making use of a principle made available to itself only through itself.
We are now in a better position to understand Nietzsche’s target in GM III 25. Galileo’s
foreknowledge about what the behavior of the ball would be as he rolled it down the inclined
plane was, for Kant, instructive; this is the manner in which human minds relate to the reality of
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There are two ways Kantians generally talk about the relation between the schematizing work of the
categories and the world: there is the view that we impose the structure of the world onto it (e.g. when we
define theoretical terms in terms of their internal relations) and this view is called, according to Rowlands,
the imposition thesis. Although some other Kantians hold that our theoretical terms filter the world, so
what we know about its structure (as opposed to actually giving it structure) is restricted to what meaning
our theoretical terms allow for, I go with imposition for brevity and ease; it is more likely that it is the
Kantian caricature that Nietzsche was working with when he refers to Kant.
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the world: reason reveals a priori the principles by which we come to know it. When Nietzsche
suggests that it is humanity that is actually on the plane, he seems simply to allude to the Kantian
insight: reason—an innate human faculty—is responsible for the principles by which we come to
experience the world.17
Even if human minds are responsible for the principles by which we come to experience
the world, we still do not know what significance, if any, Nietzsche thinks this has for
contemporary scientific practices. In the final Copernicus passage, then, I will show that a
criticism of contemporary science can be ascertained.

2.1c The Copernicus Passages: GM III 25 (continued)
Does anyone really think that the defeat of theological astronomy meant the defeat of that
ideal? Has [humanity] perhaps become less in need of a transcendent solution to its riddle
of existence now that this existence looks more arbitrary, more loiterer-like, more
dispensable in the visible order of things? Hasn’t precisely the self-belittlement of
[humanity], [humanity’s] will to self-belittlement been marching relentlessly forward
since Copernicus? (GM III 25, emphases mine)
This final passage comprises a series of rhetorical questions, in which Nietzsche wants to claim
that, in light of Copernicus’ work, a “riddle of existence” ought to have been solved, but because
it hasn’t, humanity’s riddle of existence yields another disturbing truth about existence: that
human existence now seems more “arbitrary,” “loiterer-like,” and “dispensable…in the visible
order of things.” This riddle of existence should be solved with the defeat of theological

17

I take Nietzsche to express agreement with Kant in only in the following very narrow sense: human
minds, as opposed to the world itself, are responsible for the ways in which we experience the world.
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astronomy, so I begin now with a survey of what Nietzsche likely means by “theological
astronomy.”
Theological astronomy regarded all observations as evidence for theories derived from
Biblical or otherwise religious sources. The scientist who found evidence against claims made by
papal authority was under immense pressure to reconsider his or her findings. The results of
inquiry in this science were thus determined in advance—science would always stand in a
consistent and justificatory relation to the content of the canon. It deserves the name “theological
astronomy” because scientists were expected to think in invariable accordance with biblicallyderived doctrines. Because the bible is committed to the cosmological claim that the earth resides
at the center of the universe, the most relevant doctrine for astronomers in their work was that
planets orbit the earth.
We now need to understand what Nietzsche thinks the effects of defeating theological
astronomy are. The human solution of its “riddle of existence”—which I take Nietzsche to mean
something along the lines of “an answer to a question posed in philosophical inquiry”—is that it
is as a whole is now more arbitrary, dispensable and loiterer-like. “They are more arbitrary,
dispensable and loiterer-like with the defeat of theological astronomy” is the answer to the
question “How important are humans?” Formerly, humans falsely sought a solution to
philosophical problems in a transcendent source. By defeating theological astronomy,
Copernicus defeated a worldview structured by the dogmas of Christianity—a worldview whose
adherents valued humans as the most important creatures, created in the image of a perfect God,
occupying the center of the universe. Indeed, Nietzsche says, with the advent of Copernican
astronomy, humans became “animal, without simile, qualification, or reservation” (GM III 25).
The divine significance of our existence was expunged: humans became a mere animal,
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stumbling about aimlessly on the surface of a cold, harsh and indifferent planet, leading now by
relation to the former paradigm ultimately purposeless lives.
However, as Nietzsche continues in this passage, he indicates that science too seeks a
solution to philosophical problems, but scientists err by locating the solution in a transcendent
source. Though Nietzsche does not state this directly about scientists, we can infer this statement
from his description of self-denial in science:
All science today […] aims to talk humanity out of its previous respect for itself, as if this
were nothing but a bizarre self-conceit […]; one could even say that science’s own
pride[...] consists in upholding this hard-won self-contempt of humanity as its last, most
serious claim to respect from itself. (ibid)
Here, Nietzsche lambasts science on the grounds that it perpetuates a tradition of self-denial.
Scientists’ pride comes in this passage from their ability to see that a meaning-making model
sourced in a human-transcendent entities or processes makes human existence look
comparatively meaningless. But in tandem with the other Copernicus passages, scientists
participate in self-denial from their ability to harness their passions and ultimately stamp out the
distorting influence that their interests could have in the process of inquiry. The demands
scientific practitioners place on themselves to discern truths about the world therefore requires
that they eliminate to the greatest extent possible the role of the self—a goal which, if realized,
would amount to “self-contempt” (ibid).
How is the work of Copernicus different from the scientists Nietzsche attacks? Consider
first a kind of science that Nietzsche lauds in GM III 24. There, as in the case of Copernicus,
Nietzsche lauds his contemporary French science because the practices maintain the active role
of the practitioner in interpreting the world. According to Nietzsche, French scientists are more
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disposed to “doing violence, pressing into orderly form, abridging, omitting, padding, fabricating
and falsifying18” (GM III 24).
In the same passage, Nietzsche lambasts contemporaneous German science for “wanting
to halt before the factual, the factum brutum” (ibid). German science eliminated the role of the
self, assuming instead a passive relation to the world by attempting to allow facts to arbitrate our
understanding of it. The problem with German science can be generalized for most of
Nietzsche’s contemporary science as follows: the eye of the interpreter “looks outward as an
arctic traveler looks outward (perhaps in order not to look inward? In order not to look
back?…Here there is snow, here life has become silent […]” (GM III 26). Just as in Christian
thought, scientists posit a transcendent beyond that arbitrates solutions to our deepest
philosophical problems. Nietzsche is not saying here that scientists should not look at the world
when they wish to understand it; what he is saying, however, is that thinking facts are out there
somewhere and, as a result, structure inquiry in such a way as to diminish or eliminate the
importance of the self, replicates the structure of Christian self-denial.
Since Nietzsche denigrates a science because it lets objects themselves articulate the
standards for inquiry, modern science therefore too falls under a category of inquiry that utilizes
a transcendent criterion of judgment. This criterion is to be further specified as anything literally
outside human persons, which Andy Clark calls the “skin bag” (A. Clark 2003, 5). Thus, If
human existence is now “arbitrary, more loiterer-like, more dispensable” because we mistakenly
sought a transcendent solution to philosophical problems, then I propose we regard Nietzsche
characterizing the results of modern scientific inquiry in the same way, as it too mistakenly seeks
a transcendent solution to the following philosophical question: “What is truth?” The results of
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This will be particularly relevant in 2.2a—Nietzsche is unambiguously praising practices that embrace
falsification.
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modern scientific inquiry19 therefore now seem “more arbitrary, more loiterer-like, and more
dispensable in the visible order of things.” (GM III 25).
To understand how these properties apply to the results of scientific inquiry, let’s look at
Nietzsche’s characterization of the results of scientific inquiry in GM III 12. There, Nietzsche
says that scientists strive to be “pure, will-less and time-less subjects of knowledge.” The
scientist thinks she will know better what the world is like if she adopts an attitude devoid of
emotion and passion and of anything that could cloud her “objective” gaze on the world.
Nietzsche suggests in GM III 25 that she also wants her truths to be non-arbitrary, nondispensable and not at all loiterer-like; in other words, the scientist desires that her truths about
the world be true even if there were nobody around to think them or be interested in them.
This relation of her truths to the world is for Nietzsche’s scientist non-arbitrary because
the scientist thinks she does not capriciously test the veracity of any old statement; rather, the
scientist tests sentences that she thinks—or has “good reason” to think—accurately correspond to
the world. This relation between her truths or discoveries and the world they are intended to
describe is also non-dispensable because, when sentences do accurately correspond to the world,
the scientist certainly shouldn’t do away with them; she ought instead to keep them around
because they represent the way the world is, and it is valuable to be able to say true things about
the world.
Last, this relation is not at all loiterer-like. A loiterer invites us to think of something,
usually a person, who lingers around a place, but does so only transiently. To be not at all
loiterer-like suggests that something permanently inhabits a place. Thus, Nietzsche’s imagery
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I realize that extending these qualities to the results of scientific inquiry is tenuous because the referent
of “[humanity’s] riddle of existence” is just an existential one. However, my reading is neither
inconsistent with the direct existential riddle implied by the grammar of the passage, nor does it deviate
from the focus Nietzsche gives to self-denial throughout GM.
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invites us to consider that scientists often imagine that their truths would permanently inhabit the
world, even if we weren’t there to think them, formulate them or have an interest in them. But
Copernicus, Nietzsche suggests, has shown that in the “visible order of things,” we now know
the world is not the location in which the truths of scientists reside. However, we’ve proceeded,
since Copernicus, completely oblivious to this truth, and Nietzsche calls our attention to it in this
passage.
I have argued here that the strand of thought connecting the Copernicus passages contain
a commitment to anticipating a view on the semantics of theoretical terms. We have seen that
this view is the description theory of reference, in which the meaning of theoretical terms is to
stand in internal relations with one another, defined and imposed by practitioners of science.
Since this semantic view implies incommensurability, the falsification thesis is true for these
passages in GM. The Copernicus passages together constitute a reason against thinking not only
that the developmental hypothesis accurately charts the evolution of Nietzsche’s thought, but
they also constitute a reason against thinking that science has general normative authority for
Nietzsche.

2.2 Introduction: Twilight of the Idols
Nietzsche writes TI in 1888 and publishes it in January 1889, shortly before the time
Nietzsche suffers a mental collapse in Turin. It would be the prime of what Clark and Leiter
characterize as “mature” Nietzsche—so it is here that we purportedly find Nietzsche finally
coming to terms with a deflationary account of truth Clark characterizes as commonsense
correspondence, having given up on metaphysical correspondence; we purportedly find him
placing empirical inquiry at the helm of epistemic virtue; we thereby should expect to find him
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attributing unequivocal general normative authority to science. There are two “hot spots” in the
secondary literature: in TI IV, “How the “True World” Finally Became a Fable,” and in TI VI,
“The Four Great Errors.” I will survey these areas in turn, first 2.2a and then 2.2b. I’ll argue that
contrary to Leiter and Clark’s read, these passages contain another substantive commitment to
the falsification thesis and therefore a denial of truth. And as I’ve argued above, if we have good
reasons for thinking a denial of truth continues on into Nietzsche’s mature thinking and writing,
then it follows that we have good reason for thinking that the developmental hypothesis is
textually inconsistent with the published works and is therefore inadequate. If the developmental
hypothesis is inadequate, then the developmental hypothesis fails to support attributing Nietzsche
with accepting science’s general normative authority.

2.2a “How the ‘True World’ Finally Became a Fable”
Subtitled “The History of an Error,” this section contains a conceptual evolution of an
error. Presumably the error has to do with the “True World;” what’s unclear is whose history this
error is. Clark persuasively argues that in part, the history Nietzsche details is his own
intellectual history and development. It will be useful to walk through each stage to illuminate
why she thinks this. In addition, Clark argues that in this section, Nietzsche eventually comes to
distinguish his own current views from earlier, errant stages. I will explicate Lanier Anderson’s
argument that the latest stage of Nietzsche’s development contains an expression of the
falsification thesis, and defend it from an objection in Leiter (2002).
Stage one begins with the following:
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1. The true world—attainable for the sage, the pious, the virtuous man; he lives in it, he is it.
(The oldest form of the idea, relatively sensible, simple, and persuasive. A
circumlocution for the sentence, “I, Plato, am the truth.”)
Stage one is the basic starting point in the development of the concept of truth in the
western tradition. Plato takes notes at Socrates’ trial, and later uses Socrates as a prop to espouse
anti-democratic political theory and a view of truth such that it is philosophers, and nobody else
who can grasp the highest form of truth by being capable of intuiting the form of the good.20 So
Plato essentially is truth by virtue of the fact that he is the one articulating the conditions of
possibility for which one can claim to know the truth. So the “true world” is the world known,
grasped and lived by the philosopher.
2. The true world—unattainable for now, but promised to the sage, the pious, the virtuous
man (“for the sinner who repents”).
(Progress of the idea: it becomes more subtle, insidious, incomprehensible—it becomes
female, it becomes Christian.) (ibid)
Here, Nietzsche describes the appropriation of this Platonic metaphysics of truth by Christianity.
The “true world” is now the world promised in the form of “heaven” to those who abide the
edicts of church authorities, and the “true world” is promised to those who don’t abide the same
edicts is promised in the form of hell. In both cases, though, we have “unattainable for now,” but
which becomes attainable in one way, the other after death.
3. The true world—unattainable, indemonstrable, unpromisable; but the very thought of it—
a consolation, an obligation, an imperative.

I fully appreciate that this is likely a historically inaccurate account of what’s actually taking place in
the dialogues, but it is the popular understanding of them which is shared by Nietzsche.
20
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(At bottom, the old sun, but seen through mist and skepticism The idea has become
elusive, pale, Nordic, Königsbergian.)
Clearly our pale Königsbergian is a reference to the Kantian thinking that led to Nietzsche’s
early appropriation of the metaphysical correspondence theory, which he then mustered in the
service of a denial of the possibility of truth, the falsification thesis. I take the sense of
“obligation” that Nietzsche associates with the true world to be one which proceeds in two steps.
The first is that the true world constitutes the domain of truth, full stop. Since truth is valuable,
we ought to seek it out; but, as we have seen, we cannot acquire access to this domain—it is
“unattainable” and “indemonstrable.” Second: the “very thought of it” is therefore a
“consolation” because we may suppose that there is a domain in which truth can be said to exist,
and we ought to seek it out because truth is important; but it is at the same time impossible due to
the fact that human minds falsify reality.
As Clark observes, Nietzsche is leaving no doubt about the occupants of stages one
through three. The next three, however, start looking like stages that Nietzsche himself moves
through along the course with an apparent development.
4. The true world—unattainable? At any rate, unattained. And being unattained, also
unknown. Consequently, not consoling, redeeming, or obligating: how could something
unknown obligate us?
(Gray morning. The first yawn of reason. The cock-crow of positivism.)
Clark characterizes this as the stage in which “Nietzsche argues that the true or metaphysical
world has no function to play, but does not deny its existence” (Clark 1990 112). This was a brief
period of time in which Nietzsche entertained the plausibility in valuing positivism despite there
being a thing in-itself that is cognitively inaccessible. Importantly, Clark points out here (ibid)
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that Nietzsche’s use of the phrase “true world” is in fact a use, and not a scare-quoted mention—
the latter of which is on her reading Nietzsche’s target in this progression.
5. The “true” world—an idea which is no longer good for anything, not even obligating—an
idea which has become useless and superfluous—consequently, a refuted idea: let us
abolish it!
(Bright day; breakfast; return of bon sens and cheerfulness; Plato’s embarrassed blush;
pandemonium of all free spirits.)
We have in stage five what Clark claims maps onto Nietzsche’s development in GS and
BGE. The so-called “true” world is now scare-quote mentioned as a target. Compare Nietzsche’s
talk about truth, and his conventions for doing so, here with stage four. In stage four, the true
world is if not possibly unattainable, “at any rate unattained.” Concerning the relation between
the true world and attainability is a relation of logical possibility, since it is not the case that it
could possibly turn out that the true world could be as of yet unattained and impossible to know.
But the language in stage five says of the “true” world that as a concept it is “useless”
“superfluous” and therefore “refuted,” calling on us to “abolish” it.
It seems to be clear from this analysis of the progression from stage four into five what
Nietzsche has in mind. The traces of the in-itself are brought to the fore and recognized as having
no cognitive value in assessing truth. So we should expect stage six to further reiterate this
finding, since as Clark claims “no one denies that Nietzsche places his thought in stage six”
(Clark 1990 112).
6. The true world—we have abolished. What world has remained? The apparent one
perhaps? But no! With the true world we have also abolished the apparent one.
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(Noon; moment of the briefest shadow; end of the longest error; high point of humanity;
INCIPIT ZARATHUSTRA.)
On Clark’s interpretation, stage six is the culmination of his intellectual development. If we
accept the existence of the in-itself, then necessarily every mental representation of an object is
an appearance, since the way it shows up to me in my representation depends on the structure of
the cognitive apparatuses that make representing it the way I do to myself possible. But if we
deny the existence of the in-itself and at the same time, that the domain in which the in-itself
resides can be the domain for truth, then I have at the same time demolished any purpose for
calling my mental representation of a thing an appearance of the thing. The thing I represent just
is the thing; therefore, “with the true world we have also abolished the apparent one.”
Anderson (1996) I think has a better read on this development, and claims that it is
actually both stages five and six that encapsulate the culminating development. It will be useful
to gloss his take on the falsification thesis—a take that benefits from being anchored more
closely to the textual context of the published works. Drawing from GM itself as an example of
the thoroughgoing falsification at work in the mature Nietzsche. There, along with an articulation
of perspectivism,21 Nietzsche is arguing that interpretation and perspective are both
indispensable for any claim to knowledge (Anderson 317):
Let us guard ourselves better from now on, gentlemen philosophers, against the
dangerous old conceptual fabrication[…] in which the active and interpretive forces,
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Once again I am not trying to give a substantial reading of perspectivism or claim that my Andersonshared Kantian gloss should be adopted over the hundreds of accounts provided over the years. I am only
pointing to the textual context of the mature writings to show that there are reasons for thinking Nietzsche
never abandoned the falsification thesis, despite the generalization provided by Leiter and Clark that
nowhere in the mature writings does Nietzsche express skepticism about the possibility of truth itself.
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through which seeing first becomes seeing-something are to be shut off, are to be
absent…(GM III 12)
Here, Nietzsche makes a claim about the role interpretation has in a textual context stressing the
indispensable role of perspective in knowledge claims: “There is only a perspectival seeing, only
a perspectival “knowing” (ibid). In any perspective lies interpretation, which Nietzsche
elaborates in GM III 24, which we saw in 2.1:
French science now seeks a kind of moral superiority over German science, that
renunciation of all interpretation (of doing violence, pressing into orderly form,
abridging, omitting, padding, fabricating, falsifying and whatever else belongs to the
essence of all interpreting)… (GM III 24)
So if for any perspective, adopting a perspective necessarily requires interpretation in order for
seeing to become seeing-something at all, then the adopted perspective falsifies reality. Along
the lines of the same argument I made for reading the Copernicus passages on the description
theory of reference, a version of which shares with Kant the model of imposing concepts on
observed entities, Anderson reads Nietzsche as remaining broadly committed through his mature
period to the thesis that:
our perspective brings a set of concepts to the data of sense, and we use those concepts to
organize our and interpret our experience. This interpretive amounts to a falsification
because the concepts we employ are not derived from the known objects, but are notions
that we impose onto experience in a way that transforms it. Since truth traditionally
requires that our beliefs conform themselves to theory-independent objects, this
transformation of experience by our perspective prevents us from reaching the truth, and
generates a thoroughgoing falsification of our beliefs. (Anderson 1996 318)
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Since the concepts “unity” and “thinghood” and “identity” are all presupposed in any
observation of an object, it follows that any observation supporting a statement presupposing
these concepts necessarily falsifies. We can now see why discarding the apparent world in stage
six is possible:
…in the absence of a workable concept of the “true world,” we are no longer entitled to
the true/apparent distinction, and therefore cannot characterize the empirical world as
“apparent.” (Anderson 1996 320)
The strategy is to first get rid of the “true world,” and once we do that we “also and at the same
time [lose] any right to denigrate the empirical world as “merely apparent” (ibid). So stage five
and six aren’t distinct stages of development, but are instead “two sides of the same coin” (ibid).
In other words, because we always bring concepts that are imposed on the data of sense in order
to make the world intelligible to ourselves, and that these concepts aren’t also derived from
objects themselves, it follows that whatever we make of it will succumb to the falsification
thesis.
Anderson introduces an additional reason for accepting this interpretation: since stages
one and two represent the same concept in error, though the content of that concept is put into
practice differently, it doesn’t fail to be germane to the spirit of development of an error through
stages even if more than one stage shares the same concept and therefore the same error. In stage
one, the Platonist resides in the true world because he is it—“I Plato, am the truth.” The
Platonists specialization enables him to intuit the form of the good, but only the virtuous
philosopher can live in and be the arbiter or truth, accordingly. The error in stage one
“progresses” into stage two, but only inasmuch as it is “more subtle, insidious,
incomprehensible—it becomes…Christian” (TI IV). By the same token, stage five and six are
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moments of the same recognition: that once we ditch the “true world” in stage five, we can then
in stage six also abolish the apparent world.
For both the reason that the Kantian model of knowledge persists through the mature
works, and because it isn’t textually incongruent to assign more than one stage to one
development in the “History of an Error,” It follows then, on Anderson’s read, that Nietzsche
isn’t best read as concluding that he rejects the falsification thesis when he concludes “with the
true world we have also abandoned the apparent one” (ibid).
Once again we have an objection from Leiter, since he thinks Anderson’s got it wrong.
Leiter accuses Anderson of failing to understand the textual context of the passages he cites in
Nietzsche’s mature thinking that evince the falsification thesis. Leiter starts by addressing
Anderson’s concession to Clark that one gripe Nietzsche has is with the supposition that there
could be a “non-natural faculty capable of knowledge of reality uncontaminated by the senses”
(Clark 1990 137). Any faculty like “reason” that fits this bill is presumably at least in part being
attacked by Nietzsche in the late works. The line that sparks the controversy, then, in TI III 2:
What we make of [the senses’] testimony that alone introduces lies; for example, the lie
of unity, the lie of thinghood, of substance, of permanence. “Reason” is the cause of our
falsification of the testimony of the senses. (TI III 2)
So this may look like a winning game for Clark—“reason” is scare quoted, and in the context of
talk about the other categories of the understanding, it looks like Nietzsche is in fact targeting the
Kantian picture of pure reason being able to generate a priori knowledge. If we could abandon
this metaphysical baggage and practice science without thinking that the categories apply
because of a priori knowledge of the way human minds work, then we would have a practice of
science falling outside the scope of Nietzsche’s attack here.
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Anderson doesn’t think that this picture of the text is adequate to at least one claim
Nietzsche seems to be making in it:
If “reason” named a faculty that no one had, then this faculty could not have succeeded in
falsifying the “testimony of the senses”…A non-faculty could not be the “cause of
falsification.” (Anderson 1996 320)
To paraphrase the argument: if Nietzsche were picturing reason in the Kantian sense, and he
seems to believe that the faculty of pure reason doesn’t exist, then it follows that a faculty that
doesn’t exist can’t do any causal work in rendering this or that piece of knowledge falsified.
Nietzsche can’t be talking about a faculty he doesn’t think exists if it has to exist in order to
falsify reality, Nietzsche is attacking the faculty of reason that posits “unity, the lie of thinghood,
of substance, of permanence” (TI II 2). This is the faculty at work in empirical judgment, for any
empirical judgment presupposes these categories. Therefore, Nietzsche is advancing the
falsification thesis in TI II 2.
Leiter, however, doesn’t think this is the right gloss. His counter-argument is that what
Nietzsche is getting at in this passage is:
…of course, that philosophers have taken categories that they believed to be deliverances
of “pure reason” and applied them to reality, and in doing so falsified the real world. So
Anderson’s retort leaves Clark’s interpretation of the text untouched. (Leiter 2002 19)
So Anderson has it wrong: what Nietzsche is talking about here are the philosophers who
mistakenly craft a story about the existence of a non-natural faculty that we need to posit as
having literal existence in order to explain the conditions necessary for the possibility of
experience. This counterargument is attractive, especially if (1) it’s the case that, as Leiter
claims, “Nietzsche puts “reason” in scare-quotes throughout the section” (Leiter 2002 18) to call
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attention to the distinction Leiter is flagging. It would be even more attractive if (2) Nietzsche
contrasted the deliverances of reason, non-scare-quoted, to contrast between a kind of knowledge
he wants to advocate for and the faulty picture of knowledge built around “reason.” Finally, it
would be an open-and-shut case against Anderson’s read if (3) Nietzsche’s use of scare quotes
were deployed consistently to this end.
Looking a little closer at (1), since Leiter is attacking Anderson’s argument on the basis
of the textual context of TI III 2 and 5, let’s see if his claim checks out. Nietzsche uses “reason”
once, scare-quoted, in TI III 2; in TI 5, he attacks it scare-quoted once in quotation marks, but
twice non-scare-quoted.22 So Nietzsche’s use of scare-quotes is at least an incomplete guide to
unpacking what his target is.
Looking a little closer at (2), things fare even worse for Leiter. Nietzsche doesn’t contrast
the deliverances of reason, non-scare-quoted, to issue a contrast between kinds of knowledge he
wants to advocate for and the kinds of knowledge in that epistemically faulty picture built on the
Kantian conception of “reason.” He does, however, expand on the epistemically faulty picture of
knowledge under attack in this textual context, and in doing so, shows that he’s not just picking
on “reason,” scare-quoted or not. This invites even worse trouble for (3).
Immediately following the claim that “reason” “is the cause of our falsification of the
testimony of the senses,” Nietzsche clarifies how “reason” is the culprit here: “Insofar as the
senses show becoming, passing away, and change, they do not lie. But Heraclitus will remain
eternally right with his assertion that being is an empty fiction” (TI III 2). This is an ontological
claim that is grounding a general error of positing any reality of being against the reality of
becoming. At stake is not just the domain of empirical claims that Clark and Leiter think
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I return to this problem in 2.2b
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Nietzsche is trying to nudge us in the direction of making in an intellectually honest way, free
from Kantian metaphysical prejudices; it is the whole host of concepts we use to organize the
data of sense, whether they participate in the Kantian metaphysical prejudices or not.
Anderson clarifies: “Although our “reason” might not need, say, the category of
substance, we cannot do without some concepts to organize the data of sense” (Anderson 1996
318). Citing a fragment of the notebooks that explain why Nietzsche would be comfortable
conflating “reason” and reason non-scare-quoted as culprits in falsification, Nietzsche claims that
“Rational thought is interpretation according to a scheme that we cannot throw off” (Anderson
1996 319). Any schematized judgment that seeks to impose order on the world by making it
understood as a stable, unified, intelligible whole would presumably be doing something with the
senses that would be making a falsehood out of their testimony insofar as, again, they are not
showing “becoming, passing away, and change” (TI III 2).
Leiter’s counter-argument to Anderson is therefore unsound. There is no making-good on
a non-scare-quoted-reason-generated knowledge claim in TI II 2 or 5, because at the heart of
Nietzsche’s thinking, human minds falsify reality. Because the falsification thesis is alive and
well in these passages—in one of Nietzsche’s most central “mature” works—it follows we have
one reason for thinking that science cannot be a source of general normative authority.

2.2b TI VI 3, “The Error of a False Causality”
In TI VI, Nietzsche is surveying what he calls “The Four Great Errors,” one of which is
“The Error of a False Causality.” I will provide a general exegesis of the section focusing on the
error of a false causality and argue that what Nietzsche is expressing in this section is, once
again, another iteration of the falsification thesis. Despite obvious appearances that giving

57

expression to the falsification thesis is what he’s up to here, Clark (1993) gives one objection to
this reading, while Leiter gives a different objection against a similar reading as it appears in
Acompora (2006). I will take the objections in turn—Clark’s argument that the textual context
calls for a distinction between the world “in-itself” and “as it appears to us” lacks any plausible
support. Leiter’s objection to Acompora fares poorly.
In TI VI, Nietzsche enumerates over a number of aphorisms the four great errors of
western thought. They are “the error of confusing cause and effect,” (TI VI 1—2) “the error of a
false causality,” (TI VI 3) “the error of imaginary causes” (TI VI 4—6) and “the error of free
will” (TI VI 7—8). The “error” that gets a lot of attention from commentators is the second in
the list, the error of a false causality. The textual context concerns mental causation: Nietzsche
generally characterizes mentality or consciousness (and other mental phenomena) as an
epiphenomenon of psycho-physiological activity.23
In TI VI, the case appears to be the same: “the “inner world” is full of phantoms and willo’-the-wisps—the will is one of them. The will no longer moves anything, hence does not
explain anything either—it merely accompanies events; it can also be absent” (TI VI 3). In other
words, whenever I have a thought or formulate an intention, it’s not the case that there is a
substantive “I” as a subject contributing to the direction of my thought or intention. At best,
Nietzsche claims, there may be something like an “I” watching a causally structured series of
events unfold, mentality being a member of this set.
The difference, however, is that in this context Nietzsche’s argument to the conclusion
that mental causation is fictional is not the end of the story. From the fact that we falsely attribute
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See, e.g., GS 354 for an extended commentary on this claim; this claim is made in numerous places,
however, across Nietzsche’s so-called “intellectual development.”
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the causal efficacy of our own minds in generating intentions, thoughts or actions as effects of a
casually efficacious will, Nietzsche thinks that we project this error onto the world of objects:
Humans even took the concept of being from the concept of the ego; they posited “things” as
“being,” in their image, in accordance with their concept of the ego as cause. Small wonder
that they always found in things only that which they had put into them. The thing itself, to
say it once more, the concept of thing is a mere reflex of the faith in the ego as cause. (TI VI
3)
As we saw in the Copernicus passages, Nietzsche maintains his commitment to the semantic
interpretation of theoretical terms such that their meaning is constructed out of the internal
relations they inhabit to others, which is a function of a kind of linguistic projection on the part
of scientists. However, in this passage Nietzsche is leveling a metaphysical charge against
scientists: thinking that causation is the kind of event that belongs in nature is a mere “reflex of
the faith in ego as cause,” and arises in the first place out of the prejudices in western
metaphysics that posit the existence of a causally efficacious will. The concept of a “thing”
occurs when we describe objects in nature as stable, unified subjects participating in causal
networks because of the bad habit of interpreting ourselves as unified subjects; the concept of
“cause” likewise occurs only because of the bad habit of thinking of our unified autonomous
selves as having the capacity to causally efficaciously orient ourselves in thought, intention and
action in the world.
If “thing” and “cause” are mere projections of bad interpretation of human mentality and
action, then it follows that for any observation in scientific practice that the description of the
observation will presuppose the metaphysics of bad interpretation of human mentality and action.
If that observation presupposes the metaphysics of bad interpretation of human mentality and
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action, then we have reason to think, once again, that human minds falsify reality. Since “thing”
and “cause” are mere projections of bad interpretation of human mentality and action, then, it
follows that Nietzsche is claiming in this passage that human minds falsify reality. And since the
falsification has emerged once again in the “mature” works, we have reason to think the
developmental hypothesis fails to capture a stable development in his thinking that would show
he comes to accept truth as unproblematic.
However, Clark’s reading anticipates this interpretation. On her account, here and
elsewhere, the developmental hypothesis remains fully intact and helps explain what Nietzsche is
really driving at in TI VI. On Clark’s reading, as we saw above, Nietzsche here is fully
abandoning any commitment to the thing in-itself, denying that it bears any significance on truth.
To develop this claim in the context of TI VI 3, she critically examines the concluding aphorism
of TI III, section 6:
First Proposition: The reasons for which “this” world has been characterized as
“apparent” are the very reasons which indicate its reality; any other kind of reality is
absolutely indemonstrable.
Second Proposition: The criteria which have been bestowed on the “true being” of things
are the criteria of not-being, of naught; the “true world” has been constructed out of
contradiction to the actual world: indeed an apparent world, insofar as it is merely a
moral-optical illusion. (TI III 6)
Looking at the first proposition, “this” world might be characterized as such because its contrary,
the “other” world, or the world as it is in-itself, requires that it merely shows itself as it appears
to us. But if the reason why “this” world is characterized as such is that it can never show up as it
really is in-itself, then we are appealing to another “kind of reality” that is “indemonstrable.”

60

The attack on the distinction between the world as it appears to us and how it is in-itself
appears to continue on into the second proposition—except here Nietzsche asserts that criteria
for an object to bear properties of its “true being” are “not-being,” or not. Because Nietzsche
denigrates the distinction between appearance and reality as essentially being a “moral-optical
illusion,” i.e., lacking reality, it seems that what Nietzsche clearly has in mind again in TI, as we
saw above, is an attack on the distinction between appearance and reality. Specifically, any kind
of metaphysical correspondence theory that could serve as the basis of falsification seems to be
off the table in TI.
Returning to TI IV 3, we can see something plausibly similar taking place. When
Nietzsche attacks positing “things” as “being,” and lambasts the concept of causality in nature as
a projection of a bad interpretation of human mentality and action, he’s attacking the same
caricature of Kantian metaphysics as he did in TI III 6. With that in mind, we might have a good
reason for thinking that Nietzsche is talking about attributing these properties to objects as they
are in themselves—that causality is a relational property in-itself between two objects in
themselves. And as Clark would have it, it’s exactly this metaphysical claim mature Nietzsche
has come to abandon in his mature writings. And so having resolutely given up on the thing initself as the standard for truth, we can simply accept the world as it appears to us with causal
structure as one against which we have no other measure, and so have no reason for rejecting.
However, there is some relevant textual context absent from this reading. On the face of
it, it would be strange to think that Nietzsche would ever exoterically enumerate propositions
about what he thinks without abandoning the aphoristic style that defines how he chooses to
present his work over the course of his life. Indeed, as Clark quotes “first proposition” and
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“second proposition” from TI III, 6, she does so without addressing the puzzling characterization
Nietzsche provides in introducing these “propositions:”
It will be appreciated if I condense so essential and so new an insight into four theses. In
that way I facilitate comprehension; in that way I provoke contradiction. (TI II, 6)
It is noteworthy that in this aphorism Nietzsche starts by stating his intention to provoke
contradiction by facilitating comprehension: in other words, if he facilitates the reader’s
understanding the four propositions in this aphorism then it follows that he “provokes
contradiction.” In “understanding” here, your state of understanding isn’t just one in which you
understand that something is contradictory; Nietzsche may as well have said that he
“communicates a contradiction” if that’s what he meant.
I think something more is going on in TI III 6: by provoking a contradiction, Nietzsche is
calling attention to performing one in this textual context. Normally if I facilitate your
comprehension of something, the result is that you understand it, and not watch somebody
contradict themselves. Let’s suppose I’m teaching a student how to complete a proof in natural
deduction. I might start with a basic proof using just a few rules of inference; modeling the
application of the rules to the premises of the argument a few times, I (hopefully) succeed in
facilitating the comprehension about completing some basic proofs in natural deduction. But if
elements in a comprehension contain a contradiction in the mind of the student, by succeeding in
helping that student understand how to complete some proofs in natural deduction, it clearly isn’t
the case that I have facilitated any comprehension at all! Quite the opposite is the case: if I
succeed in facilitating your comprehension of p, and as a result, you believe both p and not p,
then you haven’t comprehended p—at least, not as such. Any use of this textual context to
supply reasons for thinking that content in this context represents something a mature Nietzsche
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thinks must address what appears to be probably an intentionally paradoxical framework
Nietzsche situates his propositions in.24 Otherwise, we aren’t digging any deeper into the
predicates that can be affixed to the so-called mature Nietzsche.
A second and potentially more damaging problem emerges for Clark’s reading of TI VI.
Her reading once again fails to account for the textual context of the immediately preceding
aphorism. Consider Nietzsche’s attack on reason in TI II 5:
Formerly, alteration, change, any becoming at all, were taken as proof of mere
appearance, as an indication that there must be something which led us astray. (TI II 5)
I take it that an exemplar for this observation is Descartes’ wax experiment in the second
meditation. There, Descartes inspects a piece of wax using the senses: he observed its color,
odor, texture, &c. Using the senses as the criterion, Descartes attempts to formulate an
appropriate concept of the object. However, subjecting the wax to the flame yields a different
color, odor, texture, &c. Since the identity of the wax remains the same, the senses present us
with a concept of the object problematically susceptible to “alteration, change, any becoming at
all.” Thus, the senses can only provide a “mere appearance” of the object, and deeper cognitive
inspection is required to formulate a concept of the object appropriate to it. This line of
reasoning, however, Nietzsche rejects:
Today, conversely, precisely insofar as the prejudice of reason forces us to posit unity,
identity, permanence, substance, cause, thinghood, being, we see ourselves somehow
caught in error, compelled into error. So certain are we, on the basis of rigorous
examination, that this is where the error lies. (TI II 5)

24

I provide an explanation for why I think Nietzsche is doing this in the introduction to Chapter 3.
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Note first that Nietzsche isn’t referring to the prejudice of “reason” to posit “unity,” “identity,”
“permanence,” “substance,” “cause,” “thinghood” and “being.” Recall that Clark couches her
account of Nietzsche in these passages as really taking issue with the domain of these concepts
as they are relegated to the in-itself of objects, and not the concepts themselves.
Recall too that her account depends on at least in part that Nietzsche consistently
delineates the meaning of these words by appealing to a use/mention distinction—he will use the
word truth when he refers to it in the metaphysically unproblematic sense of the term, but
mentions “truth” by scare quoting it when he wants to flag that it is participating in the Kantian
game of the in-itself. Nietzsche isn’t doing that here, just as he wasn’t in TI III 2—so it follows
once again that either his use of the use/mention quoting conventions to indicate problematic
concepts is inconsistent either because he isn’t doing it here but should be, or it follows that
Nietzsche isn’t calling our attention to the problems that these concepts involve at all having to
do with the in-itself.
Indeed, as Nietzsche continues in the passage, he exactly points to problems that these
concepts are tangled up in that, at the same time, do not need to rely on having anything to do
with the in-itself. He continues:
It is no different in this case than with the movement of the sun: there our eye is the
constant advocate of error, here it is our language. In its origin language belongs in the
age of the most rudimentary form of psychology. We enter a realm of crude fetishism
when we summon before consciousness the basic presuppositions of the metaphysics of
language, in plain talk, the presuppositions of reason. (TI II 5)
I take Nietzsche’s accusation of the eye as the “constant advocate of error,” especially here by
calling our attention again back to the historical development of astronomy as evidence of
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incommensurability, as an echo of the argument he makes in the Copernicus passages. We have
seen enough about this, so a passing observation will suffice: just like the error revealed in the
historical development of astronomy is an error revealed in the everyday use of language itself.
Nietzsche seems to be suggesting here that built into language itself is a “realm of crude
fetishism” that is committed to the presuppositions of reason. Nietzsche expands on what these
presuppositions of language are:
Everywhere it sees a doer and a doing; it believes in will as the cause; it believes in the
ego, in the ego as substance, and it projects this faith in the ego-substance upon all
things—only thereby does it first create the concept of a “thing.” Everywhere “being” is
projected by thought, pushed underneath, as the cause; the concept of being follows, and
is derivative of, the concept of ego. In the beginning there is that great calamity of an
error that the will is something which is effective, that will is a capacity. Today we know
it is only a word. (TI II 5).
Here, Nietzsche emphasizes the same argument that we saw in TI VI 3. The first claim is that the
mind is causally efficacious; second, we project the fiction of there being a causally efficacious
relation between minds and action onto the world, and, as Nietzsche emphasizes, we literally
create things, or objects, by projecting this model of causality onto them. In other words, as we
move from the first into the second claim, we populate the world with entities whose causality
functions as erroneously as the first claim.
The whole empirical world, then, structured on this errant projection, instantiates the
falsification thesis. Surely reality necessarily appears in the way that it does: I don’t have the
capacity to represent something other than an object when it is given to me in consciousness, but
that doesn’t mean that I’m justified or correctly adhering to some criterion of making true claims
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about those objects. Here in TI II 5, as well as in TI VI 3, we have a consistent iteration of
reasons to think the falsification thesis obtains. If it is a cognitive error to believe in mental
causality at all, and doing so is the basis for thinking causal relations really obtain in empirical
observation, then human minds falsify reality.
There is an even stronger argument, however, that Clark passes over in this textual
context. Nietzsche appears to make the claim that not only is it the case that human minds falsify
reality, but that reality itself is such that any kind of causal predication to a stable subject is
undermined due to the fact that becoming fundamentally disrupts our ability to say anything true
in general. Everywhere, he stresses in TI II, “”being” is projected by thought pushed underneath,
as the cause…” (TI II 5). Being itself is presupposed in any empirical observation, and not on the
basis of simple attribution of this predicate to the thing as it is in-itself apart from all possible
representations. The world, Nietzsche seems to suggest here, is ontologically becoming, and any
true empirical observation indicating being is necessarily false on this independent basis.
However, Leiter (2016) has an objection to this account of TI VI 3, which is similar to
my account which is his target in that essay (Acampora 2006). On her account, TI VI 3 should be
read along the lines I’ve just spelled out—namely, that Nietzsche’s gripe is that in attributing
causal relations to instantiate in and between objects, and, that in turn, inferring that the world is
made up of objects inhabiting these relations, it follows that:
The empirical world of the scientist is populated by a host of ‘spirit-subjects’ in the form
of ‘doers’ or agents. This is the framework in which the concept of causation operates.
(Acampora 2006, 320).
Leiter isn’t convinced that from the error of believing in causally efficacious minds that it
follows we have license to the conclusion that Nietzsche thinks that causation itself is a projected
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error mirroring the original one made in believing there are to be causally efficacious minds. And
he has a good reason to try to block this conclusion: if it were true that mature Nietzsche rejects
causal claims in the empirical world, it would seem that mature Nietzsche would have little
interest in the version of m-naturalism that Leiter attributes to him.
The reason Leiter thinks it makes sense to insist that Nietzsche isn’t claiming that we
project this cognitive error onto our model of nature insofar as it purports objects there to abide
causality lies curiously in the translation that he has prepared for the argument-relevant bit of TI
VI 3. After conceding that the most important part of this passage is the conclusion and
attempting to bolster his account on the grounds that he cites more of the passage than Acampora
does, Leiter provides the following gloss of the final sentences of the concluding paragraph of TI
VI 3:
Even the ‘thing,’ to say it again, the concept of a thing, is just a reflex of the belief in the
I as cause…and even your atom, my dear Mr. Mechanist and Mr. Physicist, how many
errors, how much rudimentary psychology is left in your atom! Not to mention the ‘thingin-itself’…! The error of thinking that mind caused reality! And to make it the measure of
reality! And to call it God!
From that passage content, Leiter claims, “that we are mistaken in thinking the conscious will is
causal in action…clearly entails no skepticism about the reality of causation, which is what is
supposed to be at issue in Acampora’s critique of my reading of Nietzsche’s M-Naturalism”
(Leiter 2016 16). And maybe he would be right, on the content of his passage translation: the
errors of mechanists and physicists, presented alongside the metaphysician’s thing-in-itself,
could run afoul into “thinking that mind caused reality,” and in their errors, think their metrics
amount to “the measure of reality,” and finally also call it “God.” Meanwhile, clear-headed
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empirical scientists practice their inquiry innocently and have the reality of causation woven into
the claims they make, since they aren’t in the business of thinking that “mind caused reality.”
However, think about where we jumped off of from the top of the passage and where we
landed. It’s hard to see how landing on the interpretation that empirical science can peddle
metaphysically uncontroversial claims because they don’t think mind causes reality has anything
to do with the relation of the error of projecting the structure of mental causation to the empirical
world. Let’s take a look at the original German of the Leiter-translated portion of the passage
above:
Und selbst noch Ihr Atom, meine Herren Mechanisten und Physiker, wie viel Irrthum,
wie viel rudimentäre Psychologie ist noch in Ihrem Atom rückständig! - Gar nicht zu
reden vom "Ding an sich", vom horrendum pudendum der Metaphysiker! Der Irrthum
vom Geist als Ursache mit der Realität verwechselt! Und zum Maass der Realität
gemacht! Und Gott genannt! –
The source of that strange irrelevance can now be made clear. Focusing on the last two
sentences, grammatically, Nietzsche just plainly isn’t saying what Leiter translates him as
saying. He isn’t saying “The error of thinking [is] that mind caused reality!” when he says “Der
Irrthum vom Geist als Ursache mit der Realität verwechselt!” He is saying: “the error of mind as
cause mistaken for reality!” or “…confused for reality!” He is simply not concluding the passage
about an error in thinking that mind causes reality. And Nietzsche concluding TI VI 3 with that
remark would confuse any reader anyway because that’s not what the passage is about. The
passage is about “the thing itself, to say it once more, the concept of the thing is a mere reflex of
the faith in the ego as cause” (ibid). And because the concept of a thing is a mere reflex of faith
about the ego as cause, it follows that Nietzsche is exactly expressing skepticism about causation
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in this passage as a result of it being modeled on the errant picture of a causally efficacious mind
projected onto the structure of the world. So, when Leiter says:
Suppose it is true that our belief in “atoms” resulted from our false belief that our wills
are causal. How does this lead to skepticism about causation? (Leiter, ibid)
One wonders in response if he has read an even somewhat accurate translation of TI at all. Let’s
assume he has; one plausible option for explaining his confusion here is that in constructing his
own translation, Leiter incompetently mistranslated the final sentences of the passage and his
inability to understand the passage stems from this mistake.
If the issue is incompetent translation, though, we would expect the rest of Leiter’s
translation of TI VI 3 to be thoroughly garbled; German readers know it isn’t, and the fact that it
isn’t garbled explains why in broad strokes it looks more or less like Kaufmann’s. The case at
hand seems decisively disanalogous to an “Ich bin ein Berliner” mistake. So: what gives? I have
a somewhat more plausible and I guess slightly more charitable hypothesis. Since Leiter has had
an agenda over the last twenty odd years in articulating and defending “Nietzsche’s MNaturalism” (which he continues to do), it of course looks bad for your account if you both
subscribe to the developmental hypothesis and your mature Nietzsche is very liberally assaulting
robust conceptual elements of the m-naturalist framework—here, the concept of causation itself.
It is in clear view of this very liberal assault that led Acampora to observe that Leiter’s account
of Nietzsche is “simply mistaken” (Acampora 2006 ibid). To be fair: I think there is a kind of
thinking that sometimes occurs in Nietzsche’s published works that matches up with Leiter’s mnaturalist reading. But this passage is a thorn in the side of anyone in Leiter’s philosophical
position. The charitable explanation of the mistranslation, then, is that there is some obvious and
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intentional mistranslation of the German to make sure that mature Nietzsche plays by the rules
Leiter has set out for him.
At the end of his rope in a different discussion in the same 2016 essay, Leiter makes a
conditional concession that the will to power may be a metaphysical claim that mature Nietzsche
accepts; however, he states:
If it turns out that Nietzsche, the man, really is committed to what seems entailed by the
most flat-footed literalism about a bare handful of published “will to power” passages,
then so much worse for Nietzsche we might say. We do Nietzsche the philosopher a
favor, however, if we reconstruct his project in terms that are both recognizably his in
significant part, and yet at the same time far more plausible once the crackpot
metaphysics of the will to power (that all organic matter “is will to power”) is
expunged…Nietzsche was a mere mortal like the rest of us, and even being a genius
cannot compensate for the dangers of being self-taught about so much. Perhaps Nietzsche
really did believe he had some deep insight into the correct metaphysics of nature, one
missed by the empirical sciences. If he had that thought—one wholly inconsistent with
the rest of his naturalism—so much the worse for him. (Leiter 2016 19)
To paraphrase: if Nietzsche is really inarguably committed to this claim or the claim that
becoming disrupts any and all epistemic credibility to empirical claims, due to textual evidence
for it in the mature writings, then accepting these “so much the worse for Nietzsche!” qualifiers
as the case somehow saves Nietzsche’s philosophical significance from himself. Leiter’s gambit
is to therefore jettison as “crackpot” what appears incongruent with his own account of mature
Nietzsche, and to steadfastly insist he’s got a handle on how the mature Nietzsche ought to be
representing his thoughts.
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To respond to this strategy: first, I would stake a high credence on the fact obtaining that
Nietzsche the person would reject the paternalism of someone claiming to better understand his
thinking than he himself does. Nietzsche the philosopher would reject ever needing a favor done
in order to get his project off the ground in the “right way.” The bottom line here, I think, is that
there are only so many “dangers” you can help save Nietzsche from until you are no longer in a
dialogue with Nietzsche at all.25 “So much the worse for” is a phrase really not about Nietzsche
at all; it’s about Leiter, who, when confronted with evidence that supplies a reason for thinking a
major thesis of his research is false, dissembles. And here my spade is overturned—I don’t have
anything else to say about an account of Nietzsche’s thinking that treats it not just with disregard
but, quite plausibly, with intentional dishonesty.

2.3 Conclusion
In this chapter I have outlined three arguments against reading Nietzsche as affording science
general normative authority. I argued that in the late work GM, Nietzsche expresses skepticism
even about common sense correspondence—what Clark treats as a “disquotational” view of
truth. If science proceeds successively in incommensurable paradigms, then it follows that what
we’re talking about when we make empirical claims is really the referent of internal relations
constituted in and by the socially imposed regimes of “normal science.” If the referent of
empirical claims are the internal relations constituted in and by the socially imposed regimes of
“normal science,” then it’s not the case that truth is out there, and can be located independently
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I return to this important problem in the conclusion of this dissertation. The problem of reading
Nietzsche with a hermeneutics of charity, or with consistency in relation to some doctrine or other, is one
that presents itself to other commentators as well (most of whom handle the challenge with more grace
than Leiter does). Janaway (2007) correctly identifies, I think, some potentially insurmountable barriers of
time, language, culture and history, all of which prevent us from likely succeeding in the task of finding
out what the “Real Nietzsche” was up to.
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of these practices. It follows, therefore, that science can’t itself supply the source of general
normative authority because there are socio-cultural-political interpretive activities that precede
any empirical observation which are responsible for giving it its structure and content. Therefore,
there is one textual context in which Nietzsche expresses incommensurability about theoretical
terms which is logically incompatible with affording science general normative authority. It is, as
Rorty rightly attributes to Nietzsche, merely one perspective on the world among many others, as
Rorty likes to say. (Rorty 1989)
The second and third arguments are, as we saw, situated in a more thoroughgoing
location of Nietzsche’s intellectual maturity—in TI, a work in which Nietzsche is supposed to
have finally gotten over the intellectual motivation to doubt truth. In 2.2a I reviewed two
interpretations of TI III 2 and 5—Clark’s, which is intended to support the view that there is a
mature Nietzsche operating in the textual context. I introduced Anderson’s account, which I used
to explicate an objection to Clark’s reading. He argues that if there is no causally efficacious
“reason” to falsify reality, then there isn’t a faculty accomplishing this goal; but there is a faculty
falsifying reality, and it is reason. Therefore, Nietzsche subscribes to the falsification thesis. I
introduced Leiter’s objection to this argument, which hinges on an implausible interpretation of
the textual context of TI III 2 and 5. I also reviewed a different textual context of TI in 2.2b to
see if things cash out differently between Clark and Leiter’s interpretation and my running
interpretation. Not only is the conclusion of 2.2a supported, but I argue that Leiter intentionally
mistranslates a relevant portion to distort the text to appear to run counter to any appearance of
the falsification thesis in the mature works.
So from 2.1-2.2, it follows that the falsification thesis is true at least in part in Nietzsche’s
mature period; and if that’s true, then both the developmental hypothesis is either incomplete or
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false and that science does not have general normative authority in the later works. At this point,
we are left to wonder: what entity or process could possess normative authority if it is neither
religion nor science? Many commentators think it has to be science, and I’ve given reasons to
think this is not the case. Is there anything left? I think so. Instead of looking at theoretical
sources of general normativity, for Nietzsche I think the best answer comes from a practical
source of normativity.
The practical source of normativity is the value of life itself, and the general normative
authority of life it is encapsulated in, quite characteristically, a series of questions Nietzsche puts
to the reader to try to illuminate that for them. In the following chapter, I will unpack the general
normative authority of the value of life as it occurs in the published works. Since Nietzsche calls
attention to it infrequently, the task will be somewhat apocryphal; however, I think in tandem
with remarks Nietzsche makes about “higher moralities” that a general source of normativity in
the value of life itself can function as the “higher morality” Nietzsche never explicitly articulates.

73

CHAPTER THREE: THE ORDERS OF NIETZSCHEAN NORMATIVITY

3.1 Introduction
I have shown that there are serious challenges to the developmental hypothesis, and these
challenges are perhaps insurmountable; and if these challenges are insurmountable, then it
follows that we have good reasons against accepting the view that scientific inquiry can be the
source of general normative authority for Nietzsche. If science fails as a candidate, then we need
to uncover the source of general normative authority that can be best understood as pervading
Nietzsche’s thought. In this chapter, I will claim that the value one places on their own life is the
bearer of general normative authority for Nietzsche. This general normative authority outstrips
other sources of normative authority, including science.
But first, a final word about science. It’s clearly not the case that in the published works,
Nietzsche thinks science is not a source of normativity full stop. We need to find a place for
science that can measure up to our standards for textual consistency. In what follows, I will make
the case for a conception of Nietzschean normativity such that it is ordered across different
instances of valuational degree. There may be a domain appropriate to the normativity of science
such that its pursuit and our acceptance of its results are warranted; but the domain of general
normative authority extends farther, and contains values more important than those animating
the normative domain of science. I will address this up front, and proceed to argue that GS 341
contains an argument for higher morality. Explicating it requires close attention to the way
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naturalism is retained in the normativity in Nietzsche’s higher morality. I look to Schacht (2013)
for a good provisional model of this normativity, but argue his account sells the space of
individuality short. To unpack what that could be, I turn to Anderson (2013) and examine his
concept of the Nietzschean “minimal” self. The self being addressed, properly understood, is the
subject of Nietzschean higher morality, and the manner of his non-MPS moral system is thus
exhibited. Although this is a formal picture of what I think higher morality for Nietzsche looks
like, I close by canvassing a few objections pertaining to the ability of the theory to generate
content that is recognizably moral.

3.2 The Order of Scientific Normativity
Consider an argument that Leiter makes in objecting to Acampora’s read of TI VI 3. In
addition to the unsound argument Leiter makes against Acampora that I detailed in the prior
chapter, Leiter adds the following sound argument:
Suppose it is true that our belief in “atoms” resulted from our (false) belief that our wills
are causal. How does this lead to skepticism about causation? It might warrant skepticism
about the atomistic metaphysics of physics, but causation seems intact. Indeed, in the
very next section of Twilight, Nietzsche quickly returns to his confident distinguishing of
real from imaginary causes, consistent with the entire tenor of this chapter. (Leiter 2013
591my emphasis).
Nietzsche in fact does this—and not only in TI. Another of Nietzsche’s late works, AC,
published after TI, contains an important shift in the way Nietzsche speaks about the senses and
empirical investigation. In decisively cognitive language, packed to the brim with causal claims,
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Nietzsche describes not only in AC 15 but throughout AC itself the failures of the Christian
metaphysics:
In Christianity neither morality nor religion has even a single point of contact with
reality. Nothing but imaginary causes (“God,” “soul,” “ego,” “spirit,” “free will”—for
that matter, “unfree will”), nothing but imaginary effects (“sin,” “redemption,” “grace,”
“punishment,” “forgiveness of sins”). (AC 15, emphasis unchanged)
So, although I think it is a mistake to think Nietzsche is doing anything but denying causality in
TI VI 3, it is equally mistaken to think that Nietzsche in these later works has something against
the concept of causality itself. After all, he’s here making the claim that God is an imaginary
cause, along with the rest—and he’s rattling off a series of imaginary effects, to boot.
Even Acampora concedes the following later in her analysis of Nietzsche’s general
commitments concerning causation:
This is not to say Nietzsche rejects causation altogether, only that our current way of
conceiving it is hampered by these other conceptual presuppositions or ‘errors’ as
[Nietzsche] calls them. (Acampora 2006: 330 n. 8)
Leiter makes of this remark that it is actually a concession by Acampora to his argument against
her reading—and again, Leiter argues soundly: if Nietzsche is perfectly content to deny that the
content of your mind as you understand it is the kind of entity that can bear any causal relation
on your actions, or really anything else, then Nietzsche in this textual context is simply saying
that some causal claims are false, but is not committing himself to the claim that all causal claims
are. And if not all causal claims are false, it follows that some (or “at least one”) are true, then it
turns out Nietzsche doesn’t have a gripe with causation as such, contrary to Acampora’s original
claim.
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If Nietzsche is sometimes committing himself to the falsification thesis in his later works,
but sometimes wholesale abandoning it, as evinced in AC 15—what gives? How can Nietzsche
sometimes claim, as I argued he does in chapter 2, that the concept of causation itself is a mere
projection of human, western metaphysical, conceptual prejudice on a world that doesn’t answer
to being? “The world” rather answers to its true essence as a radical flux of becoming—but then
Nietzsche turns around the next chapter, the next book, elsewhere, and starts making claims
about real causes, distinguishing them from imaginary causes. Is this simply a case of incoherent
thought?
I think a preliminary answer is that: yes, this is a case of incoherent thought. But I highly
doubt that Nietzsche is accidentally incoherent here26 about his general commitment to causality.
If he isn’t accidentally incoherent, then I suspect he has a purpose for including the contradiction
in his published works. As our first clue as to why he might be committing himself to an
incoherent position on causality on purpose, recall that in Chapter 2 I claimed that any good
account of what’s going on in the textual context of TI V and VI will have to answer to what’s
going on with the conclusion of TI V. There, Nietzsche says “It will be appreciated if I condense
so essential and so new an insight into four theses. In that way I facilitate comprehension; in that
way I provoke contradiction.” I claimed that any good account of TI needs to address why
Nietzsche is situating the condensed conclusion of the section “Reason in Philosophy” in this
paradoxical context—neither Leiter’s, Clark’s nor Acampora’s do this.
When Leiter observes that Nietzsche “quickly returns to his confident distinguishing of
real from imaginary causes, consistent with the entire tenor of this chapter,” I think he
inadvertently shows that he’s aware of what’s actually going on in TI VI 3, despite intentionally
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And elsewhere, too, where apparent incoherence emerges, e.g. TL.
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mistranslating27 the passage to cover over textual consistency problems with his account. Why
does Nietzsche “quickly return” to making causal claims unless he’s paused or began a
substantial diversion from doing just that—and such a diversion, Leiter wants to claim,
Nietzsche was never even on to in the first place.
Nietzsche is putting forth p in TI VI 3, GM III 25, TL et. al—and ~p in TI VI 4, in the
passage from AC cited above. Facilitating comprehension of Nietzsche’s thinking in the style I
have just formulated provokes contradiction: he’s arguing for a conclusion and its contradictory,
and in TI, the same textual context. Recall the forceful conclusion of Nietzsche’ analysis of
science’s commitment to the ascetic ideal:
No! Don’t give me science as an answer when I look for the natural antagonist of the
ascetic ideal, when I ask: “where is the opposing will in which its opposing ideal
expresses itself?” Science is far from standing enough on its own for this….(GM III 25)
The metaphysics of causation have their place in empirical observation, and science is capable of
supplying truth—even under the model of Kuhnian incommensurability, science has its place in
explaining the world. In other words, the practice of empirical observation in scientific practice
is a source of normativity. There is normative authority in science, for Nietzsche; he makes
empirical claims and compares their value to non-empirical religious or philosophical claims. To
claim otherwise is to ignore passages such as I have detailed so far in this chapter. Science’s
deployment of the senses to critically examine and interrogate the world is a cognitively superior
way of accessing it to the way Christianity does, and the way philosophers often do.
Granting normative authority to science, I will offer, is a way of giving it a scalar degree
of ordered, normative superiority over western metaphysics. It subscribes to the ascetic ideal, as
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Or so I abductively argued, from a position of charity, in the prior chapter.
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Nietzsche concludes GM III 27—and we philosophers, having had the flame that Plato lit several
thousand years ago passed on to us, do as well; it is inescapable to the way we operate. However,
the fact that Nietzsche offers up TI VI 3 and then “quickly returns” to the business of slinging
causal claims around is significant, as it is the case that the “mature” works are riddled with this
kind of contradiction.
I propose that we understand Nietzsche communicating to the reader through these
intentional, performative contradictions that there are limitations in value about what theory can
supply to you, however conceived. Theoretical knowledge is important, and developing it
empirically is cognitively superior to the power relations that priests and philosophers establish
in the lies they tell to others about the nature of the world, of reality. But, by showcasing
contradictions on purpose in his own argumentation and presentation of theoretical knowledge, I
propose we understand Nietzsche as communicating that there are orders of normativity: there
are values that surpass the value of the criticism he is able to supply that may motivate a reader
to revise her beliefs about the way the world is. Suppose you accept Nietzsche’s claim that the
reality of the purported causal ordering of the world by Christianity is false. Then, suppose you
read TI VI 3 and Nietzsche says causality is an errant projection on the behavior of objects in the
world based on a false picture of mental causation. Picture Nietzsche whispering, as you reflect
on the tension: There’s something more important, reader. Theoretical, or in the case for
Nietzsche, any worthwhile knowledge in that domain--empirical knowledge--is not the source of
general normative authority because it fails on its own terms to address itself to the person
reading his work the only way a completely general account of normative authority does—
practically.
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3.3 Normativity, Moral Theory and Reflection
In order to dive right into the general source of Nietzschean normative authority, we will
need to get a clearer grip on the relation between moral theory and normativity. It will be useful
to turn to Christine Korsgaard’s picture of the relation. While there are substantial and not
insignificant differences to approaching normativity between Korsgaard and Nietzsche, I will
assume for now, but show after articulating Anderson’s conception of a Nietzschean minimal
self,that there is enough in common with her framework to justify modeling some elements of
Nietzsche’s own thinking on it.28
Korsgaard situates normativity in the framework of reflective endorsement: if, on
reflection, I can’t endorse a belief or a value, it fails to bear any normatively relevant results:
It is always possible for us to call our beliefs and motives into question. This is why, after
all, we seek a philosophical foundation for ethics in the first place: because we are afraid
that the true explanation of why we have moral beliefs and motives might not be the one
that sustains them. Morality might not survive reflection. (Korsgaard 1996 49)
Probably no other moral skeptic came on the scene before Nietzsche to demonstrate so forcefully
a variety of moralities failing to survive his novel standards of reflection. The majority of his
published work is demonstrated to executing exactly the kind of explanation Korsgaard is
canvassing here that is geared at undermining the reasons we think we have for believing and
behaving morally—not just specific instances of having the moral belief that “I ought to do X,”
but believing that I myself and other selves are equipped with the moral psychological equipment
that enables someone with the ability to carry out the functions of morality (e.g. freedom of the
will, transparency of the mind to itself, etc).
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The capacity for reflection will be retained and repurposed for Nietzsche’s higher morality.
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Before pressing on, it’s worth noting that in adopting this model of the relation between
moral theory and normativity, I’m not giving undue epistemic privilege to a mental capacity
Nietzsche spends so much time in the published works trying to undermine. All I’m doing is
illustrating that for Nietzsche, if the moral system in question lines up with the adequacy
conditions for being an MPS, Nietzsche rejects it and it is therefore not normative for his
thinking about morality—that system does not survive Nietzschean reflection and it thereby
“dies,” to put it slightly differently.
Recall that for Nietzsche, the argument that MPS is “unreasonable in form” emerges out
of the following textual context:
all these moralities [of today]…[are] unreasonable in form—because they address
themselves to ‘all,’ because they generalize where generalization is impermissible. All of
them speak unconditionally, take themselves for unconditional, all of them flavored with
more than one grain of salt and tolerable only—at times even seductive—when they
begin to smell over-spiced and dangerous, especially of “the other world.” All of it is,
measured intellectually, worth very little and not by a long shot “science,” much less
“wisdom,” but rather, to say it once more, three times more, prudence, prudence,
prudence, mixed with stupidity, stupidity, stupidity. (BGE 198)
In the textual context of the passage, Nietzsche is taking umbrage with the following
representatives of various moralities, and moralities themselves, on the grounds that they all try
to moderate, diminish or otherwise place limitations on the expression of affect: Spinoza;
Aristotle; Christianity; and Hafiz & Goethe. Presumably all the players here are also subjects of
Nietzsche’s attack in BGE 198 on “these moralities of today.”
In chapter one, I formalized this argument as follows:
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P1’. MPS addresses itself to all and MPS generalizes where generalization is impermissible and
MPS speaks unconditionally and MPS takes itself as unconditional and MPS is aperspectival in
nature and MPS appeals to the “other world.”
P2’ If MPS addresses itself to all and MPS generalizes where generalization is impermissible and
MPS speaks unconditionally and MPS takes itself as unconditional and MPS is aperspectival in
nature and MPS appeals to the “other world” then MPS is unreasonable in form.
Therefore,
C. MPS is unreasonable in form.
Suppose we take this to be a representation of Nietzsche’s central argument against MPS; if
some moral system S contains all six properties I derived from textual context in chapter one of
this dissertation, it follows that S is an MPS and Nietzsche hence rejects S.
To give a brief analysis of the six properties together in a moral system we know
Nietzsche rejects, consider a (brand new to this chapter) S1, Christianity.
S1 “addresses itself to all” in familiar ways—Christians recommend the bible to everyone
as the general source of normative theoretical and practical knowledge. It “generalizes where
generalization is impermissible” because it does not exempt anyone from the scope of its
recommendation. It “speaks unconditionally” in that, as the general source of normative,
theoretical and practical knowledge, there can be no alternate source; in so doing, it gives itself
the authority to be the bearer of this authority, which I take Nietzsche to indicate as problematic
as noting that it “takes itself as unconditional.” It is aperspectival in nature: what the individual
happens to believe, desire or value prior to encountering the normative demands of S1 is
irrelevant to the way in which S1 purports to apply itself to the person. Last, S1 makes explicit
use of the other world in advancing its demands; the use of the otherworlds of heaven and hell
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serve jointly to motivate people to comply with the demands of morality, this latter too being
derived from an other-worldly source (God). S1 ticks all the boxes, and so counts as an MPS;
hence, S1 fails to survive Nietzschean standards of reflection.
Let’s look at S2, the version of Utilitarian moral theory Nietzsche would likely have been
acquainted with, that espoused by JS Mill. For Mill, an action is right to the extent that doing it
causes an introduction of the greatest happiness for the greatest number into the world.29 The
ultimate end of morality, or the supreme principle towards which all human action ought to aim
is happiness. The idea is that in sitting at this desk, I bring about the means capable of realizing
an end—getting some progress in writing today. That end itself serves as the means to a more
general end I may have—finishing the dissertation, which serves my more general desire to
develop in life, which leads, Mill thinks, to my general end—the end of a person, as such—of
personal happiness.
What’s more, in attempting to supply a proof of the greatest happiness principle, Mill
offers up the following:
No reason can be given why the general happiness is desirable, except the fact that each
person desires his own happiness, so far as he thinks it is attainable. But this is a fact; so
we have not only all the proof there could be for such a proposition, and all the proof that
could possibly be demanded, that happiness is good, that each person’s happiness is a
good to that person, and therefore that general happiness is a good to all the aggregate of
all persons. (Mill 1863 24)

This is an intentional simplification of Mill’s view--the analysis of happiness as non-hedonic pleasure
which is intended to avoid utility mongers isn’t relevant to the pattern of assessment Nietzsche generally
finds faulty with utilitarianism. There are certain contemporary non-maximizing versions that may evade
other problematic aspects of MPS, such as“generalizing where generalization is impermissible.” See
Railton (1984). But the form of the recommendation of utilitarianism is one Nietzsche rejects.
29
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In this argument for S2, from the fact that “each person desires his own happiness, so far as he
thinks it is attainable,” Mill claims it follows that happiness is “good,” “good to that person,” and
“that general happiness is a good” for everyone. It’s worth noting that this argument commits a
version of the naturalistic fallacy—just because something is desired, does not make it
desirable.30 Nevertheless, I want to focus on how this line of reasoning places S2 into the mold
of an MPS, and hence, a system which for Nietzsche does not survive reflection.
S2 addresses itself to all by presuming that a condition of the constitution of the way you
value things is that deep down your valuing bottoms out in your own personal happiness. This is
also aperspectival: it doesn’t matter what “optics” you happen to have on the value of your own
personal happiness, or how you see and rank its importance to you. These two properties taken in
tandem suggest that Mill’s moral theory is generalizing where generalization is impermissible.31
Indeed, consider the following remark for a more explicit framing of S2 as an MPS by Nietzsche
himself:
Ultimately they all want English morality to be proved right—because this serves
humanity best, or “the general utility,” or “the happiness of the greatest number”—no, the
happiness of England. With all their powers they want to prove to themselves that the
striving for English happiness—I mean for comfort and fashion32 (and at best a seat in

30

See Leiter (2000)
Interestingly, Mill’s account of utilitarian moral theory doesn’t rely on otherworldly entities like “God”
in order to support his case. It is within any system of morality that makes direct appeals to
“otherworldly” support that Nietzsche, recall, denigrates metaphorically as “beginning to smell overspiced and dangerous” (BGE 198). This is after listing the more odious and banal offenders in a moral
system—invoking an otherworldly entity as justification for anything automatically places your
argument, position or theory on the ban-list. The fact that Mill’s account evades just this one property
doesn’t exempt his system as an MPS.
32
Given that Mill takes his utilitarianism to be non-hedonic, the jab of what English utilitarians really
seek behind “happiness,” “fashion and comfort,” probably misses its mark somewhat, although the
utilitarian desire for tranquility and sanitized pleasantness is lambasted elsewhere.
31
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Parliament)—is at the same time also the right way to virtue; indeed that whatever virtue
has existed in the world so far must have consisted in such striving.
None of these ponderous herd animals with their unquiet consciences (who
undertake to advocate the cause of egoism as “the general welfare,” is no ideal, no goal,
no remotely intelligible concept, but only an emetic—that what is fair for one cannot by
any means for that reason alone be fair for others; that the demand of one morality for all
is detrimental for the higher men. (BGE 228)
First, Nietzsche calls attention to “addressing itself to all”—Utilitarians want to make their
theory of morality completely general for creatures with the ability to feel pleasure and pain, but
Nietzsche points out that these theorists are really just generalizing their own, idiosyncratic
English interests as the generalized content. Second, Nietzsche hits on “generalizing where
generalization is impermissible”—that perhaps the “general welfare” advocated in English
utilitarianism is good for people from England; there are “higher” types for whom these values
are not valuable. Third, presuming that these values, once again, are good for everyone
regardless of their perspective makes this a thoroughgoing aperspectival moral theory for
Nietzsche. Hence, S2 does not survive reflection, and cannot be the general source of
normativity for Nietzsche.
Finally consider S3, Kantian moral theory. Something akin to Kantian moral theory is the
theory Nietzsche takes the most seriously—and likely sustains his attack on in more length and
frequency than any other version of morality. This is somewhat of a significant apex for the
series of systems I have been considering in this chapter. According to a kind of proto-genealogy
of morality (prior to the eponymous GM) from 1886’s BGE, Nietzsche makes the following
observation:
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During the longest part of human history—so-called prehistorical times—the value or
disvalue of an action was derived from its consequences. The action itself was considered
as little as its origin. It was rather the way a distinction or disgrace still reaches back
today from a child to its parents, in China: it was the retroactive force of success or
failure that led men to think well or ill of an action. Let us call this period the pre-moral
period of mankind: the imperative “know thyself!” was as yet unknown. (BGE 32)
Despite utilitarian attempts to motivate the plausibility of their normative ethical
framework, Nietzsche nevertheless relegates the interpretation of the moral criterion of an action
to its consequences in the “pre-moral” period of humankind. What is curious, and has his
attention, is the shift—what I think it safe to say in his thinking is regarded as an evolution—into
conceiving the morality of an action in the mind of the person doing the action.
In the last ten thousand years, however, one has reached the point, step by step, in a few
large regions on the earth, where it is no longer the consequences but the origin of the
action that one allows to decide its value. On the whole this is a great event which
involves a considerable refinement of vision and standards; it is the unconscious
aftereffect of the rule of aristocratic values and the faith in “descent”—the sign of a
period one may call moral in the narrower sense. It involves the first attempt at selfknowledge. Instead of the consequences, the origin: indeed a reversal of perspective!
Surely, a reversal achieved only after long struggles and vacillations. To be sure, a
calamitous superstition, an odd narrowness of interpretation, thus became dominant: the
origin of an action was interpreted in the most definite sense as origin in an intention: one
came to agree that the value of an action lay in the value of the intention. The intention as

86

the whole origin and pre-history of an action—almost to the present day this prejudice
dominated moral praise, blame, judgment and philosophy on earth. (BGE 32)
Nietzsche conceives S2 as an expression of a morality that is still on its way in evolution.
Utilitarianism doesn’t really value self-knowledge, or, if it does, it’s to the extent that having selfknowledge contributes to producing the greatest happiness for the greatest number. Kant’s theory
brings the self under the microscope. Therefore, morality, having evolved into the form it has
“today” for Nietzsche is essentially Kantianism. So we have an even clearer picture into the
“morality of today” that Nietzsche is picturing as the target of his frequent assaults. To
appreciate the depth and breadth of Nietzsche’s rejection of this “prejudice” in normative ethics,
I’ll give a general account of Kant’s framework to give more substance to some of the puzzling
insults to, and remedies Nietzsche offers for, that framework.
For Kant, one condition of possibility for experience is conceiving of nature as a lawgoverned whole. When objects in the natural world are subject to motion, they do so according to
laws; take for example, in a vacuum this pen here will fall according to the gravitational constant
9.8m/s/s. The pen doesn’t have a choice, and it obeys the law of gravity; however, the mug,
should I toss that too, will follow the same law, and so will all other objects in the Earth’s
atmosphere. Other natural laws apply in this general way too.
But for Kant, though people are animals and are hence objects too and subject to various
physical laws, they are also rational and are moved according to a kind of law different than the
ones that range over the movement and behavior of objects in the world. When someone makes a
choice, they move themselves and do so on the basis of a principle they regard as endorsable or
choice-worthy of all other creatures with the capacity for rationality. Should I regard the reasons
as adequate to justify the action that I perform, I recommend the action as one that can be chosen
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by all other rational agents as well by expressing an ought-statement. In Kantian ethics, the terms
“ought” or “should” have two different meanings that inform the nature of the practical
recommendation they separately supply for a person. However, in general, both senses express
an imperative to rational beings:
An imperative is expressed by an “ought” and thereby indicates the relation of an
objective law of reason to a will which is not in its subjective constitution necessarily
determined by this law. (G Ak 4:413)
Ought-statements express imperatives, which indicate a particular kind of constraint on the will
of a rational agent. For Kant, the will of a human agent ordinarily tends not to be constrained in
the way that the imperative constraints it, when issued. Human agency in general is in need of
imperatives, Kant thinks, because we have a tendency to fail to act rationally; because we aren’t
always susceptible to the recommendations reason gives for action, we are therefore not perfectly
rational. If an agent were perfectly rational, she would never act outside the scope of the
constraints that any imperative would place on her; the agent would be in need of no such
commands of reason (G Ak 4:414).
So, the two kinds of ought-statements, and, in turn, the two kinds of imperatives supplied
to rational agency are: first, an ought-statement concerning some “good merely as a means to
something else,” (ibid) that is, the good brought about by purpose- or goal-driven actions. An
ought statement concerning good brought about by purpose-driven action expresses a
hypothetical imperative (ibid). The sense of this ought statement is called hypothetical. If S has a
goal she wants to accomplish (say, to become an electrical engineer), there is a hypotheticalought statement that addresses a hypothetical imperative to the rational part of her nature: that
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she do the kinds of things that bring about the end (e.g. applying to a school that has a relevant
program, getting in, developing good study habits, &c.).
The other sense of ought expresses one imperative:
Without being grounded on any other aim to be achieved through a certain course of
conduct as its condition, commands this conduct immediately…It has not to do with the
matter of the action and what is to result from it, but with the form and principle from
which it results; and what is essentially good about it consists in the disposition, whatever
the result may be. This imperative may be called that of morality. (G Ak 4:416)
The imperative under discussion is of course the categorical imperative. This imperative is
expressed by an ought statement that takes into consideration nothing having to do with the
consequences of some action an agent would do. Instead, the agent’s action must result from
reason’s “form and principle,” which is self-same in rationality itself across all cases of agents
possessing rationality. Take some person S. If S wants to know whether she has a reason to φ, S
asks herself “do I have a reason to φ?” If on the one hand, S finds such a reason for herself to φ
on reflection, then S ought to φ. On the other hand, if S consults herself and asks “do I have a
reason to φ?” and the verdict is “no,” then S shouldn’t φ. If the maxims of an agent’s action
violate the objectively necessary constraints of reason, i.e., maxims that can be willed to be a
universal law, S’s action would be irrational, since she would acknowledge not having a reason
to do it but does it anyway, and therefore immoral.
Suppose S must rob banks in her free time in order to bring about her becoming an
electrical engineer. Her bank robbing fulfills the rational requirements of the hypothetical
imperative to become an engineer because robbing causes (in part) the realization of the goal.
While S can be said to abide the imperative expressed by a hypothetical-ought statement, in this
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case she can not be said to abide the imperative expressed by a moral-ought statement. The first
formulation of the categorical imperative says that one should only act on maxims that can be
willed to be a universal law. The action involving the maxim “stealing” is an action whose
maxim can never be universally willed because it generates a contradiction: I would be
committed to willing both the existence and non-existence of private property. Since S can’t will
the maxim of her action as universal law, she engages in practical irrationality by choosing to rob
the bank. S, on Kant’s analysis, has a reason against acting immorally, and in disregarding the
reason supplied to her by morality, acts irrationally and therefore immorally.
A word about Kant’s moral psychology is needed. Any action undertaken involving what
he calls inclination—roughly, anything in the doing of an action that could be said to satisfy the
desires or interests of the agent—automatically disqualifies the action in question from counting
as satisfying the demands of morality. The “form and principle” of the agent’s motivation in
acting has to be oriented to respect for the moral law, and nothing else, in order that the agent’s
action count as satisfying the demands of morality. As a rational agent, my maxims have to be
willable by all other rational agents in order to satisfy the Kantian categorical imperative. 33 If,
say, I tell the truth because I recognize and respect truth-telling as the right thing to do but also
because telling the truth makes me feel good, the content of the maxim will accord with my duty
to do the right thing, but it won’t be directly from my recognition of my duty to do the right
thing. The content of the maxim will re-direct to some material content of me feeling good about
myself, and I can’t will me feeling good about myself as something everyone categorically ought
to do.

Securing the content of an agent’s will as moral just in case her will is oriented to the moral law out of
respect for the moral law when she performs a morally good action allows Kant to claim he’s exhibited
the ground of morality a priori, which is again a feature of Kant’s analysis of the morality of action that
leads Nietzsche to call him an “idiot.”
33
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My ability to be motivated out of respect for the law alone and not out of any semblance
of inclination is made possible by the capacity in my Kantian moral psychological inventory
called autonomy. For Kant, morality is “the relation of actions to the autonomy of the will, that
is, to the possible universal legislation through its maxims” (Ak G 4:339). In other words, my
ability to will a maxim in a way that could be genuinely considered universal depends on my
ability to weed-out any trace of inclination that would relegate the scope of my willed-maxim to
be merely subjective. For this reason, anchoring morality in any part in the material interests and
desires of an agent—her inclination—is automatically off the table. S’s own personal happiness
is thereby something she may will as an end in the structure of a hypothetical imperative. If she
wants to feel good about herself, then she wills the requisite means to cause that to happen.
That’s the rational structure of any hypothetical imperative, though, and an agent’s inclinations
are therefore morally neutral. You can only succeed or fail to perform a moral action by abiding
the categorical imperative (in the right way) or not.
Nietzsche hates this as a theory of morality and a picture of attendant moral psychology,
and as much as he can be said to decisively reject any thought or position or argument, it’s these
two together:
One more word against Kant as a moralist. A virtue must be our own invention, our most
necessary self-expression and self-defense: any other kind of virtue is merely a danger.
Whatever is not a condition of our life harms it; a virtue that is prompted solely by a
feeling of respect for the concept of “virtue,” as Kant would have it, is harmful. “Virtue,”
“duty,” “the good in itself,” the good which is impersonal and universally valid—
chimeras and expressions of line, of the final exhaustion of life, of the Chinese phase of
Konigsberg. The fundamental laws of self-preservation and growth demand the
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opposite—that everyone invent their own virtue, their own categorical imperative. A
people perishes when it confuses its duty with duty in general. Nothing ruins us more
profoundly, more intimately, than every “impersonal” duty, every sacrifice to the Moloch
of abstraction. How could one fail to feel how Kant’s categorical imperative endangered
life itself! The theologians’ instinct alone protect it![...]What could destroy us more
quickly than working, thinking, and feeling without any inner necessity, without any
deeply personal choice, without pleasure—as an automaton of “duty”? This is the very
recipe for decadence, even for idiocy. Kant became an idiot. (AC 11)
Here Nietzsche uses “virtue” to refer to the general Kantian enterprise geared toward
generating a morally desirable account of human action. The idea that morality requires
“working, thinking and feeling” without any reference to what actually makes a person who
works, work; for a person thinking, to have thoughts; for a person feeling, to actually feel. That
morality could require personal choice without it being deeply about the person making the
choice, is an anti-practical agency. Saddling people with a conception of obligation to the moral
law that is adequately realized only if the person’s motivational state is such that respect for the
law is the only attendant psychological constituent is wrong—the same goes for conceptions of
“duty” and the value of “the good in itself” (ibid). These three can’t be “impersonally universally
valid” ways of orienting any normative recommendation. While Kant started out on the right
track by positioning self-knowledge as a plausible domain for morality, he “became an idiot.”
Looking back at our criteria, as I’ve argued, Kant’s system seems the decisive MPS
Nietzsche has had in his crosshairs all along. S3 addresses itself to all: the categorical imperative
ineluctably addresses itself to all rational natures as such. There is no “opting out”34 of S3 if you
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See Williams (1983) Ethics and The Limits of Philosophy on the problem of in the inescapability of the
Kantian morality system. Specifically, “Morality, the Peculiar Institution.” N.b., the “peculiar
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have the capacity for reason: you’re autonomous and therefore morally responsible for the
actions you do and the reasons you choose for doing them, and for the way in which you find
yourself motivated when you so act. In this way, S3 likely generalizes where generalization is
impermissible—on Kant’s analysis, people do not seem to have a way of escaping the scope of
moral demands, and escapability seems to be the only way to evade the charge of generalizing
where generalization is impermissible.
S3 certainly takes itself unconditionally—not just when the demands of morality apply to
you, but the way the value of its ends apply to you when you choose to adopt them. As Kant puts
it, the will is “absolutely good which cannot be evil, hence whose maxim, if it is made into a
universal law, can never conflict with itself” (G Ak 4:437). The value of your will, should you
abide the following “principle,” which is the good will’s supreme law, applies universally: “Act
always in accordance with that maxim whose universality as law you can at the same time will’
(ibid). Nietzsche rejects valuation that is as impersonal as this is, and he also rejects its
aperspectival construction. The highest good you can achieve as a Kantian moral agent is in
producing a “good will,” whose structure and content is identical across all cases of successfully
having developed a good will. Nietzsche rejects value considerations built completely
independently of any individual perspective.
Finally, and to be sure a source of ire for Nietzsche, Kant grounds our capacities as
“rational beings and agents” in a “supernatural” freedom that exists not in the phenomenal world
but in the noumenal world (Wood, 176). This “other world” rather than the practical world of
experience is surely what Nietzsche thinks lacks any sort of plausibility and is often a central

institution” was the colloquial name given to the institution of slavery by southerners in the 19th
century.
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component of an MPS. In no uncertain terms, Nietzsche rejects S3, more vehemently and
personally than he ever bothers to do with something like S1 or S2.
So, Kant became an idiot. But linger with the verb ‘to become’: Kant became an idiot,
and he did so by sliding into prescribing an MPS that Nietzsche seems acutely disappointed in.
There is curiously some prescribing in this passage, right along with the ridicule of Kant that
feels ineluctably Kantian: here we have important evidence of some components of our longsought-after source of general normativity for Nietzsche. In the textual context of the passage,
Nietzsche’s own conception of normativity purports to contrast itself against that of Kant’s, and
it does so by appealing to robust examples of what Nietzsche probably regards as contradictories
of properties in Kant’s moral theorizing: the impersonal and universally valid:
The fundamental laws of self-preservation and growth demand the opposite—that
everyone invent their own virtue, their own categorical imperative. A people perishes
when it confuses its duty with duty in general. Nothing ruins us more profoundly, more
intimately, than every “impersonal” duty, every sacrifice to the Moloch of abstraction.
(AC 11)
I want to draw attention to the fact that instead of the impersonal and universally valid, we have
“fundamental laws of self-preservation and growth” demanding the opposite—the laws of selfpreservation and growth demand that someone confront morality from the point of view of their
own perspective. It is in addition up to each person to “invent” a conception of “virtue” or of
“the good in itself” or of “duty” that is good for them, and even that they “invent” their own
categorical imperative.
Let’s look at what that could mean for the CI. It’s crucial to note that Nietzsche isn’t
demanding that people invent their own subjective imperatives simply for themselves—they are,
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in other words, not simply constructing idiosyncratic normative demands for themselves alone.
The imperative Nietzsche is calling us to construct is categorical. However, the imperative
Nietzsche is calling for here is also one that we in fact do subjectively construct. But it can’t be
both the case that the categorical imperative be categorical and idiosyncratically constructed
according to the “my own” of one person. We confront a puzzle. What could Nietzsche possibly
be getting at here? For the moment, we will have to set this puzzle aside. In what follows, I need
to first set the scene for what kind of plausible non m-naturalistic constrained account of
Nietzschean naturalism could look like. That’s because commentators are in near-unanimous
agreement that Nietzsche is a naturalist, and some moral theories (like Kant’s) sometimes
struggle with being consistent with naturalism. The account will have to be naturalistic, since
“anti-nature” results from what I called anti-practical agency—generalizing in impersonal and
universally valid ways. Once we have a picture of non-reductive naturalism, and the constraints
it places on agency, we will see a space that opens for a plausible source of general naturalized
Nietzschean normative authority.

3.4 Schacht on Rethinking Nietzsche’s Naturalist Normativity
I am no longer dealing with a conception of normativity that is deflated on the framework
of m-naturalism. Science has its place, but it cannot be the source of general normative authority.
And yet, Nietzsche frames his philosophical project as one in which humanity is “translated back
into nature” (BGE 230). This thought is a familiar refrain for Nietzsche: the framework for his
thinking, and therefore for his conception of normativity, must be naturalistic. But if the
naturalism that forms the basis for his conception of the general source of normative authority is
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not constrained by reductivistic, m-naturalist scientific normativity, what other resources could a
naturalist muster to answer to the general demand of a naturalistic normativity?
To start, I think Schacht has put thinking about the question of the relation between
Nietzsche, naturalism and normativity on a positive trajectory. Coming to the conclusion I have
arrived at, in the previous section from different reasons, Schacht stresses that
Nietzsche’s naturalism is one that allies itself with the Wissenschaften but does not
simply take its cues from them…it by no means posits dogmatically—or even simply
assumes—that there cannot be anything more to human reality and the world in which we
find ourselves than the natural sciences can tell us about them. (Schacht 2013 237).
To further distinguish Nietzsche’s naturalism from the kind I have discussed so far arguing
against, Schacht invokes Janaway’s (2007) take, which we share in agreement, is closer to
what’s actually going on with Nietzsche’s naturalism than Leiter’s treatment of it:
[Nietzsche] opposes transcendent metaphysics, whether that of Plato or Christianity or
Schopenhauer. He rejects notions of the immaterial soul, the absolutely free controlling
will, or the self-transparent pure intellect, instead emphasizing the body, talking of the
animal nature of human beings, and attempting to explain numerous phenomena by
invoking drives, instincts and affects which he locates in our physical bodily existence.
Human beings are to be “translated back into nature” since otherwise we falsify their
history, their psychology, and the nature of their value. (Janaway 2007 34)
This is basically right, but we need some more general table-setting before seeing what kinds of
conceptions of normativity can hang with Nietzsche’s thinking or not. Part and parcel of
Nietzsche’s rejection of the traditional items of paradigmatically western moral psychology is
found in his remarks about the “death of God.” Nietzsche has us picture those words coming out
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of the mouth of a “madman,” wandering a marketplace seeking God as Diogenes sought the
wise:
Many of those in the marketplace [who] did not believe in God were standing around just
then, and [the madman] provoked much laughter. Has he got lost? asked one. Did he lose
his way like a child? asked another. Or is he hiding? Is he afraid of us? Has he gone on a
voyage? emigrated?—Thus they laughed and yelled.
The “madman” thus has an audience of atheists. His reply:
The madman jumped into their midst and pierced them with his eyes. “Whither is God?”
he cried; “I will tell you. We have killed him—you and I. All of us are his murderers. But
how did we do this? How could we drink up the sea? Who gave us the sponge to wipe
away the entire horizon? What were we doing when we unchained the earth from its sun?
Whether is it moving now? Whither are we moving? Away from all suns? Are we not
plunging continually? Backward, sideward, forward, in all directions? Is there still any up
or down? Are we not straying as through an infinite nothing? Do we not feel the breath of
empty space? Has it not become colder? Is not night continually closing in on us? Do we
not need to light lanterns in the morning? Do we hear nothing as yet of the noise of the
gravediggers who are busying God? Do we smell nothing as yet of the divine
decomposition? Gods, too, decompose. God is dead. God remains dead. And we have
killed him. (GS 125)
This is a paradigmatically Nietzschean way of rejecting a concept. Note that Nietzsche isn’t
saying that “God does not exist,” or “here’s an argument that gives you a good reason for
thinking God does not exist;”35God becomes a mortal, finite creature here capable of being
I return to the significance of Nietzsche’s reluctance to rely too heavily on the cognitive value of
argumentation below.
35
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killed—murdered, even. Center stage in the madman’s monologue is disorientation. With the
death of “God,” we lose all framework for orienting ourselves toward a conception of a world
ordered by the principles of western thought and value. The concept of a human-transcendent
source of ordering normativity is “dead,” in the sense that for the normative framework
Nietzsche advances, human-transcendent sources of ordering normativity have ceased to do any
legitimate justificatory work. As such, human-transcendent sources of ordering meaning and
value are no part of the general source of normativity that Nietzsche accepts.
With the death of God, what’s left of naturalism? Schacht reflects on Korsgaard’s
framing of the normative question, which she thinks is the most plausible candidate for doing the
job:
[The first] locates the source of normativity of ‘morality’ in something about our very
nature as human beings that the proper sort of ‘reflection’ reveals to make it ‘good for
us.’ [The second] locates its force in the autonomy of the will of rational agents as such;
that is, in the very nature of rational autonomous agency. (Schacht 2013 246)
I have already suggested “reflection” is a tool that can help explain how certain moral systems
deserve to “die out,” or fail to “survive,” for Nietzsche. The reasons across S1 throughout S3
stayed the same and explain why those systems fail to meet the standards for passing muster for
Nietzsche’s thinking about normative authority—all I have on the table with modeling
Nietzsche’s reflecting on normative ethics is that the conclusions he draws about S1-S3 are that
they are no good for his cognitive standards and/or his tastes. In other words, subjectively,
Nietzsche has explained his reasons for these systems being cognitively “dead” for him, as is
God for his “madman.”
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I think, though, that Nietzsche does not accept the “force” of something he passionately
rejects as having normative authority in an agent’s life—the “very nature of rational autonomous
agency.” We have seen that rejection clearly enough when it was singled out in AC 11 as
fundamentally mistaken, and part of the general explanation of how Kant “became an idiot.” So
we will not expect to see full agreement with Korsgaard’s framing of the normative question in
Nietzsche’s thinking, but I’ll show below that because of their agreement on the special
normative function reflection can perform in certain special moments, however restrictive that
may make us consider the scope of function of reflection in Nietzsche, I’ll argue they both stand
in agreement that it can be used to frame the normative question.
Schacht, though, believes that in the case of conjoining both versions of framing the
general source of normative authority, Nietzsche contends that “this whole way of thinking—
about normativity, but also about morality—must change” (Schacht 2013 247). The reason is
that “for Nietzsche, there is no such thing as ‘morality,’ simpliciter;” instead, “for Nietzsche
there have long been and can be and in all likelihood will continue to be many moralities, none
of which has been or is or will be the thing itself, the single true or real one, among the many
pretenders” (ibid). And all this is fine—if it weren’t the case, we’d have no way to account for
the following passage:
There are moralities which are meant to justify their creator before others. Other
moralities are meant to calm him and lead him to be satisfied with himself. With yet
others he wants to crucify and humiliate himself. With others he wants to wreak revenge,
with others conceal himself, with others transfigure himself and place himself way up, at
a distance. (BGE 187)
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There are clearly very many more moral systems and subsystems of the ones we saw above in
S1-S3, and different reasons someone may personally find attractive for signing up to a given
moral system. However, there is one passage which gets scant treatment in the literature on
naturalism and normativity.
Recall from chapter one, Nietzsche advocates for a superior morality in the following
way:
Morality in Europe today is herd animal morality –in other words, as we understand it,
merely one type of human morality beside which, before which, and after which many
other types, above all higher moralities, are, or ought to be, possible. (BGE 202)
If higher moralities have not been developed, they ought to be; or at least, they should be
possible. For Schacht, this means not that “there is no such thing as normativity in or with
respect to morality;” instead, “there is a great deal of it, precisely because moralities of one sort
or another have long been and continue to be ubiquitous in human life, and because normativity
is one of their fundamental features” (Schacht 2013 247).
To get a handle on the context in which morally salient claims can have normative force
for individual people, Schacht introduces a “historical-developmental naturalism.” This
naturalism’s main focus starts with phenomena that emerge as distinct from simple biological or
physiological processes, as what we call human reality: “its main focus is upon the emergence
and development of human phenomena that have human-biological and physiological
presuppositions and psychological dimensions, but also have a historical character in which
social, cultural and circumstantially contingent events” figure centrally (Schacht 2013 241). This
naturalism is “emergentist,” rather than physiologically and psychologically reductivistic, as
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Leiter’s is; and what emerges out of the cross-dimensions of these physically and culturally
interlocking parts is what Schacht calls a “form of life.”
A form of life, or “FOL36,” Schacht describes, is “a very elastic one” owing to the
diversity and multiplicity of instances, but can be defined as “semi-autonomous socio-cultural
units with their own developed and developing identities and structures, which include
distinctive and evolving sets of values and norms” demarcated by an emergence37 of new norms
and values (Schacht 2013 249). But it’s not the case that even in a given society that everybody
inhabits one and only one form of life—each individual’s life is comprised of a “multiplicity” of
various strands of the forms of life that my culture or society offers me. It might be that my
church-going neighbor and I both participate in some common form of life when we both value
watching the Top Chef, but the concatenation of forms of life that comprise the horizon of the
world she experiences is different from mine, as church-going isn’t one of any of the strands that
comprise mine.
So there is a relatively large apparatus into which I’m born that is responsible for
providing various avenues for developing myself in my culture to potentially individuate myself
by38 distinguishing the forms of life that I inhabit from others. But what about the contributions
individuals bring to the scene of normativity? Preliminarily, Schacht has a blend of cognitive and
psychological apparatuses that comprise the individual in what he calls sensibility. This probably
Nietzsche-consistent notion of a substantive component of actual people is defined by Schacht as

I sometimes refer to the plural “forms of life” as “FOLs.”
Or at least variance indicated by a partial emergence of new norms and values.
38
There could be two numerically distinct people who could be more-or-less qualitatively identical, seen
from the vantage point of the FOLs those two inhabit. Given FOLs are culturally scripted, and, we’ll see,
so are sensibilities, to the extent that one’s sensibility is scripted by the “socio-cultural semi-autonomous
unit” an FOL represents, it’s at least in principle possible for this situation to obtain, between and among
and between very many numerically distinct people.
36
37
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“complex configurations of dispositions, attitudes, beliefs, valuations and interpretive
tendencies…powered by one’s affective resources, and may be channeled at least to some extent
by inherited but humanly variable traits” (Schacht 2013 244). Instead of the transcendental ego
unifying me as subject by being unifier of my beliefs, desires, perceptions, and etc. I simply am
the cognitive and non-cognitive amalgam of beliefs affects, valuations and so forth. But
sensibilities are “also strongly scripted culturally, reflecting elements of cultural formations to
which one has been exposed and internalized” (ibid). So my sensibility is always in dialogue
with the forms of life to which I have also been exposed.
To take stock, the relation between normativity, forms of life and sensibility are that
“Values are FOL-relational, norms are FOL-contextual and normativity is FOL-structural”
(Schacht 251). When it makes sense for someone to ask themselves whether they ought to do
something, answering the question will involve interrogating the way these three elements hang
together for the person. If someone has for instance been exposed to a new value related to some
new form of life they hadn’t been exposed to, whether it makes sense for the person to adopt that
value will depend on the other values they already hold, and to what forms of life the person
already inhabits.
How can normativity developed thus far stand as a source of prescription and therefore a
source of potential transformation of an agent’s sensibility? Recall that for Korsgaard, one of the
reasons we seek the foundations of morality in a philosophical framework is that we are worried,
on reflection, that “morality might not survive reflection” (SN 102). But if the system in question
does survive reflection? I will stick once again with Schacht’s phrasing—if it does, then that
system has agent normativity for the person in question: “for the norms to be taken as
sufficiently compelling (or as Korsgaard puts it, “authoritative”),” they must be adequately
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authoritative to “get actual human beings to take them seriously in their own lives and actions”
(Schacht 248). There are, as Schacht points out, norms which prescribe rules or correct-making
properties within the context of some set of FOLs. And whether or not those norms are
normative for me depend on which of those norms speak to me with force such that I’m finding
myself compelled to regard those norms as justified reasons for shaping my sensibility.
To put the concept of agential force-finding with norms, Schacht clarifies that there needs
to be a way in for the force of norms; otherwise, they’ll be inert to your mental life:
what activates that force, making it relevant and real for a human agent, is that agent’s
opting into the form of life in question. And what elevates it to the level of full agent
normativity, is that agent’s coming to know it well and intimately, from the inside, and
buying into it, internalizing it, and identifying with it to the extent of coming to embrace
and experience its norm-and-value structures as reasons of one’s own for acting in
accordance with the norms in question” (Schacht 2013 253).
It follows from the necessary condition of undergoing internalization that normativity
can have prescriptive and therefore transformative effect on an agent’s sensibility. To provide
some contrast: what would an internalization-free conception of normativity amount to?
Thinkers we have already canvassed are prepared to offer this up: Korsgaard and Kant. Simply in
virtue of the fact that you have the capacity for reason, and therefore, autonomous choice, you
are under the normative constraints of the authority of rational autonomous nature itself.
Suppose there are no conflicting duties. Suppose I’m starving and I find myself motivated
to steal food in order that I survive. Kantian moral theory says I currently possess a reason
stronger than the one that I have to survive, which is to not to break the moral law. For Bernard
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Williams, this is to look at an agent’s fully deliberated (under ideal deliberative circumstances) 39
“subjective motivational set” (Williams 102), to find no such reason internal to that set, and then
to simply tack on a reason external to the set and then attribute it to the agent. In so doing, to use
Williams’ vernacular, you simply “bluff” (Williams 111) the agent. In poker, if I bluff you, I lie
to you about what’s in my hand by betting higher than I would bet if you knew what was in my
hand; in Kantian ethics, agents are “bluffed” when a Kantian pretends they you know what’s in
“your hand” even though that item isn’t there.
Schacht’s account of naturalized Nietzschean normativity evades “bluffing” anybody of
anything. You have to internalize the values offered up to you relative to the form of life you’re
exposed to before you answer to them. To sum his picture of a naturalized Nietzschean
normativity: in order for something like a reason to have any normative force for an agent, such
that “one would not feel right about acting otherwise, even when one may be differently
inclined,” one undergoes the acquisition of “sensibilities attuned to forms of life”…that makes
“this sort of buy-in and identification possible” (Schacht 2012 253).
This feels much closer in spirit to a naturalized Nietzschean normativity, and much of it
is right. Consider Nietzsche’s remark in TI VII 1:
My demand upon the philosopher is known, that he takes his stand beyond good and evil
and leaves the illusion of moral judgment beneath himself. This demand follows from an
insight which I was the first to formulate: that there are altogether no moral facts. Moral
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The condition of being a motivation that arises under ideal deliberative circumstances is needed due to
cases like the following: you’re in a desert and you’re thirsty, and you grab a container of water and drink
it down. Surely you did so because you were motivated by a desire to ameliorate your thirst; but in this
case, the water is poisoned. Had you known that, under ideal deliberative circumstances, you wouldn’t
have drunk the water. So analyzing what is in a person’s interest to do, or what they have reason to do,
involves an inclusion of the counterfactual that whatever you’re motivated to do, what’s in your interest
to do could be made adequately clear.
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judgments agree with religious ones in believing in realities which are no realities. (TI
VIII 1)
Schacht’s account of the Nietzschean source of general, naturalized normativity explains
why Nietzsche could advance this claim. But to appreciate why, Nietzsche in expressing
thoughts in language that we use today in metaethical discourse hasn’t done that explicitly in
language we use to analyze normativity or other moral concepts; so there is a rare opportunity to
at least not contort Nietzsche into the lexicon he doesn’t make use of himself.40 Of course that
doesn’t entail that Nietzsche means the same thing by the terms he uses as contemporary
metaethicists—but it is convenient for our purposes that in this context he is using a shared
lexicon in TI VIII 1.
If you’re expressing41 a cognitivist view about moral discourse, you express that what
people are doing when they make moral judgments is advancing a belief that can be true or false.
Since beliefs are “truth apt,” i.e., they’re the sorts of things that can be true or false, moral
judgments themselves are the sorts of entities that can be true or false (Miller 2011 3). As Miller
puts it, if a moral judgment is true, cognitivists believe we “cognitively access” the moral fact
that makes it so; but error theorists think there aren’t any such things as moral facts. This is
because “there simply are no properties in the world of the sort required to render our moral
judgments true” (Miller, ibid). TI VIII 1 is a pretty clear expression of just this error theory. If I,
say, attribute to you a Kantian autonomous will, regard you as freely choosing to act when you
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With Hussain, I think restraint should be used in trying to attribute a full-scale commitment to some
particular metaethical claim, since the valences and relations that some terms have and bear on one
another are not the same for Nietzsche’s thinking as it is for the current debates. I circle back to this in the
conclusion.
41
It’s important that in the context I’m analyzing is a view that Nietzsche expresses in TI VIII 1. I’m not
attributing to Nietzsche the position of cognitivism about the semantics of moral discourse in general or in
contexts outside this passage.
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do so, and hold you morally responsible for what you do, I “believe in a reality” which “is no
reality” (ibid). The reality of agency does not contain those faculties, and that’s not how
Nietzsche believes we should think about the way people’s actual minds work, descriptively and
prescriptively.
But there is a missing piece in Schacht’s account: what exactly in a Nietzschean-FOL is
Nietzsche’s reader supposed to internalize? Schacht concedes that his account “does no more
than set the stage for the further consideration of what can be done with these ‘mechanisms’ (as
it were), as they are employed in the profusion of forms of life they make possible (Schacht 2013
255). I’m arguing now that this is too modest a concession—on Schacht’s analysis of
Nietzsche’s naturalist normativity the story has been told and the show is over. There doesn’t
seem to be any space for the individual person reading Nietzsche to meaningfully interact with
any bit of the normative structure that shapes the interactivity of various FOLs and culturally
scripted sensibilities. Schacht’s account paints a picture of passive agency, one in which one is
subjected to the system of FOLs whose values get transmitted into the mind of the person
inasmuch as their current values already permit internalization, or they are transmitted into the
mind when some facet of a person’s culturally scripted sensibility allows for a revision or
override.
Take for instance Schacht’s discussion of the difference between first-personal accounts
of experience with the normative and third-personal. Contrasting again with Korsgaard, who
offers: “The normative question is a first-person question that arises for the moral agent who
must actually do what morality says” (Schacht 252). Nietzsche, on Schacht’s analysis would
offer instead: “The normative question, on one level of consideration, is a first-personal question
that arises for a norm-sensitive agent in a norm-covered situation (who may be inclined to do
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otherwise)” (ibid). The level of consideration that the first-personal contribution to internalizing
this or that new norm is further specified as “secondary and derivative” in relation to the thirdpersonal view of that person, defined as “circumstances external to ‘first-person’ reflection and
deliberation” (ibid).:
When one enters into a norm-governed situation within some norm-structured context,
and meets standard criteria of being able to understand the situation, one is thirdpersonally subject to the norms in question by the very nature of the case. The firstpersonal ‘I ought’ is a derivative internalization of a third-personal ‘One ought.’ (ibid)
On Schacht’s analysis, the force that the norms some normatively structured value-salient FOL
unleash when internalized by a person happen first in the third-personal, first-personal-external
socio-cultural fabric that is host to the FOL in question. If it sounds like I’m speaking now like
the whole normative enterprise belongs in the first place to something like self-amalgamatingrevising-determining whole—like an autonomous person fully exercising their cognitive
capacities—that’s because this is exactly how Schacht pictures their functioning. We already saw
Schacht call FOLs “semi-autonomous socio-cultural units” (Schacht 2012 248).
FOLs sound like an indispensable element to wherever we land on what the general
source of normativity is for Nietzsche. Indeed--as we saw in the Copernicus passages, Nietzsche
conceives of science itself as a socially configured and structured enterprise. But the most
consistent refrain from Nietzsche from the beginning of his published works to the end is that
human beings are constantly trying to talk themselves out of respecting themselves—whether
that be by talking about the absolute source of value residing in something other than my self—
some value-establishing normative structure in a triune here, scientific inquiry there, and in
Schacht’s case, it’s the inherited filled-to-the-brim with normative salience FOL that comprises

107

who and what I am. This smacks too much of “God,” which Nietzsche’s madman has declared is
already dead. Is there really nothing left of “me,” after all the subjection to the normative
ordering of FOLs, to engage in some normatively recommended positive ideal of Nietzsche’s
own—of my own? Is there no first-personal -ought that I can supply myself by reflectively
engaging with some of Nietzsche’s most significant normatively laden thoughts? There must be.
Schacht isn’t prepared to make the move, however; as is common with addressing what
Nietzsche is up ton in AC 11 and BGE with the call for the construction of some “higher
morality” with its own categorical imperatives, Schacht punts:
There are normative constraints aplenty for Nietzsche, for constraining is the function of
norms. But the only normative constraints he recognizes are constraints set by norms. In
the absence of all norms, or beyond them or in abstraction from then, there can be no
such constraints. The constraints upon the embrace of norms that he is prepared to
recognize, beyond those of norm-system priority, are constraints of a practical nature and
valuational considerations that for him require a different sort of analysis, a further topic
that must be deferred to another occasion. (Schacht 2013 25)
I receive. The occasion to critically examine what constraints there might be on the
embrace of norms that Nietzsche prescribes beyond whatever current norm-system priority the
person reading Nietzsche subscribes to is now.

3.5 Eternal Recurrence: First Pass
The cryptic call for the possibility for a higher morality—or that there even ought to be a
possible higher morality—in BGE 202 is usually left alone; however, it’s made all the more
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demanding of our attention given what Nietzsche says about the kind of resources required for
critiquing any form of morality:
If this book is pessimistic even into the realm of morality, even to the point of going
beyond faith in morality—should it not for this very reason be a German book? For it
does in fact exhibit contradiction and is not afraid of it: in this book faith in morality is
withdrawn—but why? Out of morality! Or what else should we call that which informs
it—and us? For our taste is for modest expressions. But there is no doubt that a ‘thou
shalt’ still speaks to us too, that we too obey a stern law set over us—and this is the last
moral law which can make itself audible even to us… (D P, 4).
The scope problem sets itself back before our attention. If faith in morality is somehow required
to withdraw faith in some moral system, then it follows that some element of that moral system
must be stable throughout morality and what remains of it in Nietzsche’s thinking. In what
follows, I’m going to articulate what I think Nietzsche takes to be higher morality than the lower
slave-morality of resentment. I stipulate up front that it is already from within the framework
I’ve been assessing possible moral systems as candidates for Nietzsche’s acceptance that I will
use to formally define one as “higher,” i.e., Nietzsche-accepted, and the other(s) as lower, i.e.,
MPSs.
I’m turning now to what scholars call Nietzsche’s “doctrine of eternal recurrence,” or
“the eternal recurrence,” which shows up as the penultimate aphorism in the original publication
of GS.42 Eternal recurrence is, as Nietzsche describes, both “the highest form of affirmation
attainable” (EH Z 1) and “the fundamental conception” of Z (ibid). Nietzsche also claims, of Z,
not surprisingly by transitivity, that
Nietzsche amends the publication of GS to include a book V in 1887 (also, a book of poems by “Prince
Vogelfrie” [“Prince Freebird”] and a new preface).
42
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With [Zarathustra] I have given mankind the greatest present that has ever been made to
it so far. This book, with a voice bridging centuries, is not only the highest book there is,
the book that is truly characterized by the air of the heights—the whole fact of man lies
beneath it at a tremendous distance—it is also the deepest, born out of the innermost
wealth of truth, an inexhaustible well to which no pail descends without coming up again
filled with gold and goodness. (EH P 4)
Nietzsche thinks most highly of Z of all of his works, and I have not addressed Z in this
dissertation. And I won’t, regardless of this appearing to be an oversight. Unpacking Z is a task I
simply leave for another time. I’m focusing on GS and not Z, because the former, along with all
the rest of Nietzsche’s published works, generally represent a sustained attempt at undermining
or critiquing in some way or another some element of the western conceptual inventory.
Consider that GS 341 contains a pretty clear expression of eternal recurrence, and given the
significance afforded to Z, which has as its fundamental conception of the story’s eternal
recurrence, that it is not unreasonable to prefer a clear expression of it as a “doctrine” in the
penultimate aphorism to Z. Consider too that Z is a fictional story, that, while undoubtedly
containing a plethora of important and potentially relevant considerations, Nietzsche, as
philosopher, gives articulating eternal recurrence one stab before changing hats and articulating
it in the mode of Nietzsche as storyteller. This does not preclude Z from informing an account of
higher morality—quite the contrary: it likely does. So this account will have to be partial and
incomplete, since I do not have the space to address it.
I think we have it in our sights now a clear justification for setting Z aside for the
purposes of this work, as well as a clear justification for looking at GS 341 as an expression of
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Nietzsche’s positive content—norms Nietzsche is embracing “beyond those of norm-system
priority,” higher morality:
What, if some day or night a demon were to steal after you in your loneliest loneliness
and say to you: “This life as you now live it and have lived it, you will have to live once
more and innumerable times more; and there will be nothing new in it, but every pain and
every joy and every thought and sigh and everything unutterably small or great in your
life will have to return to you, all in the same succession and sequence—even this spider
and this moonlight between the trees, and even this moment and I myself. The eternal
hourglass of existence is turned upside down again and again, and you with it, speck of
dust!”
Would you not throw yourself down and gnash your teeth and curse the demon
who spoke thus? Or have you once experienced a tremendous moment where you would
have answered him: “You are a god and never have I heard anything more divine.” If this
thought gained possession of you, it would change you as you are or perhaps crush you.
The question in each and every thing, “Do you desire this once more and innumerable
times more?” would lie upon your actions as the greatest weight. Or how well disposed
would you have to become to yourself and to life to crave nothing more fervently than
this ultimate eternal confirmation and seal? (GS 341)
The demon sneaks up to you (in your loneliest loneliness), and proposes that your life
will start de capo! when it ends. Your life as you lived it and will live it starts over from the top,
until you finish living it in death, and around again—with a level of granular similarity and
identicalness such that nothing changes, including “this moonlight between the trees,” or you,
reader, completing the reading of this sentence. Is this good news to you? If you really think
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about it, and let the “thought gain possession” over you, you’ll either change as a person or be
“crushed,” as you are. How much “better disposed” to yourself would you have to become to
regard this as something worth “craving nothing more fervently”?
There is a wide range of places to start with analysis, but I’ll start with an obvious one.
There has been enough ink spilled in the literature to establish collective agreement43 that this is
a practically-oriented thought experiment and not a theoretical one. Nietzsche himself took
seriously the idea of eternal recurrence and tried to construct a cosmological proof of literal
eternal recurrence in his unpublished notes, but decided the proof wasn’t up to snuff and it never
made publication. Clark has persuasively argued44 that none of GS 341 requires that you literally
believe that everything will eternally recur exactly as it has before infinitely many times more.
But even picturing eternal recurrence hypothetically, it’s not clear that eternal recurrence should
matter to you.
Soll argues that the recurrence of one’s life “should actually be a matter of complete
indifference” (Soll in Clark 1990 266). This is because recurrence “requires the qualitative
identity of a life in each cycle of cosmic history,” and also because there is no psychological
continuity between you, in this current cycle, and you in any other cycle. Soll concludes that this
lack of inter-cycle psychological continuity between selves fails to give you any reason to care
about eternal recurrence. Certainly if that’s the case then my search for an expression of higher
morality in eternal recurrence is dead on arrival.
Put slightly differently, Clark sums a thought experiment that supports the same
conclusion.

43
44

One notable exception, arguing that 341 be read cosmologically, comes from Loeb (2013).
See Clark (1990) Chapter 8.
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Suppose the demon, instead of announcing the eternal recurrence, proclaims that there
now exist an infinite number of duplicates of our solar system and therefore an infinite
number of individuals qualitatively identical to myself. Although this might arouse much
amazement and even interest, few people would perceive the existence of such duplicates
as adding infinitely to the joy or suffering of their own lives. (Clark 1990 268)
The thought experiment leads to the same conclusion: why should I care about the well-being of
my duplicates when their well-being isn’t causally or psychologically or otherwise connected to
my own? Clark suggests that this problem isn’t really surmountable as it’s been posed, and
suggests what I think is probably a sound work-around: “I suggest that we[…]incorporate an
unrealistic or uncritical model of recurrence into our formulation of Nietzsche’s ideal of
affirmation.” (Clark 1990 269)
Compare Nietzsche’s question—would you be willing to live this same life eternally?—
with a question people do in fact ask each other: if you had to do it all over, would you
marry me again? (ibid)
When people ask each other this, they’re asking for an honest assessment of the thing as a
whole—from the start, through now, would you make the choice again? And of course if one or
more members of the couple is a philosopher they might raise some objection like “well, whether
or not I’d make the choice to marry you depends on knowing what I did when I was motivated to
marry you in the first place, and I know a lot more about you now than I did then, so it’s an
incoherent question.” The person asking the question is looking for an honest answer that would
disclose an authentic “underlying attitude;” Clark rightly points out that if someone put up an
objection to a question like this, that they’d be showing “evasion,” not “intellectual honesty”
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(ibid). Approaching it through an ordinary, non-critical lens allows us to envision what the
question is asking with more than enough clarity.
Clark proposes that with GS 341, Nietzsche’s minimal goal, then, which relies neither on
cosmology, nor invites an indifference resulting from an overly-critical evasion, nor
metaphysics, but is instead simply offering up affirming recurrence as an ideal—and to satisfy
the ideal, you have to be willing to “play the game:” you allow…
…the recurrences of one’s life as continuous with and therefore as adding suffering and
joy to one’s present life, the extreme reactions Nietzsche describes—gnashing of teeth or
calling the demon divine—makes sense and complete indifference would seem
psychologically impossible. (Clark 270)
For Clark, this is the counter-ideal for Nietzsche against the one that has ruled over western
life—the ascetic ideal, maintaining that the most valuable lives led are those in which the values
of self-denial reign. Playing the game is a way to reveal to yourself that maybe the life you have
lived and currently live isn’t adequately valued, and Nietzsche constructs this metaphysicallyneutral, cosmologically neutral ideal as an alternative that might motivate you to be better
disposed to yourself and life, compared with what the ascetic ideal offers.
I find Clark’s response to Soll successful and compelling, but I wonder how we got to the
point that it was required. Soll asks a critical question about the inter-cycle relations between
end-of-life and start-of-life you1, and wonders how one could possibly aggregate enough pain or
joy for it to be worth it to end-of-life and start-of-life you2, since you1 and you2 inhabit
psychologically discontinuous memory identifier links. This seems wrong to me. While I agree
that “playing the game” doesn’t require you to believe that the “threat” of literal recurrence
motivates you to be either crushed or changed by the “news,” the point seems to be on intra-
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cycle relations between you and yourself. If “this life, as you have lived it and now live it” is the
subject of demon’s declaration, it seems that someone who understands the demon’s declaration
would be concerned to now live a life that they could assent to being eternally recurred, and not
so much on what kind of optimally good pain-free and joy-filled life they could live so as to
benefit as a utilitarian from calculating their life choices such that they are geared towards
getting the best life possible. This strikes me as a particularly utilitarian-oriented analysis of
eternal recurrence.
Utilitarian analysis of eternal recurrence cannot be right, because Nietzsche himself
would reject that the quality of a life lived could be objectively measured in terms of how much
pleasure one gets and how much pain one avoids. The impulse seems to be that the upshot of the
demon’s declaration is for you to cynically try to calibrate the direction of your life so that you
have as much joy and as little sorrow possible so as to optimize eternal recurrence to generate the
greatest happiness for you as you iteratively cycle through your life. This kind of analysis
perverts the spirit of the question the demon puts to you in your loneliest loneliness.
Clark’s response does enough to indirectly defuse this interpretation by modifying the
presupposed cognitive saturation of the inter-cycle priority of the eternal recurrence. But, in so
doing, I don’t think Clark is entitled to the conclusion that a metaphysically deflated idealoffering is required to de-fang the over-cognitivism of Soll’s inter-cycle prioritizing
interpretation. Instead, I propose we leave Clark’s move in place against Soll: if you overthink
the question you are evading. But from that Clark’s metaphysically neutral reading does not
follow. All her response does is mollify the Soll’s over-cognitive-saturated inter-cycle objection.
Therefore, we discharge Soll’s inconceivability argument on Clark’s grounds, and I don’t think
her deflationary read can stand up to scrutiny. Before we can press forward consider the fact that
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nowhere in GS 341 does Nietzsche refer to eternal recurrence as a mere “ideal” or “counterideal”—it’s a “thought.”
In fact, the thought of eternal recurrence is addressed to you: “What if […] some demon
were to steal after you and say to you: This life as you now live it and have lived it, you will have
to live once more and innumerable times more[…]Would you not throw yourself down[….]”
There is an oddity that seems to have flown under the radar in almost all of the commentary on
GS 341. Here’s some a bit of standard analysis by Higgins & Solomon that the passage tends to
receive:
It is the whole of your life that is in question. If you would gnash your teeth and curse the
very suggestion, we would have to say that your life has been a waste, to that extent. If on
the other hand, you claim to have no regrets, then that is what we would call a happy life.
(Higgins & Solomon 2867)
Who is this “you,” or maybe more the point: what is this “you”? We have seen over and again in
this dissertation the claim that the content of your mind as it shows up to you for Nietzsche is
utterly inadequate to how then, in turn, someone decides to desire, think, or act. That was a
substantive foundation of denying the reality of causation in TI VI 3. And on the basis of
passages like this, Leiter (2002), Leiter & Knobe (2007) and Matthias Risse (2007) argue for an
eliminativist or at least seriously deflationary conception of the self, preferring instead to let the
economy of sub-personal drives, affects and impulses (what Leiter just calls type fact
constitution) account for the self.45

45

To their credit, Nietzsche invites this interpretation with myriad comments all of this sort of flavor
throughout his active publishing life: “For what purpose, then, any consciousness at all when it is in the
main superfluous?” (GS 354), though I’d quickly counter by stressing focus on the scope of statements
like this (“in the main”).
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And yet, we see Nietzsche here asking not “what impulse asserts itself most prominently
in your response at the demon’s declaration,” or “what drive would need to assert itself most
strongly over all the others in order for you to be better disposed to yourself and to life…”. There
is language here that does not answer to the account of type-fact reductionism of agency.
Nietzsche is addressing you. How do we make sense of this?

3.6 The Nietzschean Minimal Self
Anderson (2013) points out, with Janaway, that there are rare moments in which
Nietzsche uses language of the sort I am pointing to in the prior paragraph--language in which
Nietzsche either addresses the reader as a unified whole or suggests they are capable of
instantiating action of that form. Consider GM III 12, in which Nietzsche characterizes
objectivity...
Not as “contemplation without interest” (which is a nonsensical absurdity) but as the
ability to control one’s Pro and Con and to dispose of them, so that one knows how to
employ a variety of perspectives and affective interpretations in the service of
knowledge…the more affects we allow to speak about one thing, the more eyes, different
eyes, we can use to observe one thing, the more complete will our “concept” of the thing,
our “objectivity” be (GM III 12, Anderson trans.).
In the context of the passage, Nietzsche is making reference to what Anderson calls “an
independent cognitive self” (Anderson 2012 207) from the cross-hatch network of drives and
affects. The ability to control one’s “Pro” and one’s “Con” and to “dispose of them” suggests the
cognitive operations of an I that can’t just be, say, the appearance of an affect: “For if the self

117

were just the dominant affect, then that affect, at least, would not be “controlled” and “disposed
of” by an independent cognitive self, and the wanted objectivity wouldn’t be achieved” (ibid).
This “I” that Anderson argues for isn’t a Kantian transcendental ego, but nor does it
reduce to what the eliminativist wants. It is instead a “minimal self,” one in which “the self is not
simply given as standard metaphysical equipment in every human, but is rather some kind of task
or achievement” (Anderson 2012 208) that involves a substantive ability to “stand back” from
our attitudes and either endorse them or reject them (Anderson 2012 210).
To bring this into view, Anderson grounds what follows in various avenues of general
textual pedigree—Nietzsche’s actual thoughts about what kinds of explanation are adequate to
the phenomena of moral developments in the west, &c. My aim is to get the machinery of
Anderson’s take on a minimal Nietzschean self in place so we can understand how it can apply
to and be put to use in my interpretation of GS 341, so I will be eliding most of the justification
that this is adequately Nietzschean and germane to the texts.46
Anderson starts with what he takes to be “two of the most central attitudes” in
Nietzschean moral psychology—drives and affects. A drive is not simply a desire. Consider my
desiring some object. My desire takes the object as what Anderson calls a “one-place
complement.” But on Katsafanas’ analysis, drives have two-place complements—not just the
particular object that is sought out in desire, but the general aim of the drive in question:
Drives are constant motivational forces that incline one to engage in certain activities or
processes. Drives are not satisfied by the attainment of their objects, since their objects
are just chance occasions for expression. In other words, the object serves as nothing
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They of course are germane to the texts that I am currently reviewing--GM III 12, as we just saw, but
this machinery will be indispensable for making sense of the you, in your “loneliest loneliness,” in GS
341.
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more than an opportunity for the drive to express itself, by inclining the agent to engage
in some activity or other. What the drive seeks is just this expression: the drive is
satisfied only when being expressed, when the process that it motivates is in progress.
Accordingly, an activity that is motivated by a drive aims at the performance of the
activity itself. (Katsafanas in Anderson 2012 218)
So, my drive to stay healthy takes as its object a chunk of time dedicated to exercise. But
whether it’s being expressed in that time I spent exercising, or if it’s being expressed in the food
I choose to cook, that drive is “satisfied only when being expressed” and uses up the object in the
venting of itself, and so fulfills the telos of that drive: the expression of itself.
Anderson defines affect as “a class of attitudes that combine a passive, receptive
responsiveness to the world with a reactive motivational output” (ibid). Like drives, affects have
a two-place complement—affects are “completed” by “(a) some stimulus object that activates the
affect, and (b) a default response upon which the affect primes us to act” (Anderson 2012 219).
The affect itself “colors the salience and evaluation of the stimulus object and it governs both the
pattern and manner of the agent’s default response” (Anderson 218). To take an example, at a
conference I see the only vegetarian entrée option is deep fried chile rellenos: I see the tray of
food, which activates the affect of disgust; my default behavioral response is aversion, and my
feeling of disgust colors both the way I see the food and feeling I get in my motivation to
subsequently avert it.47
Anderson notes a “niceness of fit” between the way structurally a drive finds “targets'' or
“pursuit objects” and the way “stimulus objects are taken by affects” (Anderson 2012 221). In
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Anderson includes several examples central to Nietzschean moral psychology—cases of resentment
and joy, for instance, have strong textual pedigree for the structure and language Anderson uses to
characterize them. For example, ressentment’s “perception of the noble man, “but dyed in another color,
interpreted in another fashion, seen in another way by the venomous eye of ressentment” (GM I 11).
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tandem with an affect, “a drive acquires sensitivity to a stimulus and thereby “knows” when to
activate; conversely, an affect can give better shape to its pattern of behavioral response by
taking up a pursuit object from a drive” (ibid). Because of their capacity to be mutually-sensitive
in this way, they become mutually “recruitable”—an affect can recruit a drive, and a drive can
recruit affect, forming a
cross-hatched, mutually supporting structure of attitudes, whose integration rests on the
way they are structurally tailored to recruit one another—e.g., with drives supplying a
target object for affect-motivated action and affects supplying activation cues and also
value-laden, nuanced specification to a drive’s object perception and manner of
expression. (Anderson 2012 223)
So, my drive to stay healthy recruited the affect of disgust at the stimulus object, that tray of
rellenos, taking it at the same time as a target object, in this case, not of consumption or
appropriation but of aversion and discard. But a larger point looms here: my capacity for
displaying the affect of disgust and being motivated by it is recruited by many other drives—my
drive for bond, for instance, recruits disgust after having moved recently to a small town and,
after the first year, learning the new university president wants to roll out a plan to cut all new
tenure lines; the same context-sensitive affect of disgust here described could also be recruited
by my drive to self-respect.
Because any affect or drive stands in a “one-many” relation to one another--one drive can
recruit many affects, and any affect can recruit multiple drives—what emerges over time is,
given the “relations between drives and affects,” the positing of a “thicker notion of the self,
existing as a repository of recruitable drives [and/]or affects that are always available to
complete any of its given drives or affects” (Anderson 2012 224). Much of the activity of
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recruitment happens psychologically automatically most of the time, this cross-hatched network
of extant sources of recruitment emerges as a mutually dependent functional multiplicity.
This process finally results in drives combining to “form more complex drives” and
attitudes “coalescing” into “loosely identifiable structures” of reliable mutual-recruitment
activity, which is just the minimal self, “a functional grouping of drives and affects that permits
such mutual recruitability. Thus, the minimal self is “but one psychological structure among the
others. It acquires the right to the name “self” simply in virtue of being the emergent structure
that encompasses all of the sub-structures” (Anderson 2013 226). I am not possible without the
network of activity that comprises the set of my drives and affects; but there emerges a “complex
psychological object built out of the constituent attitudes,” which is what Anderson calls the
minimal self. To illustrate one mode of the minimal self—a dimension in which exactly no
reflective distance between the minimal self and its constituent attitudes, he considers heightened
cases of mood
A mood is itself a particular attitude, which represents the world and the other affects
within the self as being a certain way. Even though my mood may not be a sharply
defined self-conscious attitude expressly owned by a unified “I”—after all, I can be
strongly in the grip of a mood without even being consciously aware of it—still, the
mood operates as a kind of collective condition within which my other attitudes have to
operate and with which they have to contend—a kind of “weather system” influencing
my other attitudes…a mood like depression or joy counts as an attitude inhabited by the
whole minimal self and not just an outgrowth of some particular constituent drive or
affect” (Anderson 2013 227—228).
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When I am in a mood like joy, the whole minimal self is “on the scene” in consciousness so to
speak because all of the phenomenologically relevant affects have to show up in the same color.
Joy, taken as a 2nd order affect, shades all the first order affects--the world shows itself through
a fixed lens and discloses every possibility to be to my sensibility on its own terms. Even
something banal like a glass of water can be colored in heightened moods of the kind I’m
describing. The “weather system” of this mood makes me understood to myself as such.
But the minimal self can also adopt attitudes toward itself—towards its constituent drives
and affects, on reflection. So the minimal self has this one distinctive Kantian faculty in-tact—
the “capacity to “stand back” from one’s own attitudes and assess them” (ibid). With this
capacity, the minimal self retains the capacity for autonomy—for the cross-hatch network of
mutually recruiting drives and affects to be one which, on reflection, you endorse or one which
you reject.
I should note, here, that framing the normative question as one which retains the use of
the Kantian ability to “stand back” and evaluate the structurally convergent drive-affect
psychological objects we refer, looking at ourselves “top-down” so to speak, that make up
ourselves. We can adopt attitudes towards the whole thing, in the capacity to stand back, and
assess. Due to this ability, it figures ineliminably in what our concept of the self should be. And
since this capacity enables endorsement or not, reflexive endorsement is an adequate measure of
a theory of morality.
The ability to “stand back” may show up in cases where I have a first-order drive whose
aims subordinate a second-order drive, and I have an attitude about that first-order drive such
that I don’t endorse it. Take for example a compulsive eater: food is encountered as an object for
which my drive to eat vents itself. But someone in the grip of compulsion may have a second-
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order drive whose aim ranges over all the first-order drives that pertain to eating such that this
person may not endorse the drive to eat; yet, that first-order drive could overpower the secondorder drive, again, in the grip of compulsion. We would say, with Richardson (1996) that this
person stands in a relation to the drive to eat such that it tyrannizes second order drives that may
belong to the loosely assembled crystallized drive-affect amalgam that you are aware of as a part
of yourself. Your self doesn’t agree with itself, it doesn’t endorse itself.
The aim of selfhood, from the vantage point of the minimal self, is to have one’s drives
and one’s affects under one’s control--much like one’s “Pro” and “Con” in GM III 12. And it is
not just control, but at one’s complete disposal--to be master over one’s drives and affects. In the
case of being in the grip of compulsion, a Nietzschean autonomous self has the ability to drive
out the deleterious affects and drives, and keep in the system the ones it chooses. Of course this
implies that autonomy is an achievement and not the kind of agential control you can just
capriciously wield over any drive or affect. Anyone who knows someone who has managed to
move from an unhealthy weight to a healthy weight knows that this requires a pretty substantial
revision in the ordering of one’s drives and affects. Compared with someone losing weight, we
have someone who has, on Nietzsche’s imagining, gained complete mastery over their drives:
If…we place ourselves at the end of this enormous process, where the tree finally
produces its fruit, where society and its morality of custom finally brings to light that to
which it was only the means: then we find as the ripest fruit on its tree the sovereign
individual, the individual resembling only himself, free again from the morality of
custom, autonomous and supermoral…in short, the human being with his own
independent long will, the human being who is permitted to promise, this lord of the free
will…(GM II 2)
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Anderson I think rightly posits that the achievement of true, general autonomy in the
sense of ruling over your affects and drives, being able to perfectly command them at your
disposal, is rare and reserved for truly strong and unique people—Anderson points to
Nietzsche’s own example of Goethe, whose self-creation has him “emerge as a spirit who has
become free” (TI IX 49). For Anderson, there are two conceptions of the self: the first is a
descriptive concept that “includes the moral psychological capacity of the person to frame and
carry out a plan of self creation,” and the normative concept of selfhood which includes “the
normative conception of a “true self” which encapsulates the ideal being pursued” (Anderson
230). I think it’s fair to say that autonomy is scalar—maybe only a few individuals ever
experience autonomy to the degree that Nietzsche considers necessary to inhabit the world of the
sovereign individual. But certainly a re-ordering of one’s drives such that one moves from, say,
letting the eating drive rule inordinately, to one in which the drive to health kills off that level of
strength, accomplishes something on the scale of autonomy such that she can be said to have
achieved a part of it.
But I think autonomy and the minimal self have a different relation than just the
normative conception and the descriptive conception that Anderson offers up. There is, I’ll argue
in the next section, a sense of autonomy that can apply thinly and be prescribed as a formal
component of any normative conception of the self. That’s the function higher morality
performs.

3.7 Eternal Recurrence: Second Pass
I think that accepting higher morality is a necessary condition for starting along the path
toward the kind of integration that the weightier end of the spectrum has us glimpsing fully
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autonomous sovereign individuals in the figures of Napoleons and Goethes. But I think we can
see Nietzsche giving a more thin moral prescription in GS 341 than exhorting the reader to
acquire the level of austere self-mastery seen in the rare cases.
I want to first bring into clarity how Nietzsche invokes both the reflective dimension and
the higher-order attitudinal dimension of mood in 341--I am considering now that these are two
different ways of consciously encountering yourself. Consider the first sentence: “What if, some
day or night, a demon were to steal after you in your loneliest loneliness…” In inviting you to
inhabit the perspective of the person after whom the demon is stealing, Nietzsche masterfully
invokes an extreme mood to make sure that it is you he is addressing—as a higher-order attitude
adequate in these exact kinds of situations to cultivate a “weather system” influencing all your
phenomenologically relevant drives and affects, bringing the reader’s non-cognitive whole
minimal self onto the scene. With the minimal self in view and on the scene, Nietzsche evokes
both the non-cognitive affects and the cognitive capacity to “stand back” from the affects and
assess them.
I can now spell out higher morality as it appears in GS 341. Now that we know the
minimal self is capable of reflection and of evaluation of its own values, we know Nietzsche is in
part addressing this faculty in GS 341. So let’s start with the cognitive dimension. Picking up the
thread of AC 11 now: recall Nietzsche claims that “The fundamental laws of self-preservation
and growth demand that everyone invent their own virtue, their own categorical imperative” (AC
11). I argued that there must be a way to explain Nietzsche’s use of the term categorical
imperative and not just some merely subjective imperative.
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df. Higher Morality (cognitive-reflective)
you have a (defeasible) reason to place value on your self and your life adequate to eternal
recurrence
Let’s call this the cognitive side of Nietzssche’s Categorical Imperative “NCI.” NCI prescribes
that you be a law to yourself—and that law is served up to you in the form of you giving yourself
a reason to place the level of value on your life to be commensurate with the level of demand
that is expressed in the eternal recurrence thought experiment. Formally, this law is the same for
every reader: but for the law to be taken up, or to address the reason that eternal recurrence gives
you for the value you place on your life, it must be the case that a reader supply their own raw
materials from the value they place on their own life. In this way, I “create my own categorical
imperative” (AC 11). I only create it for myself, however, if I accept that I have a reason to do
so. The NCCI ranges over all domains of assessment that are possible in a person’s life;
therefore, the value the reader places on her life must be ordered as the general source of
normativity.
What would it look like to violate the cognitive NCI? In general, you could look at
anyone who believes that the value of their self and life is essentially sourced in some minimalself independent and external source. In Christianity, eternal recurrence would be an absolute
nightmare: the value of your life really doesn’t kick in until you’ve reached the afterlife, and the
value of your human animal self is bad; the goal is to free the soul from the flesh and get to
heaven. The value of the self depends on a minimal-self-independent external source: the eternal
soul; the value of the life too depends on a minimal-self independent life—the afterlife.
In maximizing versions of utilitarianism, the value of your life and self is measured in
terms of how much happiness you contributed to increasing in the world. In Kantianism the
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animal self is a perverting source of motives that are “alien” to the processes appropriate to
rational willing. None of these sources of value can be vindicated in eternal recurrence—chiefly
because for Nietzsche these are all fabricated and false sources of value. Their chief function is
to absolve people of having to create and cultivate their own values, their own selves, and their
own lives. Jumping back to Schacht, since subjecting yourself to the reflection the demon
demands of you requires that you cancel belief in these external value-imbuing entities and
processes, the first acceptance constraint for opting-in and internalizing the norms of
Nietzsche’s higher morality is that you cannot allow the third party external entities or processes
imbue your agency with ultimate value.
Nietzsche can morally recommend taking up, cognitively, NCI. You have a defeasible
reason to value yourself and your life, and to make the source of that value a law to yourself—
this is because there is no actual other source of value for your life and self. If you have sought
out creative endeavors that fulfill you as a person, the kinds of intimate relationships and
friendships that fulfill you as a person, then you are treating yourself as an end in yourself along
with your life. You’re not treating it as good for something else--for rational agency, for the
greater good, for God—as mere means only.
The cognitive exhortation, I submit, is to be autonomous in the very thin sense of passing
the eternal recurrence test. I’ve indicated that I think in broad strokes this thin prescription has
more to do with alerting you to the fact that you might be erroneously attributing meaning and
purpose in your life to a third party which might pop up as red flags as you, say, reflect on a life
of resenting people for the actions they choose when they “could have done otherwise.” Looking
down the long hard road of Anderson’s case for autonomy as self-mastery, there can’t be any
mastery or control or ordering of the drives and affects if you regard the nature of operation of
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those processes to be subordinate to a you-transcendent source. I’m arguing that for Nietzsche’s
higher morality, you cannot be a blip on the radar of autonomy if you aren’t selved in the way
I’m describing here—being a self is a constitutive and therefore necessary condition of
autonomous human action;48 if you are not a self, you cannot engage in self-determined action,
let alone self-mastery over drives and affects to be a truly great individual.
Another way of framing NCI in GS 341 is on the model of Korsgaard’s analysis of what
she calls practical identity. Owing to the capacity of the minimal self’s ability to “stand back”
from one’s drives and affects and either endorse or reject them, the minimal self is at least
partially, under special circumstances, capable of understanding itself conceived practically. A
person facing eternal recurrence may, on reflection, bring to awareness a concept of something
like practical identity, which Korsgaard defines as…
a description under which you value yourself, a description under which you find your
live to be worth living and your actions to be worth undertaking (Korsgaard 1996 101).
When taking stock of the content of one’s practical identity, which is invited by GS 341, one is
forced to subject the patterns of action they have chosen to pursue as a whole that could survive
reflective scrutiny. After all, on eternal recurrence, they’re yours to pursue all over again, and
again, from here on out. NCCI in GS 341 can therefore be read on the model of Nietzsche
exhorting the reader to adopt a practical identity. It’s important to note that on the model of the
reading I’m pursuing here, Nietzsche might not attribute very much substance to one’s practical
identity should they, say, identify the purpose of their life as performing a moral test that should
they pass it, they’ll gain entrance to a better life. What NCCI prescribes is not just that as a
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Korsgaard has a similar formulation for agency-constituting action, but instead prescribes as sufficient
and necessary conditions for an action to actually count as such, that it issue from either a Kantian
hypothetical or categorical imperative. See Korsgaard (2009) 92-3.
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matter of fact such a thing can’t serve as an actual goal of anyone’s life, since the afterlife
doesn’t exist; it’s also a prescription for you to interpret yourself as a thoroughgoing finite being.
After all, if human animals could escape finitude, eternal recurrence would lose its bite. There’s
nothing at stake in the value you imbue the patterns of your choices over the course of a lifetime
if that lifetime never really ultimately comes to a finite stopping point. Throwing it back to
Schacht, the second acceptance constraint on the cognitive side of NCI is understanding human
life as ultimately finite.
If on reflection, you can endorse eternal recurrence, then the value you place on your life
is the general source of normativity. Of course this invites the possibility that you don’t place
any actual value on your life at all—it follows from this that for you, you won’t endorse eternal
recurrence. To that, Nietzsche simply puts it to you: “how much better disposed to yourself
would you have to become” to affirm the declaration of the demon? You don’t fail to satisfy the
NCCI on pains of practical irrationality, but instead on pains of practical self-hatred or
practical un-selfing.
It is at this point that I need to flag how crucial it is that we think of these two facets of
the minimal self as being two sides of the same coin, and neither analysis is possible without the
other. The fact that Nietzsche takes pains to evoke both in GS 341 alone is a testament to the
apparently strange details he decides to include in the passage. Not only is he asking you to
assess, on reflection, whether you could will eternal recurrence, Nietzsche has the reader situate
themselves in a mood of their “loneliest loneliness” against which their affective reaction to the
news of recurrence is measured.
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Df. Higher Morality (non-cognitive)49
you express joy (or an otherwise appropriate sense of approval) adequate to eternal
recurrence
Having the reader picture herself in her “loneliest loneliness” also hearkens back to the way Kant
sometimes has his reader picture the conditions under which the force of reason ought to have
more authority on one’s motivations than the force offered up by inclination. For instance, Kant
talks about someone who “has suicide in mind” asking himself “whether his action could subsist
together with the idea of humanity as an end in itself” (Ak G 4:429). This man apparently wants
to “destroy himself in order to flee from a burdensome condition” (ibid); however, Kant points
out that to act on that basis, the man would “make use of a person merely as a means, for the
preservation of a bearable condition up to the end of life” (ibid) and thereby concludes it would
be immoral for the man to act on a non-universalizable maxim. The difference in approach to
these scenarios, however, is that the person reading Nietzsche’s passage is actually present,
whereas in Kant’s, the person is only present inasmuch as they think all rational natures are
endowed with the same structure and obligation. With Schacht, if someone is going to internalize
the norms of higher morality, then they’re certainly affectively “on the scene” to do so.
There is less to say about the non-cognitive element—being well-disposed to yourself
and life ought to solicit joy or some appropriate affect in the context of the demon’s declaration.
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The feeling that you have willing value to yourself should be joy or some functional equivalent, if you
are passing the cognitive phase. I recognize that this puts Nietzsche’s position in contemporary
metaethical debate in a diminished position; that he doesn’t regard cognitivist interpretations of moral
discourse as necessarily truth-apt, such that his analysis of moral discourse could withstand intuitive
objections that your theory is flawed unless its semantic interpretation of its discrete elements could
answer to the Frege-Geach problem (See Miller on Blackburn’s Quasi-Realism (Miller 2011). Not only is
that an anachronistic problem for Nietzsche’s own thinking, as I model it here, but I would stagger to
guess he would be a willing participant in disrupting “intuitive” standards applying there that regulate
better or worse answers to philosophical questions.
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But it is no less important than the cognitive component, for your response conveys (or betrays)
the value you place on yourself. The response should be joy in order to satisfy both sides of the
NCI.
In both cases of the cognitive dimension and non-cognitive dimensions of NCI you are
starting with the raw matter of your assessment of and the value you place on your life. Can this
moral system I am developing here get by without doing what S1—S3 did to fail to survive
Nietzschean reflection—Nietzsche’s own criteria for rejecting some moral system?
Does it address itself to all, in the way the others do which I argued earlier in this chapter,
with Williams, constitute bluffing people who may not have already internalized the norms in
question in the context of their FOLs? No, it doesn’t. In fact, it only addresses itself to people
who are literate and capable of comprehending the meaning of the passage. It also only addresses
itself to people willing to “play the game,” people who inhabit the mood of loneliest loneliness at
the outset in order to orient their affects in the way requisite to conjure the whole person to the
reflective context. Finally, it only addresses itself to people who have had occasion to read the
passage. It doesn’t “bluff” anybody, even if the FOLs they inhabit require as a condition of
habitation having internalized norms that require fairly high degrees of self-denial. In other
words, people who haven’t read GS 341 or understood its textual context might hate themselves,
but Nietzsche’s thought can’t “gain possession over” anyone who hasn’t encountered it, however
better off they might end up as a result of interrogating it along with the value they place on their
lives.
Does it either “speak unconditionally” or “take itself as unconditional”? No on this front,
too. It does prescribe a life that’s better for people for whom slave morality and the psychology
of resentment is no good, but whether or not the norms it offers up to the reader for
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internalization, as Schacht already noted, will depend on normative factors outside the control of
the person reading the passage—norms they’ve already internalized in the forms of life they
inhabit may well force a rejection of the parameters of the thought experiment.
I don’t think Nietzsche is trying to accomplish the impossible task of taking any form of
life that the reader might bring to the text and override it with the force of his categorical
imperative. Norms of self-denial may be so thoroughly ingrained in a person’s cross-hatch of
drive and affect recruiting constitution that nervous laughter at the suicidal nihilism that would
follow the demon’s declaration, should that ever turn out to be the case, could ensue. I think on
this model of 341, here and elsewhere in the case of dissenters, Nietzsche doesn’t have any other
cognitive or non-cognitive resources to “shake the marbles loose” for someone genuinely in the
grip of the value of slave morality—those values may well have been internalized and culturally
scripted to the point that a person can’t see possible alternatives. A life of self-denial may be best
for that person.
Does it generalize where generalization is impermissible? I’ll collapse this question into
the question about whether it’s aperspectival. It generalizes where generalization is possible in
the case of people who “change as they are” from the reflective-affective encounter. I’ve already
alluded to the crucial scope modifying mechanism of internalization, but it explains endorsement
and rejection conditions present in a person’s sensibility as they approach GS 341. Someone
might inhabit a sensibility with values that make belief in God somewhat concrete, and not at all
revisable; hence, the force of the norms that the theory has to offer your agency, should you
inhabit this perspective, won’t resonate with extant values you have at all. The opportunity to
revise or expand on the basis of consistency, for instance, won’t even show up to you. The
phenomenologically ordinary operation of the affects will see the possibility of a genuinely finite
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existence, for instance—or the phenomenologically ordinary operation of the affects will take as
its object an after-lifeless reality as a given--will produce a default response of nonplussedness;
nonplussedness in the face of the object here can recruit the drive to maintain the plausibility of
an orientation-anchored belief system.50 In other words, neither can there be nor should there be
change.
Finally, as I have taken pains to indicate, Nietzsche designs and carefully caters the
presentation of his version of the categorical imperative to be as this worldly and as literal of an
encounter with an actual human animal reading GS 341 as he could. To bring not some abstract
capacity into contact with his thought and instead the whole minimal self of the reader is a
worldly move, doing his best at bringing into dialogue with his thinking who and what he thinks
you are or could be. The completely generally ordered source of naturalized Nietzschean
normative authority, then, starts and ends with the value the reader places on their own life—or,
the value they find themselves revising in so placing.

3.8 Conclusion: Is This A Good Moral Theory?
Nietzsche’s moral system isn’t an MPS, since it rejects versions of the properties that
made the others repugnant to a degree that motivated him to denounce their reality. His is a
system that still does generalize—the man published books. He certainly had hope that the
morality of GS 341 would appeal to people, and for good reason, that appeal would generally be
transformative. His “thoughts out of season” and “untimely meditations” I think were published
out of the hope that they would reach many eyes, that they would persuade people to be selves
and to give up on or revise the nihilistic values of the west of which Socrates was a first co-
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A cognitive aim of some Christians interested in theodicy.
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progenitor along with Christianity and Judaism—values that hold that life is no good and the self
is no good.
His concern for the integrity and possibility of people self-actualizing—especially, to
throw back to Leiter, when some real greatness in a person just serves to be grist for the mill of a
culturally scripted slave moral sensibility—was real, and motivated him to carefully and
meticulous publishing process. It is clear now how Nietzsche’s attack on moral values
presupposes some moral values—that our immoralism comes from moralism itself. Is it any
surprise Zarathustra explains why he “goes down” off the mountain ala Socrates with the simple
answer: “I love humankind” (Z P 2).
I want to close this chapter with a couple of thoughts about how well this alternate
version of “higher” morality fares when it is subject to standards I think Nietzsche must have
thought it could withstand. I cannot be comprehensive here—my goal has to present NCI as a
formal indicator of someone meeting a very thinly prescribed condition for autonomous action. I
have not been angling to generate much content51 for what someone’s life will look like should
they pass both cognitive and non-cognitive sides of the CI token. Nevertheless, a couple of
remarks are in order.
First, suppose someone has had a genuinely awful life owing nothing at all to being
trained to hate themselves in the tradition of Christianity and Kantianism, or to be alienated from
their own interests in Utilitarianism and science. That person might subscribe to the acceptance
constraints I detailed above in the form of full acceptance of the finitude of their existence as
well as rejecting God (accepting the “death of God”). Still, people who suffer traumatic
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I think Reginster (2006) has a promising account of the shape that action takes in that people will
resistances to goals and to overcome those resistances, but it still in the context of my argument points to
a mainly formal condition for a Nietzschean prescription in eternal recurrence.
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experiences who are for the rest of their lives triggered into reliving those experiences and who
may suffer general depression or anxiety as a result may very plausibly “fail.” Instead of biting
the bullet on calling this an opt-out on pains of self-hatred or self-denial, the analysis would
warrant a different direction. It might be a Leibnizian fantasy to expect that everyone for whom
the acceptance constraints pass muster both on reflection say “yes” to a practical identity they
could will into the future for all eternity as well as experience the feeling of joy or some
appropriate alternative. I think we regard these cases as cultural failures, or tragedies, but such as
to be motivated to publicly ameliorate some pressures some forms of life present to a person that
may make some of these lives irredeemably bad. Surely institutional racism and sexism can
contribute to this; so do forms of life in which one is a soldier and is a man and has their
sensibilities scripted and internalized such that they can’t escape being both masculine and
needing mental help. So I think taking care to make sure people have equal access to the
assessing the value of life, at least as an abstract socio-political starting-point, is an important
metric for any higher moral Nietzschean to adopt.
How well does Nietzsche’s system fare when it tackles more ordinary moral questions?
Consider the comment in D Nietzsche makes about his immoralism:
"It goes without saying that I do not deny—unless I am a fool—that many actions called
immoral ought to be avoided and resisted or that many actions called moral ought to be
done and encouraged—but I think the one should be encouraged and the other
avoided for other reasons than hitherto. We have to learn to think differently—in order,
at last, perhaps very late on, to attain even more—to feel differently" (D 103 emphasis
unchanged).

135

My account should be able to at least serve as a source of moral theorizing that, if on the success
of reflection, serves as the general naturalized source of normativity. If someone can pass both
cognitive and non-cognitive tests but live their life as a moral monster, higher morality isn’t a
really great way to be a source for grounding anything normative except the kind of thing
morality itself is there to address in the first place.
While I think this kind of moral thinking is adequate to supporting the “many” intuitive
actions we would prescribe as worthy of avoidance and worthy of pursuit (without which we
concede on pains of being fools), I think I can demonstrate the kind of thinking in one case that
would generalize to the many. Let’s close our current analysis by focusing on the pattern of
action habitual lying. When you habitually lie, you intentionally misrepresent a state of affairs,
not simply out of concern to persuade a person of the content of the lie—it is out of concern for
truth that liars lie, inasmuch as they want you not to know it.52 Ask a liar if he or she can will
their life’s eternal recurrence, and I think the answer must be no. The reason why this must be
the case is that the habitual liar doesn’t have a coherent practical conception of a life that they
could regard as theirs having lived looking back. When you think of giving half-truths, or
omissions, or embellishments, or full-on fabrications, as a property of the pattern of actions that
make up each action, can that really count as something imbued with any weight at all? I think
conceptually the habitual liar’s behavior doesn’t count as an action, so they can’t will its eternal
recurrence.
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Someone who is a bullshitter is concerned only with persuasion, as contrasted with the liar, who has an
active interest in truth. See Frankfurt (2005).
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CONCLUSION

I have been influenced by the spirit of analysis Williams brings to Anglo-speaking
philosophical ethics, but probably because like him I was first influenced by the thought that
made me pursue an academic study of philosophy in the first place—reading Nietzsche. I first
read The Genealogy of Morality as an undergraduate sophomore, which completely upended my
world. Nietzsche’s thought that the world of knowledge and morality is human, all too human
(which, if communicated as such in a formal piece of writing or informally or in conversation is
kind of an occasion for eye-rolling among readers of Nietzsche) was the first thought that made
sense to me philosophically. I confess however that after more than a decade of critically
engaging these texts, at the time of writing this conclusion to the dissertation, the following
assessment of reading and understanding Nietzsche is likely one of the very few, if any, sound
ones I have found that exists in print today:
With Nietzsche…the resistance to the continuation of philosophy by ordinary means is
built into the text, which is booby-trapped not only against recovering theory from it, but,
in many cases, against any systematic exegesis that assimilates to theory (Williams 1995
66).
As soon as one thinks they have a grasp on what Nietzsche is up to, and formulate a
contemporary model of a philosophical theory, you step in a “booby-trap.” As soon as you think
you have a paradigm into which Nietzsche’s thought could be assimilated and made clear and
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better intelligible, you’re stumbling on aphorisms in which you find Nietzsche saying that the
“will to a system is a lack of integrity” and that he also “mistrusts all systemizers” (TI I 26).
But at the same time, there are strands of consistency over time that motivate me to argue
what I have in this dissertation: that science can’t be the ordered as the general source of
normative authority because the truth required to structure agency m-naturalistically is denied in
substantive ways throughout his intellectual life, up to and included in the so-called “mature”
works. Nietzsche does have resources for motivating his critique of “morality of today” that
aren’t purely destructive. The order of completely general normative authority is sourced in the
value you place on life-- that there’s reason for finding joy in living a finite life whose purposes
are up to you to define and pursue. Or so I argued in Chapter 3. Those strands of consistency
emerge into something novel and interesting if we prick up our ears to how Nietzsche
intentionally addresses his reader with N/CCI. Nietzsche scholarship isn’t just tires spinning in
the mud, or to throw back to Williams’ picture, a bunch of us setting out on our own paths only
to inevitably be caught up on traps that are simply parts of the paths we all agreed we were
setting out upon when we first did.
Mud spinning happens too often, however, in the secondary lit. Too often is it the case
that Nietzsche scholars find a collection of passages that they take to support the model of
reading Nietzsche that aligns with a contemporary articulation of a meta- or normative-ethical
position or epistemological or metaphysical position. It doesn’t make sense to single anyone out
for doing this, since nearly everyone does (I have tried to avoid doing this in my research project
to stay as anchored to the textual context as I can)—but the kind of treatment Nietzsche gets
follows this playbook: (a) have a model built out of resources from contemporary metaethics—
say, non-cognitivism, and pick your favorite species from the literature; (b) you think Nietzsche

138

can be read on this model; (c) to argue this is the case, you might try to show some other
attributed view is limited in scope:
However, the explicitly error-theoretic claims in Nietzsche’s texts do tend to occur only
where morality in some narrow sense seems to be the topic. For non-moral evaluations,
we often get passages of the following form: “Whatever has value in our world does not
have value in itself, according to its nature—nature is always value-less, but has been
given value at some time, as a present—and it was we who gave and bestowed it” (GS
301).x
The footnotex that Hussain uses illustrates “quantitative support,” I’m calling it, by putting what
follows in the footnote on the passage citation in question: “See also HH 4; D 3; GS 115; BGE P
107; Z: 1 “On the Thousand and One Goals,” 1 “On the afterworldly”; WP 428. Cf. Z P 9, 1 “On
the flies of the Market Place”; WP 972.” None of the textual context is explicated, unpacked or
has its significance directly connected at what’s happening in his argument for reading Nietzsche
as a non-cognitivist; none of the thoroughgoing nuance that Nietzsche brings to the
communication of this thoughts is included. We are supposed to come on board with seeing
Nietzsche as a thoroughgoing metaethical non-cognitivist because of evidence like this.
I’m going to shift to a different example—a Nietzsche scholar assessing another
Nietzsche scholar’s work—to bring into the fore what’s wrong here. In Jessica Berry’s review
(2015) of Paul Katsafanas (2013), quantitative support is deployed with a bit more nuance, but
it’s used again as a tacit condition of adequacy for drawing conclusions about what Nietzsche
thinks, or is doing or is committed to, et al. I already referred to what I think at this point is a
substantively quixotic quest, in chapter 2 as trying to affix to Nietzsche genuine predicates of
thought, intent, and so forth. Here it’s against Katsafanas’ already scope-restricted argument
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about articulating a new form of constitutivism based on the will to power in Nietzsche’s
unpublished notebooks. Berry starts by reviewing Katsafanas’ aims of developing a Nietzschean
version of contemporary moral theory—it’s a theory that
…promises to meet all the stubborn challenges: to establish the epistemic respectability
of our moral beliefs; to naturalize them, making them harmonize better with our best
picture of the world; and to vindicate the source of their practical authority. (Berry 2014
648)
Despite the Nietzsche-independent exegetical virtues that Katsafanas already concedes53 must
account for any value his account must offer to normative ethical theory, Berry conjectures:
“Nietzsche’s willing complicity in this whole endeavor is doubtful” (ibid). Why? “Not
infrequently, Nietzsche sets psychology to work against philosophy itself. Some of his central
psychological insights trouble the philosophical concept of agency at its very core, raising crucial
questions about whether there are any “bare facts” from which the authority of normative claims
could arise” (ibid, my emphasis). Notice the tacit quantitative support argument: we can
demonstrate an instance of the vague concept of “frequency” to support the position that
Nietzsche is a moral skeptic.
A second argument emerges using quantitative support for the conclusion that Nietzsche
is a moral skeptic. On the self-knowledge required in “most accounts” of moral agency (Berry
649), Berry argues that agency must “require at least a modicum of self-knowledge” because
without self-knowledge, holding someone or something responsible to even a modicum of the
self-knowledge requirements of a moral system would be “wantonly cruel” (ibid). And evidence

53

In the introduction, he squarely addresses this issue and comes down hard on the side of presenting his
work not as one which tries to untangle Nietzsche, but one inspired by Nietzsche.
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of Nietzsche’s skepticism about whether people even have this modicum of self-knowledge
accrues thusly:
Everyone is farthest from himself,” he observes in The Gay Science, “every person who
is expert at scrutinizing the inner life of others knows this to his own chagrin; and the
saying “know thyself,” addressed to human beings by a god, is near to malicious” (see
also Friedrich Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morality, trans. Maudemarie Clark and Alan J.
Swensen, Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1998, Preface 1; and Daybreak trans. R. J.
Hollingdale, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, 115) (Berry 2015 650).
As long as we constrain our citation index to just those passages in which Nietzsche has decided
to attack some element of the western conceptual landscape in which he ruefully dwells—and
provided we index them so as to make the case appear open-and-shut against our interlocutor,
then Berry makes the case that Nietzsche’s a moral skeptic. And if he’s a moral skeptic, then he
wouldn’t have anything nice to say or interest to invest in whatever Katsafanas is up to.
“Nietzsche’s work is unlike the diligent, focused work of the problem-solver,” (ibid) she
claims. After all, she ponders...
in Nietzsche’s various images of himself at work I can find no evidence that he takes
philosophy to be primarily a problem-solving enterprise…Nietzsche’s work is instead the
slow but savage work of the glacier, whose frightful energy is “mainly destructive”...In
Daybreak he introduces himself as a curious and “solitary mole” who “tunnels and mines
and undermines” (D P 1)…in Ecce Homo he declares, under the heading, “Why I Am A
Destiny”: “I am no human being…I am dynamite…I am the first immoralist: which
makes me the destroyer par excellence.” (ibid)
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This counter-argument certainly makes it seem like Katsafanas hasn’t even read Nietzsche. I am
not going to sift through all of the textual contexts in which Berry really hammers it home that
Katsafanas’ “Nietzsche” is mistaken. But the evocative imagery of the “savage work of the
glacier” is worth parsing on its own terms. What is the textual context of the remark? It is in a
section of D called “Tokens of Higher and Lower Culture.” Here’s the full aphorism:
The Cyclops of culture.--When we behold those deeply-furrowed hollows in which
glaciers have lain, we think it hardly possible that a time will come when a wooded,
grassy valley, watered by streams, will spread itself upon the same spot. So it is, too, in
the history of mankind: the most savage forces beat a path, and are mainly destructive:
but their work was nonetheless necessary, in order that later a gentler civilization might
raise its house. The frightful energies—those which are called evil—are the cyclopean
architects and road-makers of humanity. (HH 246)
I find it curious in a yet-again textual context omission, that the “frightful energies” and
“savage forces” Nietzsche is talking about as responsible for “beating a path” do so as necessary
for a “gentler civilization to raise its house.” The glacier beats a path and leaves behind a
“deeply-furrowed hollow,” but we miss in Berry’s gloss that “a time will come when a wooded,
grassy valley, watered by streams, will spread itself on the same spot.” Is Nietzsche making
some kind of utilitarian observation that historically monstrous actions and people “beat a path”
toward an outcome that justifies the means? Probably not, especially with what we’ve seen from
Nietzsche about utilitarian theory. But the evidence Berry pulls from HH 246 to support the
conclusion that Nietzsche is a moral skeptic doesn’t transparently answer to the textual context.
Instead, it’s folded into another deployment of quantitative evidence for a conclusion that isn’t
supported either by the text itself or by reasons from the context to think that’s what he’s doing.
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Also note that Berry sets up a false dilemma: either Nietzsche’s philosophy is “primarily
problem solving” or it is anchored in “moral skepticism”—which is “largely destructive,”
“immoral” and “undermining.” He certainly does both; not to be confused as an argument from
quantity I’ve just argued usually unhelpfully eschews the complexity and nuance of the textual
context in which they reside, but as I’ve shown in this dissertation Nietzsche both relentlessly
attacks MPS (“War to the death against vice: the vice is Christianity” (AC, Law Against
Christianity) and called for the possibility of a higher morality in which people will their own
categorical imperative. Leiter, too has an affinity for false dilemmas: chapter one of Leiter
(2002) is called “Nietzsche, Naturalist or Postmodernist?” The naturalists are, as I reviewed mnaturalists, and reject notions such as Schacht’s “Form of Life” on the grounds that it would do
too much to essentialize the concept of “human nature,” which is not in the spirit of the methods
of science to claim. I argued in this dissertation that Schacht’s account of Nietzschean naturalism
sits fully consistent with Nietzsche’s attitude about the way culture shapes our sensibilities and
the forms of life we internalize.
I confess I am somewhat puzzled at the animosity that Leiter and others have toward
alternate readings of Nietzsche when the source material is rich and inviting of considered
judgments about the significance of its content. In Chapter two, I concluded by cautioning
against Leiter’s negative charity—that if the textual and interpretive pedigree of some account
saddles Nietzsche with some kind of anti-scientific “crackpot” metaphysics, then “so much the
worse” for the man, Friedrich Nietzsche. The spirit of this interpretation comes from what I’d
characterize as Clark’s positive charity. Early in Clark (1990), she spells out her hermeneutics:
Reasonable interpretation clearly demands that we attribute to a text the best position
compatible with the relevant evidence about its meaning. But only what the interpreter
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takes to be true or reasonable can function as the standard for the best position. Appeal to
the interpreter’s own standards will be necessary not only when there are two equally
plausible interpretations of a given text, but also for the purpose of selecting which texts
to interpret or consider as evidence. (Clark 1990 29—30)
This is at least an honest approach to the text, and I think it is also as a result interesting—Clark
seldom deploys quantitative evidence in her reading of Nietzsche, and instead prefers sustained
engagement with and interrogation of discrete textual contexts. The result of this kind of
engagement is the developmental hypothesis. I don’t think the late works are organized in the
same way Clark does, and I’ve argued there have good reasons for thinking that. Even though I
don’t think it ultimately tracks Nietzsche’s development out of juvenilia into a period of
maturity, it is interesting and plausible and is above all the result of careful and honest reading.
Of course, the “charity” that Clark has in mind here runs a very real risk of completely
distorting the source material, or at least of paring it down so that the parts of it that remain are
just the parts that are commensurate with beliefs the interpreter already holds.54 In fact, as
Hussain (2013) and Janaway (2018) have pointed out, this has led to what the former has
described as a kind of proxy war in Nietzsche’s texts between commentators who have differing
intuitions about philosophical issues:
It is hard not to have the feeling that in the face of this lack of resistance by the texts, we
are seeing regular deployments of what I would call the “principle of hypercharity”: if p,

One unfortunate instance of this is Clark’s finding “disquotational” views of truth intuitively plausible,
and so she attributes the position to Nietzsche. Tarski’s T convention governs his analysis of quotational
sentences, such as “the cat is on the mat” if and only if the cat is on the mat. That sentence is true just in
case, “disquoting” the left side of the biconditional doesn’t change the truth value of the sentence.
Convention T is simply a semantic interpretation of this sentence; isn’t a theory that ranges over the
empirical adequacy of any of the content for truth conventions governing quotational sentences, though. It
follows that modeling your interpretation such that Nietzsche holds this view and not others is necessarily
wrong.
54
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then Nietzsche believes that p. There comes a point where one should simply argue for
the philosophical positions themselves, rather than engage in proxy wars by using
historical figures. (Hussain 2013 279)
Janaway (2018) has noticed a considerable proliferation of frames of hyper-charity over the
recent years:
“If not-p, then Nietzsche does not believe that p”; “If recent empirical evidence suggests
that not-p, then Nietzsche does not believe that p”; “If p is implausible (to us), then
Nietzsche does not believe that p”; “If p is more interesting (to us) than q, then Nietzsche
believes that p” (Janaway 2018 241).
These all resemble approaches to a metaethics of Nietzsche that I’ve been unconvinced by. Too
often an omission is made, quantitative evidence is deployed, anachronistic contemporary
models are projected back on the late 19th century, on another language, into another place with
different sensibilities, forms of life. That doesn’t mean that we couldn’t ever hope to understand
Nietzsche, but if your response is one like Leiter’s in which he’s prepared to say “so much the
worse for Nietzsche,” Nietzsche seems to be “getting in his way” as Janaway (2018) puts it.
One might well wonder how I think I could then get away with talking about general
sources of normative authority. It is true that the term “normativity” in philosophy has really
come in vogue in the past thirty or so years, so am I guilty of anachronistic backward-projection?
To some extent that’s inevitable, given the point just made about interpretation. But I don’t think
I’m couching Nietzsche’s thinking in ways that are fundamentally foreign to him. “General
normative authority,” as I’ve been using it, has over the course of this dissertation referred to
some entity or process being capable of providing legitimate justification to some aspect of one’s
sensibility. And the only legitimate justification one can provide for valuing one’s self and life is
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looking to the person interrogating those values and to ask them what the verdict is. No one else
can do that but you. I think Nietzsche is familiar with non-entities fraudulently endowed with
justificatory power (e.g. God) and processes that try to take that role over for you; in so doing,
for Nietzsche, those entities and processes will smack of herd morality and the leveling down of
all people to being fundamentally similar (e.g. reason, democracy).
I also think, with Williams, that Nietzsche is absolutely committed to not continuing to
doing philosophy as it had been done prior to his writing. I think contradiction in TI is strong
evidence to posit orders of normativity—there is a domain that Nietzsche has the upper hand
over Kantian armchair metaphysics, and that domain is empirical inquiry. And yet, I’ve argued
that there are passages in which, in sequence, Nietzsche intentionally contradicts a theoretical
claim he has just advanced in the literal prior passage with causation. Science can answer some
questions, and it ought to and legitimately justifies those appropriate to its domain; but there are
more fundamental questions Nietzsche wants you to think about, and it is from those deeper
orders of normativity that we find the general source.
I want to turn back to where we started, with TL. I think, having argued that the right way
to read Nietzsche is to regard his normative commitments as ordered—that instead of landing on
“Nietzsche’s normativity,” we have instead landed on Nietzsche’s normativities—there is more
than one source of normativity, but they don’t have the same order of importance. With the
ordering of Nietzschean normativity, I think I am able to provide a solution to the scope problem.
TLa. Earth occupies a “remote corner of the universe” amongst “innumerable solar
systems” rather than at its center;
TLb. Knowledge is a human invention, opposed to a discovery or a revelation
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TLc. The significance of knowledge and its inventors has been falsely inflated in
discussions about the place of humanity in the context of history
TLd. Humans, despite claims to the contrary, are mortal
We can now revise the scope problem to include developments in the dissertation that
have changed our working conception of it. We saw that Nietzsche denies truth in TL, but
attaches an order of general normative authority to it in his later works, with the caveat that the
most important questions we put to ourselves to answer aren’t empirical questions that lead to
theoretical knowledge but instead are questions we put to ourselves in an honest interrogation of
the value we place on our selves and life. So Nietzsche can accept TLa and TLd as
uncontroversial empirical claims. That is a resource at his disposal.
Nietzsche can also accept TLa and TLd on the grounds required by the acceptance
constraints to eternal recurrence that I laid out at the end of chapter 3. God has ceased to be
believable—that makes the human condition one in which we don’t reside in a special domain
created for out of love by an omnibenevolent and omnipotent creator. Atheist argumentation
should have put the issue to rest long ago, or atheist objections to Christian argument should
have done the trick as well--but as Nietzsche says, offering up arguments to that conclusion just
invites scrutiny that maybe better arguments for the Christian just haven’t been devised yet:
In former times, one sought to prove that there is no God—today one indicates how the
belief that there is a God could arise and how this belief acquired its weight and
importance: a counter-proof that there is no God thereby becomes superfluous.—When in
former times one had refuted the “proofs of the existence of God” put forward, there
always remained the doubt whether better proofs might not be adduced than those just
refuted: in those days atheists did not know how to make a clean sweep. (D 95)
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A genealogy, an assertion of the lack of believability the concept it has these days given our
ability to understand the phenomenon of Christianity using the modern tools of interpretation of
archaeology, cross-cultural anthropology history, or a declaration of a “madaman” may better
accomplish those ends. So TLa, the refutation of theological astronomy Copernicus failed to put
to rest, is covered by our new resource-enhanced perspective. Without an immortal soul, we’re
condemned to mortality on this floating rock.
TLb we can accept because it falls under a conception of scientific knowledge as socially
constructed in the processes outlines in my reading of the Copernicus passages—theoretical
terms are defined by the internal relations they stand in to other theoretical terms. Those terms
are themselves created and then imposed on the empirical world. Along with this insight, the fact
of knowledge being socially constructed might surprise people who place value on science
instead of religion to instead lead the charge in answering fundamental questions about the
meaning of life; but the most central one is the one you figure by reflecting on the value you
place on your life.
Just like this early work, I see the source of general normative authority in the value you
place on your life. TLb and TLc are fire-escapes for someone searching for a footing in the
value-supplying externality. He’s focusing you to look inward. I just explicated how TLa and
TLd are acceptance conditions for buy-in to the values laden in the FOL Nietzsche hopes to
inspire you to take on. And the “late” works I still see as engaged in a project not only to mine,
undermine and to destroy confidence in some of the descriptive elements in an MPS that permit
you access to that fire-escape to a firmer footing in a value-supplying externality; There I see
sustained effort at articulating a higher morality that differs from the other MPSs but still
participates in the spirit out from morality! to invite, to recommend, value to your self and life,
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and if you can’t live up to the invitation, you’ll simply admit you can’t on some form of selfhatred; There I see Nietzsche imbuing your ability to assess all of your drives and affects sub
specie your loneliest loneliness weather system as the place from which the most important
moral question gets its first answer, where autonomy begins; I see Nietzsche imbuing the process
of the interplay of your capacity to reflect on the value of your life and the reception of your
affects in eternal recurrence, with your answer to the question supplying you with the general
source of normativity.
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